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Abstract 
The major determinant of the performance of financial markets is the nature of the 
information available, both in terms of the overall quality of the information held by 
investors, and the distribution of information amongst investors. The nature of this 
issue makes it difficult to model realistically. This thesis marks an attempt to gain 
insights to the behaviour of securities markets by investigating the consequences of 
relaxing, in a realistic way, some of the restrictions on information in existing models. 
The core of the thesis consists of formal models of the stock market. The first of these 
is a development of the information aggregation literature, and in particular the model 
of Hellwig (1980). It looks at the ability of prices to aggregate information that is 
dispersed among agents who specialise in acquiring information about particular 
components of the factors that determine the future stock value. We find that 
narrowing the extent of specialisation beyond a certain point will inevitably lead to a 
reduction in the informativeness of the market price. 
The second model is also a development of the information aggregation literature, and 
looks at the implications of investors obtaining private information about the extent of 
liquidity trading. We find that such a framework gives rise to the possibility of 
multiple equilibria and price 'crashes. ' The third model is an extension of the second 
in which the acquisition of information is made endogenous, and shows that the main 
results of that model are retained. It also shows up the dominance of the cost of 
information about value, rather than about liquidity trading, in determining the overall 
informativeness of the price. 
After investigating the possible consequences of, and providing evidence for, the 
existence of positive feedback trading we investigate the behaviour of a market in 
which investors exhibiting such behaviour are combined with investors who trade on 
the basis of value in a form as in De Long, Shleifer, Summers & Waldmann (1989, 
1990a). We then apply results from Hart (1977) to determine the conditions under 
which manipulation can be possible. A number of model characteristics are shown to 
be possible depending on the specific form of the feedback trading. We finish by 
adding shocks to the system, as in De Long et. al., and look at the effect of both 
competitive and monopolistic speculation. We find that competitive speculation may 
be more destabilising than monopolistic speculation, and that positive feedback 
trading is more destabilising when it acts after a delay. 
xi 




Models of the stock market often contain assumptions about the information held by 
the investing agents that are so restrictive that they are unable to reflect certain aspects 
of the behaviour of real-world markets, such as crashes. The work contained within 
this thesis attempts to revise infon-national assumptions in a realistic way, in order to 
obtain richer results. Revisions in the informational assumptions can take place in two 
directions: firstly, in the direction of attempting to reflect the high degree of 
uncertainty about the future; and secondly, in the direction of better reflecting the 
informational asymmetries between investors. The latter may best be served by 
relaxing the strong informational assumptions implied by full rational expectations. 
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In this chapter, after briefly looking at the role of formal models in the understanding 
of reality, we look at ways in which models can be constructed, basing this on the 
development of the literature. We look at the implications for modelling of the 
assumption of rational expectations, and the ways in which particular streams of the 
literature, such as those focusing on market microstructure and information 
aggregation, have developed. We look at issues such as: the importance of the 
assumptions of common priors and common knowledge; the possibility of 'sunspots' 
and 'bubbles'; the way in which infonnation is acquired and supplied; the 
implications of the presence of liquidity traders; and the implications of the presence 
of investors who are not 'rational' in the sense in which this term is used in the 
rational expectations literature. At the appropriate points within this chapter, outlines 
of the work in the remainder of this thesis will be given, in order to highlight the 
points of departure from the existing literature. 
The remainder of the thesis follows a similar path to this introductory chapter, with 
the initial adherence to rational expectations principles being relaxed as the thesis 
progresses. The models contained within chapters two, three and four are (noisy) 
rational expectations models of the information aggregation school: in chapter two we 
relax the assumption that investors receive information about the full liquidation value 
by endowing them with partial information only, and investigate the ability of the 
price to aggregate such 'specialised' pieces of information; in chapter three we allow 
the investors to receive information about the amount of liquidity trading taking place, 
and thus look at a situation in which prices aggregate two types of information; and in 
chapter four we allow the acquisition of information in chapter three to become 
2 
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endogenous. From chapter five onwards we begin to look at the effect on market 
prices of the existence of investor demand that fluctuates predictably through time or 
with price changes. In chapter six we argue the case for the existence of some 
investors whose stock demand is positively related to price changes; in chapter seven 
we look at the price behaviour and the potential for stock market manipulation in the 
presence of such investors; and in chapter eight, in the light of this, we investigate the 
potential for competitive speculation to be destabilising. 
1.2 The rhetoric of financial modelling 
The appropriate method for research depends on the nature of the issues to be 
investigated, and the environment in which the research takes place. Perlman (1978) 
made the point that: 
"The essential methodological question is what does it take to convince 
oneself or others of the validity of an idea? Or, to put it otherwise, what 
system of proof works -a model, empirical evidence, moral revelation, or 
what? " (p. 582). 
We believe that the issues addressed in this thesis are ones that the construction of 
formal models can illuminate, and we have attempted to provide such models that can 
persuade the reader that the results produced can contribute to our understanding of 
how markets operate. 
3 
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All models in economics and finance must involve some degree of abstraction from 
reality in the form of simplifying assumptions. Since our aim is to produce models 
that exhibit certain aspects of real-world behaviour, the ideal way to assess the 
acceptability of a model is to compare its results to reality. Unfortunately, the reason 
we need to construct models is that we do not have a perfect understanding of reality, 
and so the assessment of models cannot be perfect: often we know certain stylised 
facts, which determine certain minimum requirements for model performance, but 
beyond this any assessment becomes subjective. Just as with predicting the future, as 
we argue below, the paucity of true information prevents a fully objective assessment 
of competing models. The necessity of subjective assessment implies that the same 
'hard' facts can be interpreted differently by different people, and that the generally- 
accepted interpretation will depend on the prevailing enviromnent. 
This reliance on subjectivity in assessing the acceptability of a model inevitably leads 
to an important role for rhetoric in the process of persuasion. I In fact, every argument 
put forward to promote a theory can be labelled as rhetoric, be it data analysis, model- 
building, or an accompanying 'story. ' In order to be persuasive, models need all three 
of these types of rhetoric to some degree, even if the data analysis component is 
simply that the results produced are not demonstrably incompatible with observed 
market behaviour. 
In constructing models built on pure theory we must therefore continually bear in 
mind their rhetorical context, and so our task is arguably: 
1 See McCloskey (1986) for a good discussion of this issue. 
4 
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"to invent marvels [in the sense of stories that clearly violate the laws of 
nature] that have a point, the way Animal Farm has a point. The plots and 
characters of pure theory have the same relation to truth as those in Gulliver's 
Travels or Midsummer Night's Dream. Pure theory confronts reality by 
disputing whether this or that assumption drives the results, and whether the 
assumption is realistic" (McCloskey, 1992, pp 3 0-3 1). 
The astute reader will recognise that this introduction is itself part of the overall 
rhetoric of the thesis: and the success of the thesis will be judged by whether or not 
the combination of its rhetorical components serves to persuade its initial readers that 
it merits the award of a Doctor of Philosophy degree. 
1.3 Modelling markets and investors 
1.3.1 Key assumptions 
When considering the most appropriate way to model the stock market, the prime 
considerations must be the structure of the market and the nature of the information 
held by the agents. We can assume that the market consists of investors alone or with 
a Walrasian auctioneer, or, as in a more recent development of the literature, that a 
specialist sets prices in an attempt to break even; we can assume that speculators act 
competitively or monopolistically or somewhere in-between; and we can assume that 
all the agents have full knowledge of the structure of the market, in terms of the 
preferences of the other investors and the quality of their information, or that some (or 
all) are not so informed. 
5 
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If we assume that each agent uses the full extent of her knowledge to form beliefs and 
optimise her behaviour, and constantly updates these beliefs as new information 
becomes available, we are making the assumption of 'rational expectations' (R. E. ) in 
the sense used in the literature, and first described by Muth (1961). It is possible, 
however, to make a wide variety of different specific assumptions, while remaining 
under the rational expectations umbrella. 
Two of the key assumptions that determine the performance of R. E. -based asset 
pricing models concern the prior beliefs held by the investors about the underlying 
structure of the world, and the extent to which these are common knowledge arnongst 
investors. The prior beliefs held by investors about the state of the, world could relate, 
in specific models, to beliefs about the particular distribution from which a future 
payoff is taken. Common knowledge, in rough terms, is that knowledge known by all 
investors to be commonly shared by them all. More specifically: 
"Two people, 1 and 2, are said to have common knowledge of an event E if 
both know it, I knows that 2 knows it, 2 knows that I knows it, I knows that 2 
knows that I knows it, and so on7'(Aurnann, 1976, p. 1236). 
Relevant common knowledge relates to the structure of the system in which the agents 
are operating, in terms of specifics such as the number of agents, their utility functions 
and risk aversion, prior beliefs and the precision of their information. It is standard 
practice in asset pricing models to assume that agents have common priors - although 
they may subsequently receive private information that causes their posterior 
expectations to diverge - and that a large part of the structure of the market is common 
knowledge. 
6 
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1.3.2 The implications of common priors and common knowledge 
Aumann (1976) showed that if two people have the same prior beliefs, and their 
posterior beliefs are common knowledge, then these posterior beliefs must be the 
same. This ensures that with identical prior beliefs agents cannot agree to disagree. 
Sebenius & Geanakoplos (1983) showed that this implies that two agents with 
common priors will not be able to agree on a bet that is acceptable to both parties if a 
dialogue takes place between them, since the dialogue will reveal the posteriors, 
which will converge. Milgrom & Stokey (1982) showed likewise that when investors 
have common prior beliefs, differences in information will not motivate trading 
activity in a situation where it is common knowledge that the other agents are acting 
rationally in offering the trade, and where the initial asset allocation is Pareto optimal 
with respect to the prior beliefs. The importance of the assumption that the initial 
allocation is Pareto optimal is that in such a situation there can be no motive for 
trading other than betting - or speculating - on differences of opinion. These results 
indicate that asymmetric information, rather than leading to trade between agents, is 
likely to stifle it. 
In order for agents with common priors to be willing to trade in the presence of 
asymmetric information, it must not be common knowledge that there are no overall 
gains ftom trade. Asymmetric information itself does not create such gains, which is 
why agents are not willing to trade in the Milgrom & Stokey framework. Gains from 
trade can result from a desire for portfolio rebalancing due to aversion to risk or 
preferences regarding immediate rather than delayed consumption. Risk aversion may 
provide insurance motives for trade, make risk-sharing beneficial, or lead to desired 
7 
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portfolio revision as a result of new information if the initial allocation was not Pareto 
efficient. Rational investors will therefore be willing to trade either when they have 
reasons to trade that make up for the possible losses from trading with better-informed 
investors; or when there is a possibility of trading with other investors who are either 
less-informed or who are trading for insurance or liquidity motives. 
1.3.3 Sunspots and bubbles 
There has been much investigation into the consequences of common priors and 
common knowledge about beliefs for the possibility of 'sunspots' and 'bubbles' in a 
market with rational investors. 
'Sunspots' are events that affect prices even though informed investors know they 
have no implications for value. The origin of the application of the sunspot 
terminology to the asset-pricing literature follows the work of Stanley Jevons (W. S. 
Jevons, 1909) who claimed to have discovered a relationship between real-life 
sunspots and the business-cycle. Although real sunspots could theoretically have 
influenced the economy through their effect on agricultural activity, the asset-pricing 
literature has come to use the term sunspot to refer to events which are observable, but 
for which there is no theoretical connection with economic activity. 'Bubbles' are 
generally regarded as scenarios where the price increases rapidly above its 'true' value 
however defined, before suddenly crashing as the bubble bursts. 
A simple backward induction argument shows that investor rationality will prevent 
the price of an asset from exceeding its fundamental value when investors' beliefs are 
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common knowledge (Tirole, 1989). However, Allen, Morris & Postlewaite (1993) 
have shown that when short sales are restricted and investors have private 
information, implying that beliefs are not common knowledge, investors may be 
willing to purchase stock in the belief that they will be able to pass it on to others 
before the bubble bursts. 
Tirole (1982) showed that bubbles will not occur in a market for an infinitely-lived 
asset in which there are a finite number of rational investors with common priors, 
unless there is a source of gains from trade. This is because investors will be unwilling 
to pay more for the asset than they would if forced to hold it forever, since they know 
that if a seller does not re-enter the market the remaining traders must share a loss. 
This again relies on the common knowledge of beliefs, but this itself is not enough: 
Bhattacharyya & Lipman (1995) showed that bubbles can still exist in a market with 
an infinitely-lived asset, and a finite number of rational investors, in which the 
fundamental asset value is common knowledge, provided that the initial wealth of 
each investor is not common knowledge. 
The overlapping generations framework first formulated by Samuelson (1958) allows 
a situation to be modelled in which there is a continual influx of new investors. It has 
often been shown in this framework that sunspots and bubbles can exist in such an 
environment when investors have common priors and all relevant variables are 
common knowledge (see, for example Azariadis (1981), Cass & Shell (1983), Tirole 
(1985), Jackson & Peck (1991)). A general requirement is that the growth rate of the 
economy exceeds the interest rate in a bubbleless situation (Tirole, 1989). Investors 
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trade as there are gains that result from the different preferences regarding immediate 
and delayed consumption of the investors in the different age-groups. The standard 
use of two periods to represent investors' life-spans, combined with the growth 
requirement, detracts somewhat from the conclusions, but nevertheless this approach 
does highlight a plausible consideration, which is that the relationship between the 
time-horizon of investors and the expected duration of price patterns may be 
important. 
The above indicates the importance of assumptions about common knowledge, priors, 
and gains from trade. It also shows that, even without the existence of ill-infon-ned 
investors (in a non-rational sense) bubbles and sunspots are not ruled out. It is 
therefore likely that bubbles and sunspots are possible when ill-informed investors are 
present. Indeed, when there are non-rational investors present, even the simple 
backward-induction argument, and the common priors and common knowledge 
argument of Tirole (1982) break down. Unfortunately, the above does not indicate 
much about the effect of the interaction of informed and ill-informed investors, and 
cannot tell us the effect of the presence of the rational investors, since these are the 
only investors present, and prices in their absence are undefined. We investigate these 
issues later in the thesis. 
10 
Alternative models ofsecurity price equilibrium / Chapter I R. A. Courtenay 
1.4 Model types 
In this section we begin by dissecting two types of rational-expectations-based stock 
market models in the literature - information aggregation models and market 
microstructure models - and highlighting the roles of the underlying assumptions in 
facilitating the isolation of equilibrium prices. We then go on to look at the 
assumptions made about future payoffs, information about the extent of liquidity 
trading, and the acquisition and supply of information. Along the way we discuss the 
models found in chapters two, three and four. 
1.4.1 Information aggregation models 
The information aggregation literature was founded by Grossman (1976) to show how 
prices could come to reflect private pieces of information when investors attempt to 
use the price to learn about the private information of others. The idea of agents using 
endogenous variables to learn about exogenous ones had previously been developed 
by Lucas (1972). Equilibrium prices in information aggregation models are 
determined by a Walrasian auctioneer who equates the demand for and supply of 
stock. 
Grossman's model contains one riskless and one risky asset, both of which make their 
only payouts one period later. Each investor is endowed with a piece of information 
revealing the payoff to the risky asset in the following period with a certain degree of 
noise. The noise in the information of each investor is assumed to be independent of 
11 
Alternative models ofsecurityprice equilibrium I Chapter I R. A. Courtenay 
the noise for all other investors, and so the 'average' value of the individual signals 
accurately reflects the expected value of the payout for large nur I nbers of investors. 
The supply of stock is fixed and positive, which ensures that there are gains from 
trade, since the two possible scenarios are that: either other investors currently own 
the stock and wish to liquidate at any price; or the investors are endowed with stock, 
and their risk aversion produces a desire for portfolio rebalancing. The investors' 
utility functions and coefficients of risk aversion, the stock supply, the relationship 
between the exogenous variables and the price, and the distribution from which the 
payoff is drawn are all common knowledge. It follows from this that agents have 
common priors. Since the price contains information about the payoff, it is determined 
simultaneously with investors' individual stock demands. Grossman showed that the 
model equilibrium tends towards full revelation of the asset payoff, ensuring that the 
private information becomes redundant. This, however, cannot be a legitimate 
equilibrium, since if investors fail to take their private information into account the 
price cannot reflect it. If prices do not fully reflect the private information, investors 
will benefit from using it, which will lead back towards full revelation. ' There is 
therefore no equilibrium in which investors use their information, and no equilibrium 
where they do not. 
Grossman's model shows that gains from trade are not enough to guarantee an 
equilibrium in an asset pricing model. Grossman pointed out that adding a source of 
extrinsic uncertainty to the model would allow the problem of full revelation of 
information through the price to be overcome, and suggested that this could be done 
by adding uncertainty about the supply of stock. Diamond & Verrecchia (1981) 
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produced a model that introduced such extrinsic uncertainty. In their model each agent 
is endowed with stock, and the total stock supply is the sum of all the endowments. 
The stock endowment of each agent is taken from a known distribution, and agents 
cannot observe endowments other than their own. These assumptions ensure that each 
agent has some information about the total stock supply, derived from their priors and 
their own endowment, but they do not know its precise level. This in turn ensures that 
prices are only partially-revealing in equilibrium, since the investors are unable to 
disentangle the price effects of the private signals and the stock supply. One problem 
with this approach is that as the number of investors becomes large, the supply noise 
disappears, and the prices tend towards full revelation. In addition, the fact that 
individual endowments give investors some information about the stock supply makes 
the model slightly less tractable than the alternative Hellwig (1980) formulation, 
which explicitly includes noise traders and is discussed below. 
It is possible to adapt the stock endowment assumption to ensure that uncertainty in 
the stock supply remains as the number of investors becomes large. This is the 
approach taken by Verrecchia (1982), a model we will become more familiar with 
subsequently. Making this assumption, however, produces results identical to those 
obtained by including noise traders, and retains disadvantages in terms of tractability. 
The inclusion of noise in supply can therefore be justified either on the grounds of 
endowment uncertainty or liquidity trading. The liquidity trading assumption is 
arguably the more realistic. 
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Hellwig (1980) was the first to explicitly add liquidity trading to a model of 
information aggregation. Under his formulation, subsequently adopted by the major 
part of the literature, the extent of liquidity trading is assumed to be drawn from a 
(known) normal distribution. Once again, since the effects of the supply outcome and 
the private infonnation cannot be disentangled by the investors, the prices are only 
partially revealing, and private information is not completely dominated by the 
information contained within the price. 
The behaviour of the agents and prices in information aggregation models has been 
replicated experimentally by Sunder (1992). Huberman & Schwert (1985) found 
evidence supporting noisy rational expectations equilibria for the Israeli bond market. 
Hellwig (1982) suggests that the root cause of the lack of equilibrium in Grossman 
(1976) (and other features of information aggregation models) is the simultaneous 
determination of price and demand. Hellwig develops a dynamic example in which 
agents base their demand on past prices, and shows that, for short gaps between 
periods, the returns to becoming informed can be bounded above zero even when 
prices approach full-revelation arbitrarily closely. 
1.4.2 Market microstructure models 
In market microstructure models, trading centres around a relatively ill-informed 
specialist who is assumed to aim to break even by setting 'fair' prices. In such a 
setting the need to incorporate gains from trade is a central issue, as the specialist is 
involved in each trade, and has no portfolio rebalancing motives for trading, and so 
will only trade if at least some of the other investors have reasons to trade other than 
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the exploitation of private information. To this end, it is generally assumed, as in the 
seminal works of Glosten & Milgrorn (1985) and Kyle (1985) that some trades occur 
as a result of liquidity considerations, and that these are equally likely to be sales or 
purchases. The trades of the informed traders are also equally likely to be sales or 
purchases, which ensures that there is a strong symmetry in the trading process. The 
specialist is unable to observe the trading of the liquidity traders. 
In Glosten & Milgrom (1985), the specialist sets bid and ask prices on the basis of the 
expected value of the stock if the next trader is a seller or a buyer. The specialist 
trades only one stock at a time, and takes account of the possible information 
contained within the trade when setting the bid-ask spread. The trades of the ill- 
informed investors provide 'noise' that prevent the specialist from discerning the 
information of the informed trader, and allows the informed traders to profit at the 
expense of the others. 2 It can be shown that in this framework uninfon-ned traders 
cannot profit from manipulating prices purely on the basis of trading strategies, even 
though the specialist will not know whether or not their trading partner at any given 
time is acting on information. 
In Kyle (1985) the traders can submit demands of any quantity to the specialist, who 
sets a price after observing the combined demand of the informed and liquidity 
traders. Unlike Glosten & Milgrom, Kyle allows for continuous trading, under which 
the incremental stock demand of the liquidity traders is assumed to follow Brownian 
2 Note that, strictly speaking, the others do not lose out in trading; it is just that the informed traders are 
able to commandeer the lion's share of the overall gains from trade resulting from the divergent 
preferences. 
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motion. This allows us to gain insights about into how information comes to be 
incorporated into prices over time. Kyle termed the liquidity traders 'noise' traders, 
due to the noise their demand adds to the aggregate demand signal received by the 
specialist. 
The noise traders in market microstructure models therefore tend to play two roles: 
they provide gains from trade, ensuring trading can take place; and they also add noise 
to the information set of the rational investors, as they also do in information 
aggregation models, ensuring that the information of the informed investors is not 
fully revealed. 
1.4.3 Focus on information about payoffs 
In both the, market microstructure and information aggregation literature we have 
examined so far, the private information is -generally a noisy observation of a single 
future liquidating payoff. In reality, of course, observations must relate to the 
underlying determinants of the future price, rather than the future price itself, and 
these observations must be 'converted' into a value estimate. One such conversion 
process is provided by the linear factor model that underlies the arbitrage pricing 
theory (A. P. T. ) formulated by Ross (1976). Under the A. P. T., the return on an asset is 
the sum of a constant term, an asset-specific term, and terms consisting of each factor 
multiplied by a coefficient representing the sensitivity of the asset to the factor. Handa 
& Linn (1991) use the n-asset framework of Admati (1985), which is an extension of 
Hellwig (1980), to show how the A. P. T. can be set in an information aggregation 
framework. 
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Handa & Linn did not investigate the effect on the ability of prices to aggregate 
information of investors specialising in acquiring information about one factor only. 
In chapter two we use a single-asset model based on Hellwig (1980) to investigate 
this issue. Although not capturing the difficulty in producing a value estimate from 
raw data not specifically relating to the payoff itself, this forniulation does allow us to 
assess the ability of the price to aggregate information in a broader sense than has 
been attempted previously. We show that the potential for specialisation in 
information acquisition to improve the efficiency with which prices aggregate 
information is strictly limited. 
1.4.4 Information about liquidity trading 
Up to this point we have assumed that the liquidity trading is unpredictable and 
unobservable. It is likely, however, that the root causes of the liquidity requirements 
can be observed to some degree, and so investors will have information about the 
actual net amount of liquidity trades. Prices in this situation would have to aggregate 
information about two independent variables: the payoff, and the liquidity demand. In 
chapter three we construct a model in which the investors receive private 
information about the supply in the same form as their private information about the 
payoff. Since the investors have some private information about the stock supply that 
tells them something about the total supply, this model has some similarities with 
Diamond & Verrecchia (1981): but, unlike that model, the supply uncertainty remains, 
and private information about the supply retains some value, when the number of 
investors becomes large. We demonstrate that this may lead to multiple equilibria, 
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with each possible equilibrium representing a different way in which the information 
can be aggregated, and corresponding discontinuities in the price function. 
1.4.5 Information acquisition 
So far the models we have examined have not dealt explicitly with the process by 
which the investors obtain their information, but have instead taken the quality of each 
investor's private information as given. Since, however, the equilibrium price function 
determines the value of information, the quality of information should be treated as 
endogenous. 
Grossman & Stiglitz (1980) looked at the situation in which agents can choose to 
purchase a given infonnation signal at a given cost. Since the signal is identical for all 
who acquire it, this is not a model of information aggregation. Supply uncertainty 
once again prevents the information from being fully revealed in the price. Grossman 
& Stiglitz show that in equilibrium the number of investors choosing to observe the 
information signal is such that the benefits of doing so will exactly offset the cost. 
They also show that the informativeness of market prices is bounded away from zero, 
even as the noise in supply becomes small, which contrasts with the results of Hellwig 
(1982) we revealed earlier (sub-section 1.4.1). 
Verrecchia (1982) looks at the issue of information acquisition in the information 
aggregation framework of Hellwig (1980). The stock supply issue is set up along 
similar lines to Diamond & Verrecchia (1981), with investors being endowed with 
stock, and each agent's endowment being taken from the same distribution. The 
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difference here. though, is that the variance of this distribution depends on the number 
of investors present such that the overall variance of the stock supply does not. This 
ensures that the stock supply still provides noise as the number of agents becomes 
large, and under this scenario the situation is identical to that in the large market case 
of Hellwig. In the Verrecchia model it is assumed that the investors face fixed linear 
cost functions that relate the cost of acquiring the information to the precision of the 
information acquired. The key comparative static results are that the informativeness 
of the price tends to increase with decreases in the level of supply noise, the cost of 
acquiring information, and the overall risk-aversion of the investors. 
Verrecchia looks only at the acquisition of information about the future payoff. In 
chapter four we generalise this to the acquisition of information about both the 
payoff and the amount of liquidity trading, thus extending chapter three similarly to 
the way that Verrecchia extended Hellwig (1980). This allows us to see the way in 
which the acquisition of the two information types impinge upon each other, most 
notably when the cost of acquiring information changes. 
The main analytical result of chapter four is that, when the agents receive no free 
endowment of value-information, the cost of supply-information does not affect the 
total quality of information (in other words the conditional variance of the liquidation 
value) obtained by the agents: the acquisition of supply information merely serves as a 
way for the agents to obtain the same quality of information more cheaply. A 
corollary of this is that price discontinuities cannot occur without a positive free 
endowment of value-information. 
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1.4.6 Information supply 
Diamond (1985) utilised a model similar to Verrecchia (1982) to assess the optimal 
amount of public information a firm should release. Admati & Pfleiderer (1986), still 
in an information aggregation framework, looked at the strategies a monopolistic 
seller of information may use when selling information directly to traders. Admati & 
Pfleiderer (1990) later compared direct selling strategies to indirect ones in which the 
monopolist sells shares in a portfolio constructed using his private information. In 
both of these models, the monopolist is prevented from trading in the market on his 
own account, and is assumed to be always honest in his dealings. Admati & Pfleiderer 
(1988) show that the possibility of an information seller also trading on his own 
account can be dealt with fairly easily in a framework based on Kyle (1985), since it is 
always optimal for the information owner to sell the information signal as he receives 
it (and not to add noise as Admati & Pfleiderer (1986) show is optimal in an 
information aggregation framework), and so if he decides to trade, he does so under 
the same conditions as the other investors who have purchased the information. It is 
demonstrated that it is the degree of risk aversion of the information owner and that of 
the other investors that determines how the owner chooses between the three 
possibilities of. trading and not selling; selling and committing himself not to trade; 
and both selling and trading. The Kyle framework proves more tractable for the 
analysis of this issue since the investors are assumed to submit their demands before 
observing the price, which ensures that the value of information is not dispersed by 
the partial revelation of this information to uninformed agents via the price. In fact, in 
this framework rational agents who are not informed and have no liquidity 
requirements have no reason to trade, and so the only active investors are the noise 
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traders and the investors who have purchased information. If we are interested in the 
willingness to acquire information when it can partially be revealed to non-acquirers 
through the price, the information aggregation framework is more appropriate. 
1.5 '111-informed' investors and liquidity traders 
1.5.1 Focus on liquidity traders 
In both the market microstructure and information aggregation models we have seen, 
liquidity traders have been included to introduce gains from trade and add noise to the 
system, and their trades have been assumed to come from a distribution that is 
symmetric. However, as Allen & Gorton (1990) have argued, on closer inspection this 
assumption of symmetry becomes difficult to justify, since it is difficult to conceive of 
situations where investors are forced to buy stock in the same way that they are 
sometimes forced to sell. 
Allen & Gorton also noted that, while anyone can take advantage of positive 
information by buying stock, the exploitation of negative information would involve 
short-selling unless the stock was already held, and this may not be pursued as 
vigorously. The combination of this with the asymmetry of liquidity-motivated trades 
will ensure that a sale is less likely than a purchase to be motivated by information, 
and so purchases involve more information on average than do sales. Allen & Gorton 
show that if this feature is introduced into the Glosten & Milgrom (1985) framework, 
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an uninformed manipulator can profit from simple trading strategies if the specialist is 
not aware of her presence in the market: the manipulator can buy several units of 
stock at rapidly rising prices, and then sell out at prices that fall at a slower rate, with 
the average sale price being higher than the average purchase price. As Allen & 
Gorton point out, however: for the model to conform to the requirements of rational 
expectations, the specialist should recognise the possibility of speculative trades, and 
the next step would be to discover an 'equilibrium level of manipulation. ' This work 
shows that the specific assumptions made about the behaviour of noise traders are 
extremely important in determining a model's character, and so attention should be 
paid to determining the appropriate characteristics. 
Allen & Gale (1992) provide a model that exhibits an equilibrium level of 
manipulation of the sort we required from Allen & Gorton, albeit in a different 
framework. They show how an uninformed trader can successfully manipulate a stock 
price even when the other investors are fully aware of the strategy that is being 
followed. Allen & Gale's model contains three types of traders: price-taking investors, 
who originally own the stock; an informed trader, who receives information about the 
future stock value; and a manipulator, who has no such information. The price-taking 
investors can tell when one of the two 'large' traders are present in the market, but 
cannot identify which type of large trader it is. The investors know the correct a priori 
probabilities that they will be trading with the manipulator and informed trader 
respectively, and it is these that determine the prices at which the investors are willing 
to trade. The effect of the manipulator's potential presence is not to make the 
investors worse off, since their rationality protects them from this, but to worsen the 
22 
Alternative models ofsecurityprice equilibrium I Chapter I RA. Courtenay 
terms on which the informed investor can trade. It is only by assuming that the risk- 
aversion of the large traders is lower than that of the investors, and so the trading of 
large traders involves a welfare-enhancing transfer of risk from the other investors, 
that Allen & Gale prevent the manipulator's profit from being mirrored by a loss for 
the informed trader, and his associated withdrawal from the market. This once again 
highlights a need in R. E. models for there to be a source of overall gains from trade. 
1.5.2 Portfolio insurance 
Portfolio insurance strategies can provide a motivation for liquidity trading. A 
dynamic portfolio insurance strategy involving stock and bond market trading to 
replicate the payoff of a buy-and-hold strategy plus a put option leads to investors 
buying more stock when prices rise, and selling stock when prices fall. Portfolio 
insurers therefore engage in positive feedback trading, which occurs when net stock 
demand bears a positive relationship to the current price or past price changes, and 
also results from trend following and price-induced fads, as we shall see later. 
Brennan & Schwartz (1989) constructed a model containing portfolio insurers and a 
representative (non-portfolio-insuring) investor, and found that the effect of portfolio 
insurers on the volatility of prices was relatively small. However, Gennotte & Leland 
(1990) included portfolio insurers in an otherwise standard information aggregation 
framework, and showed that their behaviour can lead to price discontinuities of the 
form found in chapter four; although the effect in the absence of the discontinuities is 
again relatively small. 
23 
Alternative models ofsecurity price equilibrium /Chapter I RA. Courtenay 
In Gennotte & Leland, the stock demand from the portfolio insurers is assumed to be a 
particular function of the market price. It is found that under this specification there 
may be two possible equilibria, since the total demand curve is of a reverse-s-shape 
(and supply is fixed). Over a range, the demand curve is therefore of a perverse nature, 
which is due to the increased desire of the 'rational' investors to hold stocks that 
results from a lower price being more than offset by the higher stock sales of the 
portfolio insurers. Over the range of possible levels of the liquidation value, there may 
therefore be a region with two potential equilibrium prices, instead of just one as 
elsewhere. Plotting the path of prices as the liquidation value signals fall or rise shows 
up a discontinuity which occurs at the point where the second potential equilibrium 
disappears. Gennotte & Leland construct a story to accompany this, in which the 
discontinuity in the price function resulting from the model is translated into a crash 
in continuous time, even though all the equilibria result from one-off model runs. In 
chapter three we follow the precedent set by Gennotte & Leland and use the 
comparative statics of a single-period model to try to explain a phenomenon that is by 
its very nature dynamic. 
One aspect of the Gennotte & Leland model that arguably violates its internal 
consistency, is the assumption that the portfolio insurance corresponds to a put-option 
replication strategy in world in which prices are distributed log-normally, even though 
in this model prices are distributed normally. Of course, in such a one-period 
framework it would be difficult to justify any particular form of portfolio insurance: 
but the fact still remains that it is the particular form of portfolio insurance specified 
that drives the results. 
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1.6 The effect of uncertainty 
1.6.1 Uncertainty and the common prior assumption 
The presence of uncertainty can undermine the common prior assumption. The three 
reasons commonly used to justify the assumption of common priors are given by 
Morris (1995), and are: that it is implied by rationality; that it would otherwise make 
theorising too easy; and that bounded rationality should form the starting point for 
looking at differences in beliefs, rather than different priors. 
That care must be taken to ensure that any assumption of different priors is 
reasonable, in order to prevent its use in justifying any result or explaining any event, 
is uncontroversial. The key issue here, though, as in the other two objections, is 
whether or not the assumption is appropriate: clearly, if an event is caused by 
differences in priors, then any explanation should reflect this. In order to assess the 
rationality of different prior beliefs, it is necessary to investigate the foundations of 
the theory of predictive probability. 
Savage (1972) gives the three possible interpretations of the probabilities applied to 
future events. These are thefirequentist view, that probabilities can be determined by 
observing the outcomes of repeated events; the personalistic view, that probabilities 
are determined subjectively by individuals; and the logical view, that probabilities are 
objectively determined by the nature of the situation. Both the frequentist and logical 
views point to probabilities that are independent of any subjective opinion, and so 
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provide possible bases for the Common Prior Assumption (C. P. A. ). The personalistic 
view is that differences of opinion are fundamental. In fact: 
"Most holders of personalistic views... envisage the possibility that a person 
may consider one event more probable than another without having any 
compelling argument for his attitude. Viewed practically... the holder of a 
personalistic view typically supposes that the person is under the influence of 
experience, and possibly even biologically determined inheritance, that 
expresses itself in his opinions, though not necessarily through compelling 
argument" (Savage, 1972, p. 65). 
As a consequence: 
"The criteria incorporated in the personalistic view do not guarantee 
agreement on all questions among all honest and freely communicating 
people, even in principle. That incompleteness... does not distress me, for I 
think that at least some of the disagreement we see around us is due neither to 
dishonesty, to errors in reasoning, nor to friction in communication, though the 
harmful effects of the latter are almost incapable of exaggeration" (Savage, 
1972, p. 67-68). 
As Morris points out, "The logical view of probability has largely been discredited in 
the philosophical literature" (ibid p. 234) and that "At best, logic tells us how to 
update a prior given new information, but not how to choose a prior" (ibid p. 235). 
The problem is especially acute for beliefs concerning events that are endogenously 
determined. 
The difficulty with applying the frequentist view to future events is that it may be the 
case that leaming is not yet complete; and if this is the case, it is almost inevitable that 
there will be differences in beliefs. Perhaps the key question is whether or not a 
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pooling of all information and opinions will lead everyone to the same conclusions; or 
to put it another way, whether or not the 'Harsanyi doctrine, ' that all differences in 
beliefs can be explained by differences in information, holds. If the latter holds, taking 
information to include all that can be gleaned from the opinions of others, then it 
would perhaps be appropriate to embrace the C. P. A. and explicitly model the leaming 
process. As we have already seen, however, those who hold the personalistic view 
would argue that after all such pooling of information, there is still likely to be 
differences in beliefs. Some of these could be due to information processing effors, 
and in such cases explicit consideration of this should be taken, and the C. P. A. 
maintained. However: 
"there are some situations where we have a very clear idea that there exist 
heterogeneous prior beliefs that have nothing to do with information 
processing errors in anything other than a tautological sense. In those cases, it 
will be more insightful to take the heterogeneous prior beliefs as primitive and 
not attempt to reduce them to infon-nation processing errors" (Morris, 1995, p. 
242). 
Knight (1921) argued that the situation at each point in time is to a large degree 
unique, and so it is impossible to derive an objective probability distribution for future 
events. Perfect knowledge of the available information is insufficient to ensure a 
unique rational estimate. Thus there is a difference between risk, where the 
probabilities relating to the possible outcomes are objectively known; and uncertainty, 
where the probabilities are not known. Morris (1995) suggests that risky situations can 
be thought of as ones where learning is complete; and uncertain situations as ones 
where learning is still taking place. The key point is that, until learning is complete, it 
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is not clear what lessons can be learned from the available evidence; and since, in 
relation to economic issues, the underlying situation is always shifting, uncertainty is 
ever-present. Keynes also recognised this. In the General Theory he wrote: 
"We are assuming, in effect, that the existing market valuation, however 
arrived at, is uniquely correct in relation to our existing knowledge of the facts 
which will influence the yield of the investment, and that it will only change in 
proportion to changes in this knowledge; though, philosophically speaking, it 
cannot be uniquely correct, since our existing knowledge does not provide a 
sufficient basis for a calculated mathematical expectation7' (193 6, IV, p. 15 2). 
As a consequence: 
"human decisions affecting the future, whether personal or political or 
economic, cannot depend on strict mathematical expectation, since the basis 
for making such calculations does not exist; .... it is our innate urge to activity 
which makes the wheels go round, our rational selves choosing between the 
alternatives as best we are able, calculating where we can, but often falling 
back for our motive on whim or sentiment or chance" (ibid, VII, p. 162-3). 
Uncertainty exists as the future economic situation depends on the outcomes of a huge 
number of personal decisions, which we cannot predict with certainty. We simply do 
not have enough information to be able to judge the relative merits of a wide range of 
predictions, and must rely on subjective judgement to choose between them, thus 
allowing scope for divergence of opinion. 
Evidence of the importance of recognising the existence of true - or 'Knightian' - 
uncertainty has been unearthed by Dow & Werlang (1992), who show that this can 
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explain the high volatility of stock prices when it is treated as qualitatively different 
from riskiness. Indeed: 
"Since the future profitability of companies depends heavily on many long- 
term factors, including political factors, which are extremely difficult to 
predict, it is natural to think that the stock market is characterized by a high 
degree of Knightian uncertainty" (Dow & Werlang, 1992, p. 631-632). 
Models containing rational investors with different prior beliefs are rather thin on the 
ground. Varian (1989) argued that the models of heterogeneous beliefs prevailing 
before the appearance of the rational expectations literature, such as Lintner (1969), 
can be interpreted as representing those belief differences remaining after all learning 
has taken place. It would be preferable, however, to model such learning explicitly. 
Harrison & Kreps (1978) provided a rare example where this occurs. The model is 
built around two sets of risk-neutral investors who are prevented from selling short. 
They receive identical information but interpret the implications of this in different 
ways, and it is assumed that the knowledge of the others' beliefs does not lead to the 
investors revising their own expectations, but rather to them taking them into account 
when determining how much they are prepared to pay for stock. Since they know the 
value the other investors will place on the stock in different circumstances, and so 
realise that there exists the possibility of selling the stock in the future for more than 
they believe it is worth, each agent is prepared to pay more in this scenario than they 
would if prevented from reselling and instead forced to hold forever. This willingness 
to pay more for something if allowed to sell than if forced to hold forever can form 
the basis for a definition of speculative behaviour, as we shall see later. 
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It is clearly possible to argue that differences in priors can exist, and that bounded 
rationality is therefore not necessarily the appropriate way to model the causes of 
differences in beliefs. The difficulty comes in judging what differences in prior beliefs 
are appropriate, and in assessing how agents' beliefs change with exposure to the 
beliefs of others and new information. This difficulty in determining the correct 
specification, combined with ease of modelling and a legitimate desire to investigate 
how markets would behave in the absence of differences in prior beliefs, has led to the 
almost universal adoption of the C. P. A. 
1.6.2 The extent of common knowledge 
Uncertainty about the structure of the market and the beliefs and nature of its 
participants, as opposed to uncertainty about the future, is reflected in the extent of 
common knowledge. It is clear that: 
"When payoffs in a game are not common knowledge, the outcome depends 
not only on players' beliefs about payoffs, but also on their beliefs about 
others' beliefs about payoffs, on their beliefs about others' beliefs about their 
own beliefs, and so on ad infiniturn" (Morris, Rob & Shin, 1995). 
Such a progression concerning the beliefs of others is known as higher order 
uncertainty, and there is increasing evidence that this can significantly affect model 
performance (see, for example, Morris, Postlewaite & Shin (1995) and Morris, Rob & 
Shin (1995)). Making an assumption of a high degree of common knowledge about 
the structure of the system in which the agents operate does, however, lead to a much 
higher degree of tractability than would be the case otherwise, and so this continues to 
be done. As with the possibility of different priors, however, it should always be 
30 
Alternative models ofsecurity price equilibrium / Chapter I RA. Courtenay 
borne in mind that common knowledge may be narrower in scope than is 
hypothesised in specific models. 
1.6.3 Uncertainty and belief formation 
When there is uncertainty about the quality of the information on which other agents 
are basing their trades, there is scope for prices to follow a trend before the 
uncertainty is removed. For example, an increase in demand from uninformed 
investors may be interpreted as having informational content by other investors, and 
lead them to revise upwards their estimate of the underlying stock value, thus leading 
to a rise in price in excess of that justified by the demand increase itself. A trend in 
uninformed investor demand can therefore lead to a trend in prices which is reversed 
when the uncertainty is resolved. The price movement will therefore resemble that of 
a bubble; but it is not a bubble in the strictest sense, since the price at all times reflects 
the information of the investors. The greater the degree of uncertainty about the 
fundamental determinants of stock value, the greater will be the scope for investors to 
misread the information content of price movements. 
Uncertainty concerning the amount of information reflected in the price is also 
important. If investors do not know whether or not a particular piece of information is 
already incorporated into the price, they will not know whether or not they should act 
on it. s could lead to investors trading on information that has already reflected in 
the price, which Black (1986) has termed noise trading. Such noise trading will be 
positively related to past price movements, since they will be affected in the same 
direction by information. 
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There is no guarantee that any information will be fully incorporated into prices, since 
no investor will know when this process of incorporation has been completed: it is 
possible that there is a rapid initial price adjustment, after which investors believe that 
prices have moved to reflect it, and a subsequent slow price adjustment as the initial 
pricing errors are eliminated. This is fundamentally different to initial pricing errors 
caused by uncertainty about the implications of the information, since it implies that 
the price does not move solely to reflect the implications of the information, but that a 
component of the price change does not reflect the information, but results simply 
from the inability of prices to aggregate information successfully. This has 
implications for event studies. If price changes are equally likely to overestimate the 
implications of the new information as underestimate them, and the errors have a 
mean of zero, this effect will not be observable in aggregate empirical data. 
As well as leading to trading on noise, a lack of information can also allow investors' 
demand to be affected more by fads and fashions, and psychological factors. This will 
even be the case if investors believe in the efficient markets hypothesis, since this will 
prevent investors from consciously counteracting their whims. In such a scenario, the 
demand of these investors will be determined independently of the price, and this is 
arguably a better justification for the symmetric behaviour of noise traders in some of 
the models we have seen than that of liquidity trading. 
The degree of uncertainty influences the lack of informedness of both the ill-informed 
and relatively well-informed investors; and the latter effect allows the behaviour of 
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the ill-informed investors to exert a greater effect on the price, since the well-informed 
investors will be less willing to trade strongly against them. 
Since fluctuations in such demand is likely to affect the market price, it should be 
monitored and predicted by investors. Shiller (1984) gives a simple model in which 
6smart' investors take the fluctuating demand of other investors into account when 
determining the level of their own investment, without fully neutralising their effects. 
1.6.4 Consequences for model-building 
We have seen that it is likely that investors have different prior beliefs, and are 
sufficiently ill-informed to suffer from bounded rationality and to share relatively 
little common knowledge. There are two approaches that can be taken to modelling 
under these conditions: either the shortcomings of the investors can explicitly be taken 
into account; or simple mechanistic rules can be used as a proxy for their effect. 
There is much that can be achieved by modelling ill-informed investors explicitly. As 
we have already argued, however, such modelling may be sufficiently intractable as to 
be unable to capture investor behaviour realistically. In addition, the assumptions that 
need to be made in terms of the nature of the prior beliefs, information sources, 
common knowledge and knowledge concerning the structure of the market may need 
to be sufficiently ad hoc that they offer no advantage over more mechanistic 
behavioural rules; although as with most things, the relative advantages of the 
techniques will depend on the particular issue being addressed. 
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The aim in incorporating mechanistic behavioural patterns for ill-informed investors 
should be to use reasonable and realistic patterns, and to apply the model to suitable 
situations, not letting it produce absurd results. We should be aware that there are 
limits to the extent to which investors can be exploited, and not place too great an 
emphasis on model conclusions that depend on such scenarios. 
Investor strategies such as portfolio insurance and chartism, as well as trading on 
noise, investor contagion and other psychological effects, indicate that positive 
feedback trading, which involves a demand function for stock that bears a positive 
relationship to price movements, may be an appropriate pattern of investor behaviour 
to model. This conclusion is reinforced by anecdotal evidence of stock price bubbles 
and episodes of manipulation, as we shall see in chapter six. 
1.6.5 The effect of price-related ill-informed liquidity trader demand 
The implications of the existence of ill-informed liquidity traders clearly depend on 
the nature of the other agents operating in the market. The models we have seen so far 
add liquidity traders to a market with competitive rational investors, and possibly a 
manipulator as well. If it is thought that the general investor behaviour roughly 
follows mechanistic rules - albeit perhaps with a knowledge of the fundamental stock 
value - and so fits into our category of liquidity traders, then we can legitimately 
examine the behaviour of a market in which they appear alongside a manipulator 
alone. Models such as this have been developed to investigate the stabilising effect or 
otherwise of speculation. Hart (1977) provides a fairly general characterisation of the 
behavioural characteristics of the mechanistic traders that can allow a manipulator to 
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profitably disturb an initial steady state, and aids the understanding of previous 
models in the literature, as we shall see in chapter five. The possibility of profitable 
destabilising manipulation is shown to be dependent on a feedback between past 
prices and mechanistic trader demand. In chapter seven we analyse a simple model in 
which such feedback trading takes place, continuing this in chapter eight with the 
addition of exogenous shocks. 
Competitive (informed) speculation is generally thought to be stabilising, and would 
be in most modelling frameworks. However, De Long, Shleifer, Summers & 
Waldmann (1989,1990a) have produced a model that shows that competitive 
speculation may destabilise prices around a demand or value shock in the presence of 
positive feedback trading. Even here, though, an increase in the market power of the 
speculators relative to the feedback traders will have a stabilising effect. We analyse 
the claims of De Long et. al. in chapter eight. 
1.7 Agency issues 
The management of funds is also subject to the complexities of a principal-agent 
relationship: the managers may have less incentive than individual investors to extract 
the best possible value from their portfolios, since what matters to them is 
predominantly their career progression, which tends to depend on their short-term 
performance relative to other fund managers. A strategy based on underlying value, 
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that is likely to pay off in the long-term, is an extremely risky strategy for a manager 
who might be out of a job before it can bear fruit: it is more sensible to act similarly to 
others. 3 Even if success is achieved in this manner, it may not be recognised: 
"it is the long-term investor, he who most promotes the public interest, who 
will in practice come in for most criticism, wherever investment funds are 
managed by committees or boards or banks. For it is in the essence of his 
behaviour that he should be eccentric, unconventional and rash in the eyes of 
average opinion.... Worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to 
fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally" (Keynes, 1936, V, p. 
157-8). 
In addition to this, Allen & Gorton (1993) demonstrate that asymmetric information 
between investors and portfolio managers can provide managers with an incentive to 
chum, which can result in bubbles. 
1.8 Concluding comments 
We have seen that rational expectations models often require liquidity traders to 
provide gains from trade and informational noise. The specific form of liquidity - or 
'ill-informed' - trader behaviour is also important, even when there are competitive 
rational investors present in the market, and is especially so when the bulk of 
investors follow mechanistic rules. As we stated at the start of this chapter, the thesis 
as a whole follows a similar structure to this introduction: we can think of it as 
charting the implications of the presence of liquidity traders as their demand alters 
3 This idea provides the motivation for Scharfstein & Stein (1990). 
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from being purely random as in the information aggregation models of chapters two, 
three and four, to varying through time or with price changes as in the later chapters. 
The thesis can also be viewed more explicitly in terms of the informational 
assumptions made. Chapter two looks at the ability of stock prices to aggregate 
information when this information is dispersed throughout the economy, in the sense 
that any given investor receives only part of the information required to form an 
estimate of the future stock value. Chapter three looks at the ability of stock prices to 
aggregate two different types of information, relating to both the future stock value 
directly and the amount of liquidity trading. Chapter four looks at the incentives for 
investors to acquire information of the two types, within the framework constructed in 
chapter three. We then begin to consider the possibility that some investors may not 
have sufficient information to be able to conform to the requirements of rational 
expectations. In chapter five we look at the implications of the presence of such 
investors, focusing particularly on the fads model of Shiller (1984) and the possibility 
of profitable destabilising speculation. In chapter six we provide evidence that such 
6naive' or 'ill-informed' investor behaviour can take the form of positive feedback 
trading, under which the demand from these investors bears a positive relationship to 
current and / or past prices. In chapter seven we investigate the performance of a 
system containing positive feedback traders along with investors who trade on the 
basis of underlying value, and, following Hart (1977), assess the potential for 
manipulation in such a situation. We finish in chapter eight by assessing, in the light 
of chapter seven, the conclusion of De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann 
(1990a) that competitive speculation can be destabilising. 
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Chapter 2 
On the aggregation of dispersed 
information 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter contains an example of a model in which the noise traders play a 
facilitating role in allowing an equilibrium to exist, but are not central to the model 
performance beyond this. The motivation behind this specific formulation is the fact 
that, in reality, information about future value comes in many different forms, relating 
to different aspects of the determinants of the future value; and these different pieces 
of information, which do not correspond directly to estimates of future value, must be 
aggregated and converted into such an estimate. The assumPtion used in the 
information aggregation models we considered previously was that the information 
obtained by the agents concerning the liquidation value related to the entire 
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liquidation value, and so represents an extreme simplification. Figure 2.1 illustrates 
the link between information and the value estimate. 
Fig. 2.1: The information conversion process. 









It is possible to think of the 'conversion process' as a model that translates relevant 
data into a value estimate in the same way that a macroeconomic model uses data 
about certain underlying economic variables to produce estimates for the future values 
of key macroeconomic variables. 
In addition to this feature of information, the overall stock of information is dispersed 
among agents, with different agents receiving information about different factors. This 
raises questions about how stock prices can aggregate information that is dispersed 
among agents, an issue that has so far not been addressed by the information 
aggregation literature. 
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The information aggregation literature, beginning with Grossman (1976), and 
developing with work such as that by Hellwig (1980) and Diamond and Verrecchia 
(1981), Admati (1985), Kim and Verrecchia (1991a, b) and Brennan and Cao (1996), 
has tended to assume that investors receive information signals relating to the entire 
future value itself, and so has avoided the need to investigate the issues of conversion 
processes and the dispersion of information. 
One possible conversion process is the linear factor model that underlies the arbitrage 
pricing theory (A. P. T. ) of Ross (1976), under which the return on an asset is a linear 
function of a number of fundamental factors. Handa & Linn (1991) show how the 
A. P. T. can be embedded in the n-asset information aggregation framework of Admati 
(1985), itself an extension of Hellwig (1980). Handa & Linn made the assumption that 
each investor receives information about all the factors. In this chapter we use a 
single-asset model based on Hellwig (1980) to investigate the ability of prices to 
aggregate information when the investors specialise in acquiring information about 
one factor only. ' Although this in a sense circumvents the problem we highlighted 
earlier concerning the difficulty of converting raw data into value estimates, it does 
test in a new way the ability of prices to aggregate information across investors. 
We will be working in a 'large market, ' as first described by Hellwig (1980), in which 
individual investors do not influence the price. As well as being tractable, this is 
consistent with the price-taking assumption, and so avoids the problem of 
When the following chapter was first written, the author was unfortunately not aware of the work of Handa & Linn (1991). 
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schizophrenic investor behaviour present in finite-agent models, as pointed out by 
Hellwig, whereby investors take into account the covariance between their signal and 
the price, but still act as price-takers. This problem cannot be avoided in the Diamond 
& Verrecchia formulation, since when the number of agents becomes 'large', the 
noise in the stock supply disappears and the Grossman (1976) problem of the non- 
existence of an equilibrium recurs. It is possible to overcome the problem in finite- 
investor models by assuming that each investor represents a continuum of agents with 
identical information. Kyle (1989) proposed an alternative method of dealing with the 
schizophrenia problem, which was to allow the agents to take account of their 
influence on the price. Kyle showed that each investor trades less aggressively in this 
case than when perfectly competitive, which reduces the amount of information that is 
reflected in the price. The results obtained working in a 'large market' framework are, 
however, more tractable, which is why this has become the standard approach in the 
literature, and why we will use it in the models contained in the following three 
chapters. 
Grinblatt & Ross (1985) show that in the standard (Hellwig-type) information 
aggregation model structure it can be profitable for a non price-taking investor to 
behave strategically to alter the equilibrium price function, even when the strategy is 
both linear and committed to in advance. We will not consider the possibility of 
strategic behaviour in the information aggregation work that follows. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In the following section we derive the 
equilibrium price function for the general form of the model, which can be thought of 
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as building on the foundations of the large-market case of Hellwig (1980). We then 
assume full homogeneity across the liquidation-value components, and describe this 
more tractable case, giving two numerical examples of how the informativeness of the 
price falls with the number of components. We finish with a look at the possible 
implications of informational gains from specialisation, and conclude that a broad 
infon-nation base is vital. 
2.2 Liquidation Value With N Additive Components 
Consider an economy in which there are two assets, one risk-free and one risky, both 
of which pay out (the only) units of the single consumption good in the following 
period. The risk-free asset pays out a single unit of the consumption good with 
certainty, while the risky asset pays out a random quantity of consumption goods. The 
payoff to the risky asset -W, the liquidation value - is drawn from a normal 
distribution with mean and variance as follows: 
il -N (ii, Ilh,, ) (2.1) 
Assume that the liquidation value of the stock is the sum of a number of different 
components; in particular: 
+ "2 + "3 +* ýUýN (2.2) 
For the sake of simplicity also assume that these components are distributed 
independently of each other. Each component can be thought of as a coefficient 
multiplied by a factor that partly determines the payoff. 
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The investors are aware of the structure of the economy - specifically the value of the 
coefficients in the price function - and can also observe the equilibrium price itself 
before trading. They also receive heterogeneous pieces of private information. There 
are a 'large' number of these rational agents, and so individually they cannot influence 
the market price. We assume that there are now N types of competitive agent, present 





Following Kim & Verrecchia (1991 a), we assume for convenience that the agents of 
each type form a [0,1] continuum (i,, E [0,1]). 
Agents' utility depends solely on their consumption of the consumption good in the 
final period. It is assumed that the agents' preferences can be characterised by utility 
functions that exhibit constant absolute risk aversion. The importance of this 
assumption is that it ensures that the price does not feed back to agent demand via 
wealth, and hence greatly contributes to model tractability. Specifically, agent i has a 
negative-exponential utility function that takes the following form: 
Uj (WI )=- exp (- JV, Ir, ) (2.4) 
where W represents terminal wealth and r the risk-tolerance coefficient. 
The stock supply available to the rational investors (L) can be thought of as the sum 
of the amount of stock outstanding and the net supply from liquidity traders. 
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We assume that agent i of type n receives private information Y,, i regarding one of 
the components of the liquidation value, where: 
Y. i ý-- Ull + sw (2.5) 
The random vector is assumed to be distributed normally with mean 
T, O) and variance 
1911. 
It is also assumed that these random variables hn PL 'S,, 
) 
are distributed independently, and so all covariances are zero. 
The agents now hypothesise a price function of the following form: 
+Plul +P2w2+*****+PN'tN -7L (2.6) 
where Z is the per-capita stock supply, and: 
()c = ()c U, ot u Ul U2 2 
+* 
*+(Y' UN 
"N + ()C L 
We show in Appendix A (section Al) that the coefficients can be expressed as 
follows: 
K., (I- CC 2n 
Pn=g,, r,, K,, y(x ,, 
(X =y1 ýt r K(x 0 n. 1 
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The equation for y can be re-written as: 
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As with the original Hellwig (1980) case, the equation for beta can be analysed 
independently of the others: defining a new variable Q,, as P, /7, it can be re-written as: 
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These coefficients denote the 'structure' of market prices. When the agents believe the 
price function takes the linear form previously assumed, with the coefficients taking 
the above values, the price function will indeed take a linear form with coefficients 
taking these values. The agents' behaviour is therefore consistent with rational 
expectations. Although these models determine prices in one period only, we can 
perhaps think of each new 'game' as the latest in a long series, during which the 
agents have learned the structure of the price function. This assumes, of course, that 
the price function has remained constant over this period. Blume, Bray and Easley 
(1982) provides a survey of the literature relating to the stability of rational 
expectations equilibria in general. 
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2.3 Full homogeneity 
In this section we will assume full homogeneity, across both agents and components, 
in order to facilitate the study of the effects of changing the number of components 
(N). In particular, we assume the following: 
r, = r2 = ..... =rN =r 
si =S 2=..... = SN= Ns 
h, =h2 = ..... =hN= A (2.10) 
112 11N 
"2 UN 
These imply the following: 





UN =ct&f (2.11) 
ß1= ß2 = ..... = 
ßN =ß 
The price function now takes the following form: 
P =a +(u, (2.12) 
where: 
(X = 
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Using the results from the general case, we can find the values for the coefficients, 
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The beta-coefficient reveals the extent to which prices reflect the liquidation value, 
and so gives an indication of the informativeness of the price. We show in the 
appendix (A2) that beta decreases with the number of liquidation-value components 
(N) (in fact, as this number becomes 'large, ' beta approaches zero), and so the smaller 
the proportion of the liquidation value about which the agents have information, the 
less informative prices become. The rapidity of the fall-off in beta can be illustrated 
with the aid of some numerical examples. 
2 See, for example, the following two chapters of this thesis. 
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2.4 Numerical examples 
2.4.1 Example #1: 'Simple' parameter values 
Assume that the parameter values are as given in table 2.1. 
Table 2.1: Simple parameter values. 
s PL 
Given these values, the relationship between beta and the number of components 
making up the liquidation value is as shown in figure 2.2. 
Fig. 2.2: Beta &N with 'simple'parameter values. 
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This shows that for these parameter values the informativeness of the price drops off 
very quickly as the number of components rises above one. 
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2.4.2 Example #2: Gennotte & Leland parameter values 
In order to provide an alternative example to the one given above, and one that 
perhaps better reflects reality, we can use the parameter values given in Gennotte & 
Leland (1990). These are given in table 2.2. 
Table 2.2: Gennotte & Lelandparameter values. 
rhs PL I11 
12.5 2.5 2942 
Given these values, the relationship between N and beta is as given in figure 2.3. 
Fig. 2.3: Beta &N with Gennotte & Lelandparameter values. 
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It is clear that the value of beta, and hence the informativeness of the price, drops 
away far more slowly in this example than in the previous one using relatively 
unsophisticated parameter values; indeed, the number of components must rise to 
thirty-three before beta is halved. This slower reduction in beta is a consequence of 
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the rate of decrease being in large measure determined by the relative size of the risk 
tolerance (r) and the precision of the stock supply (pL) parameters - as is revealed 
more clearly by the expression for the reciprocal of beta given in the appendix (A2) - 
and the fact that in this example the supply precision term is large. 
With the liquidation value comprising only one component, as in traditional 
information aggregation models, the informativeness of the price is extremely high (P 
= 0.999321). This would make the incentive to acquire information very weak, as has 
previously been recognised. 3 By allowing the agents to observe information relating 
to only one of several components of the liquidation value, the informativeness is 
reduced to more realistic levels: for example, if we define informativeness as the 
divergence of beta from one, and changes in informativeness as the new level 
expressed as a proportion of the base-line level, we can say that increasing the number 
of components from one to two reduces the level of informativeness by almost 80% (P 
= 0.99672 1); and increasing the number of components to nine reduces it by 99% (P = 
0.929132). This illustration shows that, even though the fall-off in beta may not 
appear to be as dramatic in the latter example as in the former, it is still enough to 
have an enormous effect on the level of informativeness. 
3 See, for example, Kyle (19 89). 
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2.5 Specialisation versus diversirication 
In the above we have assumed that, even though we have restricted the agents to the 
acquisition of information relating to only one of several components, there have been 
no informational gains from the specialisation: the pooling of information signals by 
one member of each group will produce a 'super-signal' of merely the same precision 
as in the single-component case. If we assume that the enforced specialisation will 
lead to a higher quality of information, and a theoretical super-signal of a higher 
precision than the single-component case, the effect on price informativeness of 
increasing the number of components will not be so pronounced. 
Instead of constraining the precision of the information for each component to be N 
times the value of the single-component precision (so), we can represent it as N times 
a theoretical super-signal (s, ) that is a function of the number of components and the 
single-component precision, and can exceed this single-component precision: 
si (N) = Ns, (SO, N) > NSO (2.15) 
The coefficients of the price function under this formulation can be found simply by 
substituting in the super-signal precision (s) for the single-component precision (so). 
The beta coefficient can therefore be expressed as follows: 
s., [(h+s,, )N-s, ]+r 2 hs, 2 PL 
(2.16) (h + s, )N [(h + s, )N - s, 
]+ r2 hs., PL 
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where s., = s., (so, N) . Equating this expression with that 
for the single-component 
case, as given in the appendix (M), allows us to discover the functional form for the 
specialisation function that maintains beta at its initial level as the number of 
components increases. The form of the specialisation function that maintains a 
constant level of beta is as follows: 4 
s. (ß(1 = N)= ßQ = 
Nhs, (2.17) '»= -ý--(N 
- l>O 
Since the super-signal precision cannot become negative, there is an upper limit to the 
value of N (Nji,, j) for which it can continue to change to maintain the constant beta. 




Once the number of components rises above this level, no amount of gains from 
specialisation can prevent the informativeness of the price from falling. This shows 
that, although specialisation may increase price informativeness as the number of 
components rises initially, there comes a point where there is no substitute for a wider 
information base. 
Retuming to the two examples used previously, we can see that for those cases 
specialisation would no longer be able to maintain the informativeness of prices as the 
number of components moves beyond 2 and 6 respectively. 
4 This is equivalent to maintaining a constant level of the conditional precision for each agent (K,. ). 
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2.6 Conclusion 
We began this chapter by highlighting the necessity of a 'conversion process' between 
raw data and value estimates. The additive conversion process used subsequently goes 
only a very small way to recognising this, since the information is still assumed to 
relate to future value; and so much work is still needed in this area. Using the additive 
conversion process, and assuming that agents can receive information about one 
component only, we showed that increasing the number of components necessarily 
reduces the informativeness of the price when a 'super-signal' consisting of one signal 
for each of the components would have the same precision as in the single-component 
case. Once we admitted the possibility of informational gains from specialisation, it 
became clear that increasing the number of components may initially increase 
informativeness; but even in this case, informativeness must by necessity begin to fall 
as the number of components continues to increase beyond a threshold determined by 
the unconditional precision of the liquidation value and the precision of the 
information signal in the single-component case. This demonstrates that there is a 
balance to be struck between specialisation and a broader-based approach to 
information gathering. 
The logical next step would be to relax the assumption that agents can receive 
information relating to one component alone, in order to study the distribution of 
information that is likely to occur in equilibrium when information acquisition is 
made endogenous. This, however, is beyond the scope of this thesis, and will be left 
as an issue to be addressed in future work. 
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Appendix A: For Chapter 2 
Al General case 
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and variance-covariance matrix V,,, where: 
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The method for finding the posterior distribution of the liquidation value given the 
private information and price can be found in texts such as Mood, Graybill & Boes 
(1973). To begin, partition the vectors Y and M, and the matrices V and R as follows: 
Y* v R, R 
,M= 
(ml 
11 12 1 12 
=II 
y, V=(v I R= Y2* M2 V21 V22) 
(R21 
R22) 





The conditional mean (M, *) and variance (RII-1) are as follows: 
-'2 ý"- A -ý V12V22 
I (v " Ml* 
V2 - 
M2) 
R11-1 = K-1 = C72 = VI I- VI 2 V22 -1 V'21 
(A4) 
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Using this result we find that, the posterior distribution of W is: 
E 2P) -,, ý a on+ 
Cý In 





where the values of the coefficients are as given in the main text. 
The relationship between the posterior distribution and agent i's demand for stock is 
as follows: 
(A6) 
rn Kn[a On + (1 InYid + 
(a 
2n 
The total demand can be written as follows: 
N 
D=2, ýt,, Dý, (A7) 
n-I 
where [t, represents the measure of agent type n in the market; we can think of this 
loosely as the proportion of the total number of agents that receive private information 
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Setting this equal to the hypothesised price function gives the expressions found in the 
main text. 
A2 Full homogeneity 
The expressions for the coefficients can also be expressed as follows: 
(X - 
[(h + s)N - sf 
S2 ' Ch+s)N[(h+s)N-s]+r'h PL 
aL= 
rhSPL [(h + s)N - s] 
2 
S2 h th + s)N[(h + s)N - s]+ rh PL 
(AIO) 
s[(h + s)N - s]+ r 2hS2 PL 
(h + s)N[(h + s)N - s]+ r2 hS2 PL 
I [(h+s)N-sl(h+s)N-s+r 2 hS2 
72 
S2 rh th+s)N[(h+s)N-s]+r h PLI 
The reciprocal of the beta coefficient can be written as follows: 
+ 
[hN 
- (N - 1ý1(h + s)N - sl (Al 1) 
s[(h + s)IV - s]+ r'hs'PL 
The first derivative of beta with respect to the number of components is as follows: 
ap (h + sý[(h + s)N - slj(h + s)N -s+ 2r'hSPL 
<0 (A12) aN th + s)N[(h + s)N - s]+ r2 hS2 PL 
2 1 
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A3 Single component case 
When there is only one component of the liquidation value, the situation becomes 
equivalent to a special case of the basic Hellwig (1980) model with homogeneous 






s+r 2s2 PL 
K 
y= 
l1r + rsPL 
K 
and: 
K=h+s+r 2S2 PL 
(A13) 
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Chapter 3 
The non-uniqueness of informational 
equilibria in seasoned-equity markets 
3.1 Introduction 
Stock prices must aggregate information of many different types. They should reflect 
factors such as future interest rates, exchange rates, technological developments, and 
the motivations for investors' behaviour. It is not clear a priori that there will be a 
unique way in which such aggregation will occur; and if this is the case, movements 
between equilibria are likely to lead to prices that are more volatile than the 
determinants of the underlying value, and may cause price crashes. 
The possibility of multiple equilibria has been discovered previously resulting from: 
adverse selection in the context of a market for a product that can vary in quality 
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(Wilson, 1980) or similarly in a market for unseasoned equity issues or venture capital 
projects (Karki and Hodges, 1986); and in a market for seasoned equity in the 
presence of portfolio insurers (Gennotte and Leland, 1990). To the author's best 
knowledge, this chapter represents the first example of multiple informational 
equilibria in a market for seasoned equity in which portfolio insurers are not present. 
Standard models in the information aggregation literature, from Grossman (1976) 
through Hellwig (1980), Dimnond and Verrecchia (1981), Admati (1985), Grinblatt, 
and Ross (1985), Gennotte and Leland (1990), Kim and Verrecchia (1991a, 1991b), 
Naik (1993) and Brennan and Cao (1996), all look at a situation in which the price 
aggregates information of one type only, which relates to the future liquidation value 
of the stock. In all these models, except for Grossman (1976), in which there is no 
equilibrium price, and Gennotte and Leland (1990), this assumption ensures that there 
is a unique informational equilibrium. In this chapter we look at a situation in which 
the price aggregates information about both the liquidation value and the stock 
demand from noise traders, and show that even in the absence of portfolio insurers 
there may exist multiple potential equilibria for the price. Since the model in this 
chapter looks at the aggregation of more than one distinct type of information, it 
differs in approach from the model in the previous chapter, which looks at the 
aggregation of multiple components of the same type of information. 
This work takes as its point of departure the model of Hellwig (1980), to which is 
added heterogeneous infonnation signals relating to the level of noise trading activity 
of the same fonn as the signals relating to the liquidation value. In the section below, 
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the model structure is described. In section three the nature of the equilibria is 
analysed, and this is followed in section four by a numerical example in which there 
exist multiple price equilibria. 
3.2. Model structure 
As in the previous chapter, we assume that there are two assets, one risk-free and one 
risky, both of which pay out (the only) units of the single consumption good in the 
following period. The risk-free asset pays out a single unit of the consumption good 
with certainty, while the risky asset pays out a random quantity of consumption 
goods. As before the liquidation value ( ii ) is drawn from a normal distribution with 
mean and variance as follows: 
it -N (ii, I/k ) (3.1) 
As in the previous chapter we work in a 'large market, ' and assume for convenience 
that the agents form a [0,1) continuum (i r= [0,1]). Agents' utility depend solely on 
their consumption of the consumption good in the final period. As before we will 
assume that each agent i has a negative-exponential utility function that takes the 
following form: 
Uj (Wi) =- exp(- W, Ir, ) 
where W represents terminal wealth and r the risk-tolerance coefficient. 
(3.2) 
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The stock supply can be thought of as the sum of the amount of stock outstanding and 
the net stock supplied by liquidity traders, who do not appear explicitly in the model. 
Since if agents received information about the total stock supply from liquidity traders 
the price would become fully revealing, we will assume that the total liquidity supply 
is the sum of two parts: one part about which agents can have information (9); and 
one part about which they cannot (Z). It is possible to justify this assumption in many 
ways; for example by arguing that the portfolio balancing transactions of some 
institutions are more transparent than of others. The total supply available per rational 
investor (5ý) can therefore be expressed as follows: 
Ya L +S (3.3) 
where S and L are assumed to be independently normally distributed. 
Each agent receives, before trading, two pieces of information (. Y, and fv, ), in the Y, 
form of noisy estimates of the liquidation value and the observable part of the stock 
supply, consisting of the actual values plus noise, as follows: 
j7, = ii + iý, (3.4) 
+ Ui (3.5) 
The random vector is distributed normally with mean 
u, L, 0,0,0, o, o) and variance l l II We assume that these ho PL PS ti t i 
Si Si 
random variables are distributed independently, and so all covariances are zero. It will 
be shown below that there is an equilibrium price function of the following linear 
form: 
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P =a Y +CC LL + P-Y SS -Y LL (3.6) 
This means that if the traders hypothesise initially that the price function will be of 
this form, this will indeed be the case, and the value of the coefficients will be as they 
expected. We show in Appendix B (section B I) that the price function can also be 
expressed as follows: 
j5=-' rh,, U+(ý 
PYLPL(PS+t'ý' 
di 
rK 07 L'(PI + tl)+Y I'PL 
rs +1 
ß2 PL (PS + ti >I di ii 1' 
(P, + t, )+y '- 0YL PL 
ßY SPSPA di 2 )+ y S2 07L (PS + ti PL 
i+I 
ßY LPL(PS +ti>i di 
f2 
1)+y S2 0YL ý)S +t PL 
1 
II 
where r =- fr, di ,s =- 




11ß PL (PS + ti >i di 
r0YL2 (PS + ti)+y S2 PL 
(3.7) 
When the stock supply S is non-stochastic, and so its variance is zero, the model 
collapses to the Hellwig (1980) 'large market' case. The solution for this is given in 
the appendix (B2). 
Since it is not clear how a solution can be isolated for this general case, we will 
therefore now look at special cases, starting with a situation in which there are two 
types of agent present. 
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3.3 Two agent types 
Suppose that there are two groups of agents, present in the market in measure ýtf and 
[tg and that within each group the agents are homogeneous in that they have the same 
degree of risk tolerance and receive information of the same precision. The price 
function can now be expressed as follows: 
1 
rh + 
gfrf (PS +tf )+ý, grg 





(PS +t f 
)+ 
Y S2 PL YL2 












PL 2( 2S+ tg)+y S2 
IY 
L PS +t f 
)+y 









L PS +t f 
)+y 










Yi, '(Ps+tf)+YS, PL YL'(PS+tg)+YI'P, 1, 
where: 
ýlf + ýtg =I 
r =- [Lf rf + ýt 
grg 
s= (11r»tf rf sf + ýt, , r. , s. 









f(S +t g»g 
r2S +tf 
)+ 22 
PS +t g)+y S2 
ilf 
L 
(P yS PL 't L 
(ý PLI 
Kf =- h,, + sf + 
p2 PL 
(Ps 
+ tf ) 
7L2 )+7S2 PL 
64 
Alternative models ofsecurityprice equilibrium / Chapter 3 RA. Courtenay 
Comparing this to the price function originally hypothesised produces the following 
equations for the coefficients: 
(x. = 
ßY LPL Ilf rf 
(PS + tf )+ 11 grg 
(PS +t 9) 
rK Y L'(PS + tf 
)+ 
Y S2PL 7 L2 
(PS + tg )+Y S2PL 
r ' 
lrs+ß2 










y S2 PL YL2 
(PS 
















y S2 PL Y L' 
(PS Y PL YL ( 
1 ýlf rf (P s 
+tf )'ý, rg (PS +tz) L=1+ ßy LPL + rK 
(Y 
L PS + tf 
)+y 
S2 PL TL2 
(P 




The isolation of the solution to the above equation set can be facilitated by defining 
the following new variables: 
0, Qs Ys (3.10) 
YL 
The above equations reveal that: 
Qp = rs 
Qs, however, is now a solution to the following fifth-order polynomial: 
22 




fQS 2 PL + PS + tgýf rf tf + (QS 2 PL + PS + tf ýgrgtg ý_ 0 
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Since the coefficients can be expressed in terms of Qp and Qs, they can be produced 
readily. After substitution for Qp they are as follows: 
Cc u 
CL L 
SPL Ilf rf 
(PS + tf )+ kl grg 
(PS +t 9) 
K ps + tf + QS2 PL PS + tg + QS2PL 












=11 ýlf rf grg s+ QSSPSPL ý2ý+2 Kr PS + tf + QS PL PS + t9 + iS PL- 
(3.13) 
f(j PS +tf 11 grg PS +tg 
L+ SPL + K1r PS +tf+QS2 PL PS +tg + QS 2 PL 
where: 
K =- (llr){gf rf Kf + ýtgr gKg1 
hý, +s+ rs'p, 
kIf rf (PS + tf )+ý, rg (PS + t9 
) IPS 
+ tf + QS2 PL PS +tg + QS 2 PL 
Kf =-k+sf +r2s2 
PL(PS +tf ) 
Ps +t f+QS2 PL 
From this we can write: 
r2s2 PL (PS + t) K= h. +s+ Qs 2PL +ps +t 
These results are still rather unwieldy: the nature of the solution can be analysed more 
easily if we assume that the agents are entirely homogeneous. 
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3.4 Homogeneous agents 
Assume now that the agents are homogeneous, and so all have the same degree of 
risk-aversion, and receive information of the same precision. The signals they receive 
are therefore taken from the same distribution, although the signal of each agent 





(PS + t) L+ s+ 
ß2 PL (PS. + t) iul 2( KYL PS + t)+y S2 PL YL2 
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K=-h, +s+- 
ß2 PL (PS + t) 
Y L' 
(PI + t) +Y l'PL 
(3.14) 
Comparing this to the price function originally hypothesised produces the following 
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7 APS +t)+7 S'PL 
(3.15) 
67 
Alternative models ofsecurity price equilibrium / Chapter 3 RA. Courtenay 
=1 
1+ Py LPL 
(PS + t) 
L 2( Kr YL PS +t)+y S2 PL 
Identifying the solution to the above equation set can once again be facilitated by 
using the variables Qp and Qs, which we defined in equation 3.11 above. This reveals 
that: 
QP = rs (3.16) 
and that QS is now the solution to the following cubic: 
-, QS 
2 2st -.: 0 PL +PS + t)+ QSPJ (3.17) (QS ý 
The following section looks at the properties of the solutions to this equation. The 
coefficients can be expressed as follows: 
Cc u 
11 rSPL (PS + t) 
aL=K 
QS2 PL +PS +tl 
=1 s+r 
2S2 PL (PS + t) 
ßK 









rSPL (PS + t) 
Kr QS2 PL +PS +tl 
where: 
K=h +s+ 
r2s2 PL (PS + t) 
QS2PL +PS +t 
(3.18) 
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As in the previous chapter, the expression for the mean level of the stock price is 
given by the following: 
P =a ug+aLL+DU-YSS-Y LL 





We use this result later in this chapter. A similar expression can be derived for the 
general case given in section 3.2. 
3.5 Solutions for Qs 
We would expect the ratio of the coefficients of S and L (QS) to be positive - since 
higher supply shocks should lead to lower price and vice versa - and less than one 
when the unconditional precisions are the same - since the agents have some 
information about this for S, thus reducing its impact. The equation for Qs can be 
written as: 
F mm QS3 PL _ QS2 PL +QS(PS +t+PLr 
2 St)_ (PS + t) =0 (3.20) 









Pr2 st L 
(3.21) 
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These new variables - a, b and c- can vary independently of each other. 
For non-positive values of QS the value of this function is always negative. For values 
of QS greater than one, the value of this function is always positive. When the 
precision of supply information (t) is zero, there is a solution where QS takes the value 
of one. This ensures that all the (real) roots of the function must lie in the following 
range: 
O<QS <1 (3.22) 
This result can be replicated intuitively. Given a set of estimates about the supply 
components held by the agents, unit changes in either of the components will affect 
the price to the same degree, regardless of the prior distributions, since they will both 
affect the price only through aggregate supply. QS can therefore take the value of one. 
Whenever agents have some information about a supply component, however, a rise 
in the level of this component will be heralded by the information signals, and so its 
price effect will be partly offset. This shows that one is therefore the maximum value 
of QS. When the information is noiseless, the supply will affect the price in the same 
way that it is affected by a change in the mean level of the stock supply. The 
minimum value of Qs must therefore exceed zero. 
We can examine the possibility of finding more than one solution by looking at the 
first derivative of this function with respect to QS: 
F 
QS2 2St =3 PL - 2QspL + PS +t+ PLr dQs 
(3.23) 
- 3Qs2a - 2Qsa +b 
70 
Alternative models ofsecurityprice equilibrium I Chapter 3 RA. Courtenay 
At Qs = 0, the value of this function is positive. At QS = 1, the value of this function is 
also positive. If the value of this function turns negative between zero and one, this 
implies that the original function, F, has two turning points in this range; and since the 
constant term in the original function can vary independently from the other 
coefficients, it also implies that for certain values of this constant term there will be 
three roots. The roots of the quadratic function in equation 3.23 are given by: 
V4p 2- 12PL (PS +t+ PJ 
2St 
QS =1±. -L (3.24) 3 6PL 
This will have real roots whenever: 
PL > 3(ps +t+ PLr 
2St) (3.25) 
or, equivalently: 
> 3(b + c) (3.26) 
This shows that there are values of the parameters for which the slope of the original 
function turns negative, and hence that there is a sub-set of these values for which 
there is more than one root. 
Since all the parameters are positive, we can work out the range of values in which 
real roots must lie. This is as follows: 
O<QS (3.27) 
For each value of Qs the price function will be linear: however, the relationship the 
price bears to outcomes of the liquidation value and the stock supply will be different. 
Hence the effect of moving from one equilibrium position to another would be in 
terms of altering the volatility of prices, the degree to which prices anticipate the 
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following-period liquidation value, and the degree to which noise shocks affect the 
price. Since the amount of information the price reveals about the liquidation value 
affects the riskiness of holding stock, it will also affect the general price level, as 
revealed by the mean of the price equation. Discontinuous shifts in the conditional 
variance will lead to discontinuous shifts in the mean of the price; and this is our 
definition of a crash. 
3.6 A numerical example 
3.6.1 Finding the potential equilibria 
Figure 3.1 shows the Qs function F for the parameter values shown in table 1. The 
three roots can easily be seen, and are also given in table 3.1. 
Fig. 11: The Qsfunction. 
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Table 3.1: Parameter values and roots. 
Parameter Values. Roots for Qs. 
PL 1000 0.14428 
PS 25 0.35055 




The price functions given by the three roots are shown below in table 3.2: 
Table 3.2: The nature of the equilibria. 
QS 0.14428 0.35055 0.50517 
CCU 0.07986 0.21609 0.34041 
CCL 1.83362 1.54981 1.29081 
p 0.92014 0.78391 0.65959 
YS 0.26551 0.54960 0.66641 
YL 1.84028 1.56782 1.31918 
var(ujj5, y, iv-) 0.00666 
0.01801 0.02837 
meanCP) U-0.00666T U-0.01 801T U-0.02837E 
varCP) 0.07676 0.06575 0.05576 
For each of the values of Qs an equilibrium is possible; and each of these equilibria is 
associated with a different price function, with the equilibrium price bearing a 
different relationship to the underlying variables. The above table shows that beta, the 
coefficient of the liquidation value in the price function, falls, and therefore reveals 
less about the price, as Qs rises, which causes the variance of the price of the risky 
asset to fall - since more weight is placed on the constants - and the conditional 
variance of the liquidation value to rise. The actual variance and the conditional 
variance therefore move in opposite directions. For a positive stock supply, the mean 
price level will move in the opposite direction to the conditional variance. 
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3.6.2 Assessing the stability of the roots 
There are three values of Qs for which initial beliefs can be borne out in the 
equilibrium price. But what happens at other values of Qs? For each possible value for 
Qs, we can work out the amount of stock that would be demanded, and hence the 
excess demand, if this was the value hypothesised by the agents. Figure 3.2 shows the 
excess demand function, and reveals that it behaves similarly to the QS function itself- 
the roots are the same as for that function; and for values of QS below the first root, 
excess demand is negative; between the first two roots it is positive; between the 
second and third roots it is negative again; and above the third root it is positive. 





The agents can work out the effect on excess demand of changing Qs, so it is perhaps 
legitimate to assume that they revise their assumptions about QS in the direction that 
would lead to a reduction in excess demand. This ensures that any of the three roots 
could sustain an equilibrium, with the starting position determining which one 
prevails. Thinking in terms of a price adjustment mechanism, however, we would 
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expect the price to rise (fall) if the excess demand is positive (negative). By looking at 
the first derivative of the mean-price function with respect to QS, we can see in which 
direction Qs would have to move to bring about the appropriate price reaction (on 
average). 




2L (PS + t)QS 17 (3.28) 
aQS [0 
0+ SXP, +t+ PL QS2 
)+ r2s2 PL 
(PS + t)] 
2 
Assume the mean stock supply is positive. The above term is therefore negative, 
which implies that when excess demand is negative the required fall in price must 
come about by a rise in Qs, and when it is positive the required rise in price must 
come about by a fall in Qs. Returning to figure 3.2, we can see that if Qs, is below the 
first root excess demand is negative, and so price would need to fall to induce 
additional demand, requiring a rise in Qs; if QS is between the first and second roots 
the positive excess demand can be remedied through the price by a fall in QS; between 
the second and third roots QS would need to rise; and above the third root QS must 
fall. Hence below the second root the system converges on the first root, and above 
the second root the system converges on the third root; the first and third roots 
therefore represent stable roots, while the second one is unstable, since slight 
deviations from this equilibrium will lead to a move towards one of the other two 
equilibria, from which a return would not occur. 
75 
Alternative models ofsecurity price equilibrium / Chapter 3 R. A. Courtenay 
3.6.3 Discontinuous changes in the price function 
Imagine that the parameters change over time. We have shown above that the constant 
term in the Qs function can vary independently of the other parameters. Were this to 
occur, the function would shift vertically, either upwards or downwards. This would 
involve more than one variable changing, with the value of one variable in some way 
'compensating' for the change in the other. It seems more sensible to look at 
movements in the curve brought about by changes in one variable alone. Below we 
will look at the effects of changes in the value of t (keeping ps constant). In using a 
single period model to tell a dynamic story in this way we are following the example 
set by Gennotte and Leland (1990). 
Assume that the value of t- the precision of the information about the stock supply - 
increases. We may start in a situation such as in figure 3.3, with only one feasible 
equilibrium value for Qs. This functional form is that given by the values used above, 
the one exception being that the value for t is now 0.45. 
Fig. 3.3: One root (t=0.45). 
0 
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As this precision rises, the curve moves upwards, until we reach the point, as in figure 
3.4, at which the curve representing the function is tangential to the x-axis, giving the 
system two potential equilibria; although we would expect the actual equilibrium 
position to remain at the higher of the two, with Qs decreasing smoothly as the curve 
rises. 
Fig. 3.4: Initial tangency. 
8 
Once the value of t reaches 0.5 we arrive at the situation given by figure 3.1, with 
three potential equilibria, two of which could be described as stable. Eventually, with t 
continuing to increase, another tangency position is reached, as shown in figure 3.5 
Once the curve moves beyond this point, the equilibrium value for Qs is forced to 
switch to what was previously the potential lower equilibrium, and is now the only 
equilibrium position. Of course, the equilibrium position may switch before the 
tangency position is reached, since the 'old' equilibrium becomes more and more 
unstable, in that the size of the disturbance required to send the system towards the 
other equilibrium becomes smaller and smaller as tangency is approached. For a value 
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Fig. 3.5: Final tangency. 
of t of 0.6 the situation is as figure 3.6. 
Fig. 3.6: Back to one root (t=O. 6). 
8 
The same effect - the emergence and disappearance of three real roots - can also be 
shown with a failing value for ps. 
Figure 3.7 shows the path that would be followed by Qs given changes in the value of 
t. At low values of t there is only one real root. As t rises, the value of this root falls, 
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with inertia keeping the equilibrium at the upper of the two potential equilibria when 
the other real roots emerge. When the point of the final tangency is reached, the 
equilibrium value of QS is forced to switch to the (previously) lower equilibrium. The 
path of Qs is thus discontinuous. When t is falling, the lower of the two lines is 
followed, with inertia keeping the value of Qs low until the upward switch is forced. 
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Figures 3.8 and 3.9 show the paths followed by K- the precision for each agent of the 
liquidation value conditional on all the information available to them - and the 
variance of the price, respectively. As would be expected, these contains 
discontinuities. They are also inversely related: when the precision of the supply 
information increases, the conditional precision increases, as does the volatility of the 
price. Figure 3.10 shows the corresponding path for the mean price level, for a mean 
stock supply of 10, and a liquidation value equal to its unconditional expected value 
of 1. It confirms that the price function contains discontinuities, and that over a range 
there are two potential equilibria for the price. Following the story we have told in this 
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Fig. 3.10: Price andprecision. 
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section, we can say that the particular equilibrium that will prevail is determined by a 
hysteresis effect. 
3.7 Conclusion 
The, model in this chapter serves to demonstrate that since stock prices aggregate 
information of more than one type there may not be a unique equilibrium, as it may be 
possible for the price to reflect a given set of information signals in more than one 
way. This result was achieved in the strict world of the information aggregation 
literature, where the price function is defined to be linear, and all the variables are 
taken from normal distributions. 
The possibility of multiple equilibria is in no way dependent on the assumption of 
agent homogeneity: it was shown (in section 3.3, equation 3.12) that for two agent 
types the equivalent value of Qs is the solution of a fifth-order polynomial, which 
gives even more scope for multiple equilibria; and it is possible to surmise that as the 
number of different agent types increases, the number of different potential equilibria 
will increase. 
The existence of multiple equilibria in this model is associated with discontinuities in 
the price function. Following Gennotte & Leland (1990) a story was developed in 
which small changes in the precision of the information can induce price crashes or 
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sharp upwards price revisions by causing the equilibrium to jump across the 
discontinuity. Unlike in Gennotte & Leland, however, where the cause of the crashes 
can be attributed to the portfolio insurers, the price revisions in our model are endemic 
to the system. This is an important result. In addition, our model is arguably more 
internally consistent than that of Gennotte & Leland, since the portfolio insurers in the 
latter act as though prices are distributed log-normally, although under the model 
structure prices are actually distributed normally. The use of a single period model is 
not the ideal way to obtain results about dynamic behaviour; but unfortunately the 
models that have extended the numbers of periods analysed - such as Kim and 
Verrecchia (1991a, 1991b), Brennan and Cao (1996) and Naik (1993) - are not 
capable of dealing with situations in which there are multiple potential equilibria, and 
so rule out by design the type of behaviour found here. The approach used here is 
therefore likely to be the most appropriate available. 
This work provides two reasons why the volatility of market prices may exceed the 
volatility of the determinants of the underlying stock value. These are that: firstly, 
there may be discontinuous movements between equilibria independent of changes in 
underlying value; and secondly, there may be smooth movements between equilibria 
as parameter values, such as the quality of information, change. This provides a 
potential explanation for the empirical evidence of such 'excess' volatility discovered 
initially by Shiller (1981) and LeRoy and Porter (1981) and supported - albeit to a 
milder extent - by subsequent studies! 
1 See Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997). 
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Appendix B: For Chapter 3 
BI General case 
The vector Y, = (u, Y, . iv-, 
P) follows a normal distribution with mean 
Ul Ul ol (a -+ 
P) U+ (a L-7L)T} and variance-covariance matrix Vj, where 
V, is: 
11h. Ilh,, 







VPS + ilt -, y S /PS 
-Y S 





We will assume that all rational investors observe both price and supply signals. 
Following Appendix A (Al), for rational investor i who receives the signal vector 
0, 
yj , fv-, the conditional mean (gi) and precision (K) are given by: 
K, =- var -'(u ly e P) 
= ho +si +ß2 
PL (PS + ti) (B2) 
2( 
YL PS + ti)+y S2 PL 
[t i= E(u 
lj7,, iv-,, P) 
=1 hoU + 
ßY LPL 
(PS + ti )L+ 
sy, (B3) 
Y L'(PI + tl)+y S'PL 
ßy SPA ß2 PL 
(PS + ti) 
L2 
(PS +t 1)+y S2 PL 
wi +ý 
L2 
(PS +t 1)+y S2PL 
iii 
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var-1 (q-) YL, ,YS, p2 PL p2(PS +tijl 
ß2 PL (PS +ti) 
YL2 (PS +t i)+y S2 PL 
This signal (q-) is a substitute for the price signal. 
The relationship between the posterior distribution and the demand for stock of agent i 
(D) is as follows: 
Di = 
r, 
ý (u lj7i, V, 0- 1= 
rK, (ýt, - P) (-, Vij5 u Var ulyj 
=r hoU+ I 
ßY LPL 
(PS + ti)_ L (B4) 
7 L2 
(PS + ti)+y S2 PL 
+ 
ßy 
IPLti gi +ß 
2PL (PS + ti) 
ii-KIP 
7L PS +tl)+y S2 PL YL2 
(PS + ti)+y s2 PL 
1 
In equilibrium the average demand per investor must equal the per capita supply. As 
the number of investors becomes large, the mean liquidation-value signal tends to the 
actual liquidation value; and the mean supply signal tends to the actual outcome for 
the part of supply to which the signal relates. The following expression must therefore 
hold: 
84 
Alternative models ofsecurity price equilibrium I Appendix B R. A. Courtenay 
3ý=K+Z = 
1 
f bi di 
ßY LPL 
(S+ ti) hii +p 17 + S, (u- + 2+ti )+y 2 
YL (PS SPL 
+t (B5) ßy, 'ýPLti ß2 PL 
(PS cS +%> - Ki j5) di 2+ti )+y 2 +77- 
L 





di + rsii 
0YL 
(PS +ti)+^( 2SPL 
11 ß2p +t 
+gf- 








where rfr, di s =- (11r) f r, s, di , and: 
00 
K =- (11r) f ri K, 
0 
ß2 PL (PS + ti) 








di 2 (PS +ti)+y2 r, YL SPL 
Re-arrangement and substitution for 4ý reveals the expression for the price given in 
the main text. 
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B2 Heterogeneous agents with non-stochastic stock 
supply S 
With heterogeneous agents and a stock supply component S that is non-stochastic, the 
situation is as given by the large-market form of Hellwig (1980). The equilibrium 
price function takes the following fonn: 
P =a. 'T +a LL +PU-Y LL 
where: 
2S2 h,, +s+r PL 
(X L=- 
rSPL 
2S2 - +s+r PL 




Ilr + rsPL Ilr YL= h +s+r 2S2 PL 
= 
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B3 Two agent types 
The demand of agent i in groupf is: 
ßY LPL 
(PS + tf )- 





L PL (B7) 
+- 
ßY SPLtf -+ 
ß2 PL (PS + tf 
) 





2 (PS + tf 
)+y 2 
YL+t SPL YL SPL 
, (PS 
The demand per agent in groupf is therefore: 
PYLPL(PS+tf) 




+t S L PL 
PY SPLtf - 
p2 PL 




)+Y 2 S+ 2 (PS +tf )+y 2 
Kf j5 
YL+t SPL YL SPL 
The stock supply, as in the previous section, now represents that available to each 
investor. Taking ýtf as the measure of agent-groupf in the economy, the market- 
clearing condition is given by: 
S+L=Df +Dg 
ßyLPL(PS+tf) 





ß2 PL (PS + tf ) 
++ 
tf 
)+y 2 Y2 
(PS 
+tf 
)+y2 Kf (B9) 



















72 + tg)+7 2 Sy2 L 
(PS 
PL L 
(PS + tg )+ Y 2SPL 
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where: 
Kf =- ho + sf +ß2 
PL 
(PS + tf ) 
f 
)+, 




Re-arrangement and substitution for 4' reveals the expression given in the main text. 
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Chapter 4 
Acquisition of information about stock 
value and liquidity trading 
4.1 Introduction 
The stock demand of investors other than those trading due to liquidity considerations 
reflects the information they have about the future stock value. Learning about the 
demand from other investors therefore provides an alternative way of learning about 
future value distinct from doing this directly. In this chapter we look at the relative 
incentives to acquire information of these different types in an information 
aggregation framework. More specifically we look at the acquisition of information 
when investors have information about the activities of liquidity traders, as well as the 
future stock value, as in the previous chapter. Since the concept of supply information, 
as developed in the previous chapter, is new to the literature, what follows also 
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represents original work, although it draws heavily on Verrecchia (1982) - which 
endogenises the acquisition of information in the Hellwig (1980) framework - and 
uses similar cost functions for information that relate cost and the precision of the 
information acquired. Our treatment of the endogenous acquisition of the two 
information types is necessarily more mathematically complex than, but is also 
conceptually similar to, the treatment of the issue in Verrecchia. For the sake of 
tractability we will assume, unlike Verrecchia, that the agents are homogeneous, as we 
did previously when investigating the possibility of price discontinuities. 
Once we have developed the model analytically, we go on to look at some numerical 
examples, to see how the amounts of information acquired change with the cost of 
information, and attempt to assess the validity of the example of dual equilibria and 
price 'crashes' given in the previous chapter. 
4.2 Model structure 
As in the previous chapter we will assume, following Hellwig (1980), that the 
investors are endowed with an initial wealth (WO), and not a quantity of stock and 
bonds as in Verrecchia (1982). However, since in a 'large' market the agents will 
learn nothing from their endowments, the difference "turns out to be irrelevanf' 
(Verrecchia, footnote 7, p. 1420), and so the (slightly) more tractable assumption is 
used. 
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Different agents receive different signals, although these are taken from the same 
distributions, and so have the same precisions. The random vector 
is therefore distributed Normally with mean ýu, ZA0,0,0, O) 
and variance 
111, I, 1 
1) 
1,1 
. We will continue to assume that these random 
(h,, 
'PL 'PS ttSS 
variables are distributed independently, and so all covariances are zero. 
There is an equilibrium price function of the following linear form: 
P =a Y +a LL +P-7 sS -Y LL (4.1) 
In the previous chapter we showed that the coefficients of this price function are given 
by the following: 
(X u= 
(XL =- 
rSPL (PS +, ' JQS2 
K PL +PS +tl 
1r 2S2 PL (PS +t 
s+ 
QS2 PL +PS +ti 
7= -1 
1+ QSrSPSPL 
r QS2 PL +PS +t 
7L =II+ 




r2s2 PL (PS + t) 
QS2 PL +PS +t 
2p =P= rs YL 
(4.2) 
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-Ys QS ý YL 
and QS is the solution to the following cubic: 
QS _ IXQS2 PL + PS + t)+ QSPJ 
2 st =0 (4.3) 
4.3 Endogenous acquisition of information 
Fortunately, the above equilibria still hold when information acquisition is made 
endogenous, since these are the relevant equilibria once the information has been 
acquired. 
Assume that the traders are faced with convex cost functions (c(s), d(t)) which give 
the relationship between the outlay and the precision of the information that will be 
acquired. Each trader wishes to maximise his utility at liquidation, which, as we 
demonstrate in Appendix C (sections CI -C3), is as follows: 
1 
hoPSPL (Y +y' t) 2 
(hoy *+ PSPL (X 2 )iho + SXY *+YL 2t)+ ß2 PL (PS + t) (4.4) 
x exp -Wo 
+ c(s) + d(t)) 
r 
where: 
7*ý7L 2PS + 7S 2 PL 
and 
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L 
a It + 
(ot 
L -7 L)= u 
The optimal values of s and t satisfy the following Kuhn-Tucker conditions: 
2: 0, t 2: 0, 
ýQ) 
< 0,0, s 0, t (4.5) -ýQ» - Ft as et ( as 
The partial derivatives with respect to the information precisions are given in the 
appendix (C4), and reveal that the agents will wish to purchase information with the 
following precision: ' 
-. 
2(c' + cý, 
') 
ß2 PL (PS + t) 
s=max. s, s- -(h +s+2+ t)+y 
S2 rYL (PS PL 
max.. 
2(c, ' + d, 
')_ 
rp 27 S2PL 
2 
2 
+ PS + t)+y S2 (ho sYA PL 




where 9 and i represent minimum, or 'base-line', precisions, which the agents will 
automatically receive free of charge. Verrecchia implicitly assumed that these base- 
line levels were set at zero; but we allow the possibility that they can take positive 
values in order to make it easier to interpret the results of the previous chapter. 
I The convexity of c(s) and d(t) ensures that a maximum has been found. 
93 
Alternative models ofsecurity price equilibrium /Chapter 4 RA. Courtenay 
The decisions concerning the quality of infon-nation to acquire of the two types must 
be taken jointly with each other - since the precision of one information type enters 
the maximisation equation for the other - and also with the equations determining the 
equilibrium price function. 
4.4 Linear cost functions 
At this point we will make the simplifying assumptions that the cost functions c(st) 
and d(st) are linear and independent; and in particular that they take the following 
fonn: 
C(S, t) = C(S) =s-s+b,, 2a, 
d(s, t) = d(t) =t --t + b, 2a, 
(4.8) 
The cost function for value information takes the same form as in Verrecchia, with the 
added possibility that the base-line precision level may exceed zero. 
The first derivatives of the cost functions with respect to the precisions are: 
c'(s) 1/ 2 a., 
d'(t) 112a, 
(4.9) 
We can express the precision of the infonnation the agents receive as the sum of the 
precision of their endowment and the precision of the information purchased: 
s+s 
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+ (4.10) 
Given the above cost functions, and after substituting in the expressions for the 
coefficients of the price function, the precisions of the information acquired can be 
expressed as: 
r2 (37+ý*IPL(PS ++t* 
max. ý 0, ho + 37 ++- +i+t* +QS 2 
(4.11) 
ra, PS PL 
I 
+F+ ^* + Qs 2 t* =max. 0, t ho +Y+s* PL5 3(g+Sl 222 
XPS 
r) QS PL a, (4.12) 
+r'(s + s' 
y p, (p, +i+ i* Xp, +i+ i* t +QS2PL)]=' 
1 
The equations for QS, s and t can be solved simultaneously subject to the Kuhn- 
Tucker conditions given previously. This can be done once we have assigned 
numerical values to the parameters of the model. 
One result we can immediately obtain from the above is that when the base-line 
precision of value information (Y ) is zero, and no information is obtained about value 
(s* = 0), there will also be no information obtained about supply (t* = 0). This can 
be expressed as: 
s0 implies t* =0 when 9=0. (4.13) 
As the cost of value-information decreases, traders will acquire more of it. As the cost 
becomes 'small', traders will acquire a 'large' amount, and will therefore know the 
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liquidation value with certainty. At this point supply-information becomes redundant, 
and so we have: 
Ila., =O implies s* =oo and t* =0. (4.14) 
An increase in the cost of value-information has three effects on the acquisition of 
supply-inforniation: firstly, there is a 'substitution' effect, leading to an increased 
desire to purchase the now-cheaper supply-information; secondly, there is an 'income' 
effect, which tends to reduce the amount of supply-information purchased; and 
thirdly, there is a 'usefulness' effect, under which a cheaper cost of value-infonnation 
- since it leads to a greater amount of value-information purchased, and consequently 
an improved level of knowledge about the liquidation value - reduces the need for 
supply-information. When the cost of value-information is 'small', the usefulness 
effect dominates, and no supply-information is acquired. As the cost rises, the 
substitution effect can lead to the purchase of some supply-information, provided its 
cost is below a threshold; but eventually the income effect will dominate and lead to 
supply-information being sacrificed for value-information. 
4.5 Threshold cost levels 
Assume that the base-line precisions (Y ,i) are zero. In this situation, traders will 
purchase a positive amount of value-information when the following condition holds: 
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When a positive amount of value-information is purchased, supply-information will 
be purchased provided that the following condition holds: 
(h,, +s+r 2S2 PSPL) (4.16) 
A necessary requirement for this to hold is that it holds for large amounts of value- 
information, and that therefore the following holds: 




4.6 Information cost, conditional precision and prices 
Comparing the expression for the precision of value-information acquired with that 
for the precision of the liquidation value conditional on the price and -the private 
information signals reveals that we can express the equilibrium level of value- 
information as: 
K 
s s=max. Y, Y+^* =1 
I 
ras (4.18) 
max. Y+ s^* IK = ra 
This shows that, whenever a positive amount of value-information is acquired over 
and above the base-line levels, the conditional variance of the liquidation value is 
97 
Alternative models ofsecurity price equilibrium /Chapter 4 R. A. Courtenay 
determined solely by the unit cost of value-information and the risk-tolerance of the 
agents, in the following way: 
ras (4.19) 
Changes in the cost of supply-information, which affects the amount of supply- 
information acquired, will therefore cause a compensating change in the amount of 
value-information acquired. Obtaining information about the stock supply therefore 
allows the agents to reach the desired level of informativeness of prices in a more 
desirable way, but does not alter the market equilibrium. 
The above result also implies that the informativeness of price is a non-increasing 
function of the cost of value-information (and is a decreasing function when some 
(additional) value-information is being acquired), which confirms Corollary 4 of 
Verrecchia (1982, p. 1425-26). In addition, it shows that the informativeness of price 
is a non-decreasing function of the risk tolerance of the agents, confirming Corollary 5 
(ibid. p. 1426-27). 
When positive amounts of value-information are purchased, the mean price level can 





The mean price level is therefore not affected by the cost of supply-information, and 
hence the amount of supply-information acquired, when some (additional) value- 
information is also being acquired. 
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4.7 Numerical examples 
By attaching numerical values to the underlying parameters we can observe the nature 
of the equilibria for various levels of the information costs. We will look at five 
examples. First, we look at an example with very simple parameters, including base- 
line precisions of zero, and observe the effect of varying the cost of acquiring each 
type of information on the amount of information acquired and the mean price level. 
We then repeat the procedure using the parameter values given in Gennotte & Leland 
(1990), in order to demonstrate that the nature of the results in the first example were 
not entirely dependent on the simplistic parameter values. In the third example, using 
the simple parameter values, we use a positive base-line level and a high marginal 
cost for value-infonnation (112a. ) to effectively fix the precision of the value- 
information (s), which allows us to isolate the effect of cost on the acquisition of 
supply-information (t). This third example provides a comparative case for the fourth 
example, in which the parameter values used in the 'price-crash' example of the 
previous chapter are used to show how 'crashes' can occur under this scenario. The 
final example illustrates a case of multiple equilibria. 
4.7.1 Example #1: Zero base-line, simple parameters 
We will start by looking at the equilibria for different levels of the cost of supply- 
information. We assume that the base-line precision levels are zero. The parameter 
values used are as given in table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1: Zero base-line, simple parameters, fixed cost ofs-information. 
ho I PS PL a, 
0 3 
Figure 4.1 shows the levels of s and t that will be acquired in equilibrium for a given 
unit cost of information about supply (t-information). As would be expected, the 
amount of t-information acquired decreases with its cost, until a threshold is reached, 
above which none is acquired. The amount of s-information acquired rises to offset 
the fall in t-information, maintaining a constant overall precision in the way 
demonstrated above. 







1 -. 0.5 
0.95 10 
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 
unit cost of t-info. 
Figure 4.2 shows the amount spent on acquiring information, for both t-information 
alone and s- and t-information together. 
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Fig. 4.2: Amount spent on information, with varying cost oft-information. 
0.25 
C: 0.2 0 
0.15 CL 




0 0 -+j 
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 
cost of t-info. 
1-t-info. only-total info. 
As can be seen, the t-information spend follows a Laffer-curve, with both zero cost 
and zero purchase implying zero spend, with positive levels between these two 
extremes. The total information spend must rise with the cost of t-information, since 
the same overall precision must be maintained with a more expensive information 
mix. Since the same precision is maintained for all t-information cost levels, the mean 
price is also invariant. 
We will now look at the effects of varying the cost of information about value (s- 
information). Similar parameters to the above will be used, but with a fixed cost of t- 
information. The precise values are given in table 4.2. 
Table 4.2: Zero base-line, simple parameters, fixed cost of t-information. 
ho I Ps- [-PL r y T -- a, 
I II I 1 0 0 30 
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Figure 4.3 shows the equilibrium precision levels. 





. 0.8 4 
0.6 
2 . 0.4 
1 0.2 
0 0 
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 
unit cost of s-info. 
These are as we would expect, with the level of s-information acquired falling with its 
cost until it reaches zero, and the level of t-information acquired again starting at zero, 
becoming positive - since the cost of t-information is below the threshold - and then 
falling back to zero while some s-information is still being acquired. Figure 4.4 shows 
the amounts spent on the information. With a varying cost of s-information, the 
amounts spent on both types of information (and the total amount spent on 
information) follow Laffer curves. 
Since the precision of information as a whole is affected by the cost of s-information, 
so is the mean price level. Figure 4.5 shows the mean price levels corresponding to 
this example. As can be seen, the mean price level uniformly decreases with the cost 
of s-information up to the threshold above which no s-information is acquired. 
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4.7.2 Example #2: Gennotte & Leland inputs 
In order to show that the nature of the above results is not heavily dependent on the 
(ad-hoc and simplistic) parameter values we used above, we can study the equilibria 
for an alternative set of parameters given in the literature by Gennotte & Leland 
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(1990). The cost of acquiring information about the liquidation value can be chosen so 
that the precision is as given in that paper: in particular, the target value of 2.5 is 
achieved, when t is zero, at a value for a, of 18402. Our full set of parameter values is 
therefore as given in table 4.3. 
Table 4.3: Gennotte & Leland inputs. 
ho PS PL r a, 
12.5 5884J 5-884 1 1 0 0 0 18402 
Figures 4.6 and 4.7 show the effect of varying the cost of acquiring supply 
information on both the amounts of value- and supply-information acquired, and the 
information spend. 
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These closely resemble those for our previous example. 
4.7.3 Example #3: Fixed s 
The following two examples look at scenarios in which the precision of value- 
information is effectively fixed due to its high marginal cost. The parameters used are 
as shown in table 4.4. 
Table 4.4: Positive base-linefor value information. 
ho Ps PL r- a, 
0 'high') 
Figures 4.8 and 4.9 show the levels of supply-information acquired, and the resultant 
mean price level. 
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Now that the reduction in the level of t-information acquired, brought about by its 
rising cost, can no longer be offset by additional investment in s-information, the 
overall precision of information is reduced, and hence so is the mean price level. 
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4.7.4 Example #4: Price crashes 
In a previous paper, in which s and t were not determined endogenously, we showed 
that 'price crashes', in the sense of discontinuities in the price function, 2 could occur 
as a result of changes in the information precisions. In this example we show that they 
can also occur as a result of changes in the cost of information, provided that there is a 
positive base-line level of value-information, and the marginal cost of such 
infonnation is high. 
This example shows that by effectively fixing the precision of value-information (s), 
as in the previous example, changes in the cost of supply-information can induce price 
crashes for certain parameter values. We will use the same parameters as in the 
previous chapter, which are those given in table 4.5. 
Table 4.5: Parameter valuesfrom chapter three with zero supply info. base-line. 
ho Ps I PL I rI gI jI yI f 1 a, 
12 25 1 1000 1 1 11 1 10 1 0.5-1 -0 'high) 
Figure 4.10 shows the precision of the supply-information acquired at each cost level. 
We now have a situation in which the precision of the supply-information acquired 
does not move smoothly to zero as its cost increases, but falls at an ever-diminishing 
rate, before suddenly slumping to zero. Figure 4.11 shows the associated mean price 
levels. 
Following Gennotte & Leland (1990). 
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This reveals that the abrupt cessation of supply-information acquisition causes a 
corresponding discontinuity in the mean price level. In this example, it is therefore the 
crossing of a threshold for the cost of supply-information to either induce agents to 
purchase their first information units, or to cease purchasing any, that causes the 
equilibrium to move from one side of the discontinuity to the other. 
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4.7.5 Example #5: Dual equilibria 
Although the previous example showed that price crashes can occur, it did not reveal a 
possibility for multiple equilibria. We know that multiple equilibria are possible, since 
we can set the base-line levels of precision equal to the values that induced multiple 
equilibria in the previous chapter, and impose high marginal costs of information. In 
the following example, by positing a positive base-line precision level for supply- 
information, as well as value-information, we demonstrate that multiple equilibria can 
also occur with agents purchasing positive extra amounts of supply-information. The 
parameters used are as given in table 4.6. 
Table 4.6: Parameter valuesfrom chapter three with supply info. base-line. 
ho PS PL r !II fI yI fI 
12 25 1000 1 1 1 10 1 0.5 1 0.54 1 
Depending on which of the two potential equilibria prevail, the agents will either 
acquire no additional supply-information, or will acquire an amount that is detertnined 
by the relationship given in figure 4.12. Figure 4.13 shows the two possible mean 
price levels. 
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4.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has investigated the incentives of traders to acquire information about the 
supply of stock emanating from liquidity traders as well as information directly 
relating to future stock value. We have found that with linear cost functions for 
information, and no free information endowment, the informativeness of the price is 
determined solely by the cost of value-information and the risk tolerance of the 
traders. In this situation, the acquisition of supply-information can sometimes provide 
a cheaper way of obtaining the desired level of informativeness, but will not alter this 
desired level. 
We have also seen that, if the endowment of free value-information is assumed to be 
positive, price discontinuities can occur at the point at which supply-information 
ceases (or begins) to be acquired, following changes in the cost of this information; 
but there is only one potential equilibrium for each cost level, and so prices do not 
display hysteresis. In addition, there may also be dual equilibria, but we have found 
no evidence that changes in (supply-) information cost alone can precipitate a forced 
movement from one equilibrium to another: this remains the preserve of changes in 
the base-line precision levels, as illustrated in the previous chapter. 
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Appendix C: For Chapter 4 
CI Maximising traders' expected utility 
The traders aim to maximise the expected utility of their consumption at liquidation, 
which is as follows: 
maximise E. u, wy. p 
[U(i! D + B)] 
max. E- 
ýj, (exp(-(R-D+ B)lr)li-v = wJ7 P)l {I, ir, D, B) w-y, p 
=max. E- 
', 
E,, exp(-(u--Pý {t,., ) W-Y 
c(s) - d(t) , y, j5 
)Iiv 
= W, 57 
= max. E- exp 
I 
(#J!,, ý)- j55 Wý - c(s) - d(t) 
I 
a2r 
To analyse this further, we need to develop some background theory. 
C2 Multivariate normal distributions 
(Cl) 
The density function for the multivariate normal distribution can be expressed as: 
1 
1/2 exp -I vm-l (27cy'D ý(2 V) (C2) 
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where M is the n-variable variance-covariance matrix, D is the determinant of M, v is 
the vector of variables or, as here, the vector of the differences between variables and 
their mean value. 
The density function for the trivariate normal distribution is thus: 
I I- I[ 2Cr. 2 
-(: FY. 
2)( 
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(C3) 
and (I 12 represents the variance of variable i, ay represents the covariance between 
variables i andj, and io represents the mean of variable i. 
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And for the univariate normal the density function is: 
I 
)V2 exp 27C 
(C5) 
The integral of the density function of the n-variate normal distribution over one of 
the variables is the marginal distribution, which is the density function for the n- 
minus- I -variate case. Hence: 
I I- I 
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Hence any expression of the form: 
(C6) 
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= ff(27t )3/2 expl- 
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C3 Application to our model 
Our model gives us the following: 
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The coefficients a, ...... a6 are too cumbersome to be expressed here. 
Using the technique given in Appendix A (section Al, expressions A3, A4) and 
(C13) 
rearranging, we can write the expression incorporating the conditional mean and 
variance as follows: 
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-=a3+ ag D3c, 
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Substituting for a,, a2,...., a12, equation C 15 becomes: 
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C4 Partial derivatives 
The partial derivatives of the expected utility function with respect to the precisions of 
the value- and supply-information are as follows: 
I 
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Appendix D: Glossary of terms used in 
chapters 2-4. 
Terms with equivalents in the basic Hellwig-type, model. 
jy, Wealth of agent i. 
ri Risk tolerance of investor i. 
Market price. 
Liquidation value (L. V. ). 
Unobserved stock supply (per investor). 
Investor i's information signal concerning the liquidation value. 
ho (Unconditional) precision of the liquidation value. 
PL Precision of the unobserved stock supply (L). 
Sj Precision of investor i's LN. signal. 
(Unconditional) mean of the L. V. 
Mean of the unobserved stock supply. 
K, Precision of L. V. conditional on price & investor i's information. 
Terms added in Chapter 2. 
N Number of L. V. components. 
N Measure in market of investors receiving info. of component L 
Terms added in Chapter 3. 
S (Noisily-) observed stock supply (per investor). 
iv-, Investor i's information signal concerning the stock supply. 
PS Precision of the observed stock supply (S). 
Precision of investor i's stock supply signal. 
Mean of the observed stock supply. 
Terms added in Chapter 4. 
a, Cost co-efficient for L. V. infon-nation. 
a, Cost co-efficient for supply information. 
S* Additional purchase of L. V. information precision. 
t Additional purchase of supply information precision. 
Base-line endowment of L. V. information precision. 
Base-line endowment of supply information precision. 
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Chapter 5 
Speculation and ill-informed 
investors 
5.1 Introduction 
In chapter two we saw how the presence of liquidity traders can allow a partially- 
revealing equilibrium to occur in an information aggregation framework. In chapters 
three and four we saw how the existence of private information about the level of 
liquidity trading can give rise to the potential for multiple equilibria and price 
'crashes. ' In the remainder of this thesis we investigate the potential behavioural 
attributes of liquidity - or ill-informed - trading, and investigate the implications of 
this for security prices. 
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In the models of the previous three chapters, prices in the absence of rational 
investors, although defined, are meaningless, and do not allow for a comparison with 
and without rational speculators. In what follows we begin to look on liquidity traders 
more as a group of ill-informed investors that are potentially capable of supporting 
prices on their own. In this context, there are three possibilities for the effect of 
informed investor behaviour on ill-informed investor activity: it can mitigate its 
effects; it can unwittingly exacerbate its effects; or it can deliberately induce 
destabilising behaviour. We will see below that the particular type of behaviour 
postulated for the ill-informed investors crucially influences the effect of informed 
trader behaviour. This issue is similar to that of the effect of speculators on prices in 
the presence of non-speculators. In some instances, the informed / ill-informed 
categorisation will correspond to the speculator / non-speculator categorisation; but 
this need not always be the case. 
In the following section we look at the concept of speculation, and assess the effect 
speculators are likely to have on market prices. In section 5.3 we investigate the effect 
on prices of fads in ill-informed investor behaviour that not influenced by market 
prices, and in particular utilise a version of the model given in Shiller (1984). In 
section 5.4 we go on to look at the implications of ill-informed investor behaviour that 
is influenced by market prices, focusing particularly on Hart (1977). 
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5.2 Speculation 
5.2.1 Defining speculation 
Speculation can be thought of as trading activity motivated by expectations of 
abnormal returns resulting from subsequent price shifts, and will generally involve a 
reversal of the initial position taken. This is compatible with the definition given by 
Kaldor, who defined speculation as: 
"the purchase (or sale) of goods with a view to resale (repurchase) at a later 
date, where the motive behind such action is the expectation of a change in the 
relevant prices relatively to the ruling price and not a gain accruing through 
their use, or any kind of transformation effected in them, or their transfer 
between markets" (1939, p. 1). 
Hirshleifer used a similar definition, noting that: 
"Speculation is ordinarily understood to mean the purchase of a good for later 
re-sale rather than for use, or the temporary sale of a good with the intention of 
later re-purchase - in the hope of profiting from an intervening price change" 
(1977, p. 975). 
The expected price movement motivates speculators to pay more for the asset than 
they would if they were prevented from reselling, which provides the definition of 
speculative behaviour given by Harrison & Kreps (1978), as we saw in the first 
chapter of this thesis. 
These definitions of speculation, and the associated implicit definitions of non- 
speculators, seems fairly suitable for commodities markets, since producers buy inputs 
124 
Alternative models ofsecurityprice equilibrium I Chapter 5 RA. Courtenay 
with no intention of selling them back at a later date and sell outputs with no intention 
of buying them back, and so could be thought of as non-speculators. Even this is not 
totally clear-cut, however, since any attempt to 'time' purchases or sales would take 
such traders into the realm of speculation. 
In asset markets such as the stock market, separating investors into speculators and 
non-speculators is more difficult. This is because the possibility of re-sale is generally 
an important consideration of an investment decision. Few investors are likely to be 
willing to pay as much for an asset they cannot resell as for one they can. Telser 
recognised the problem as it related to his definition, 
"the stock market is not one for which the theory described seems applicable, 
because no reasonable distinction between speculators and other traders can be 
made. Perhaps the only non-speculators in that market are those corporations 
engaged in a new stock issue" (p. 295). 
Thus for the stock market the problem is no longer one of defining the behaviour of 
speculators and non-speculators, but rather one of defining the behaviour of the 
different types of speculators. As Baumol (1957) argued, in this situation: 
speculation "just amounts to some more skilful speculators profiting at the 
expense of others" (p. 264). 
Baumol also argued, however, that in practice the problem of defining speculators and 
non-speculators may not pose a serious problem: 
"For the relevant dichotomy may not be between pure speculators and pure 
non-speculators, but rather it may involve conscious vs. unconscious 
speculators or professional vs. amateur speculators, or even pure speculators 
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vs. those whose market behaviour is not primarily influenced by speculative 
considerations" (p. 264). 
For the stock market, it may therefore be more relevant to focus on the informed / ill- 
informed distinction, as we do in this thesis. This provides a get-out clause for 
followers of the Friedman school, who believe that profitable speculation must 
stabilise market prices, since their argument is couched in terms of speculators and 
non-speculators. The most important implication of our alternative focus is that, 
while, as Friedman pointed out, non-speculators will only be influenced by current 
prices, and not by past prices or trends in prices, ' ill-informed investors are not so 
constrained. We will see below that this distinction is crucial. 
5.2.2 Categorising speculation 
A useful starting point for the categorisation of speculation is Irwin (1937), who 
delineated three broad categories for the motivations for the trading activities of 
investors, which are 'speculation, ' 'movement trading, ' and 'manipulation, ' where: 
"It is essential in the concept of speculation that profit to the speculator 
coincide with benefit to society" (Irwin, 1937, p. 268). 
Under this categorisation, speculation therefore stabilises the price by definition. 
Movement trading involves traders chasing expected movements away from 
fundamentals, and manipulation, as had previously been recognised, involves: 
"the creation of an artificial price by planned action, whether by one man or a 
group of men.... Manipulation always implies the use of special power and 
ingenious methods in handling the markef '(Dice, 1929, p. 414). 
I In a letter to Baumol. As related in Baumol (195 7). 
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Since manipulation involves traders influencing market conditions and prices in such 
a way as to induce a profit, it involves the use of market power, something that is not 
implied by Irwinian speculation or movement trading. Allen & Gale (1992) divide 
manipulation itself into three categories: action-based; information-based; and trade- 
based. Action-based manipulation involves taking actions that will change the value 
of the stock after first taking stock positions. Information-based manipulation involves 
the spreading of false rumours and information. Trade-based manipulation simply 
involves trading the stock: it thus relies on the characteristics of the market and its 
participants for its succcss. 
5.2.3 The effect of speculators on the market 
Friedman famously argued that the effect of ill-informed trader demand on prices will 
be mitigated by the speculative activity of informed traders, claiming (in the context 
of a foreign currency market under flexible exchange rates) that: 
"People who argue that speculation is generally destabilising seldom realize 
that this is largely equivalent to saying that speculators lose money, since 
speculation can be destabilising in general only if speculators on the average 
sell.... low.... and buy.... high. " (Friedman, 1953, p 175). 
It is fairly clear that the definition of speculation used by Friedman encompassed 
Irwin's categories of speculation and movement trading, and also trade-based 
manipulation. Friedman's argument echoes that of Mill a century before, that 
described the behaviour of speculators as: 
"naturally buying things when they are cheapest, and storing them up to be 
brought again into the market when the price has become unusually high; the 
tendency of their operations is to equalize price, or at least to moderate its 
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inequalities. The prices of things are neither so much depressed at one time, 
nor so much raised at another, as they would be if speculative dealers did not 
exisf'(1848, Book IV, chapter II, section 4, pp 67). 
Against the view that speculators may destabilise the price, Mill argued that: 
"All that part of the rise of price by which it exceeds what there are 
independent grounds for, cannot give to the speculators as a body any benefit, 
since the price is as much depressed by their sales as it was raised by their 
purchases; and while they gain nothing by it, they lose, not only their trouble 
and expenses, but almost always much more, through the effects incident to 
the artificial rise of price, in checking consumption, and bringing forward 
supplies from unforeseen quarters. The operations, therefore, of speculative 
dealers, are useful to the public whenever profitable to themselves.... The 
interest, in short, of the speculators as a body, coincides with the interest of the 
public; and as they can only fail to serve the public interest in proportion as 
they miss their own, the best way to promote the one is to leave them to pursue 
the other in perfect freedom" (Book IV, chapter II, section 4, pp 69). 
Mill was therefore of the opinion that only when the activity of informed traders is 
stabilising can it be profitable. Insofar as speculators possess information of a higher 
than average quality, and actively seek out even better information, they will tend to 
drive prices towards 'fundamental' levels; which ensures that other investors trade at 
'fair' prices, and that the degree of price fluctuation in the market will be minimised. 
Speculators that trade on the basis of poor information will perform badly and their 
long-term losses will ensure their elimination from the market. Hence speculators 
reduce uncertainty; and although they may be able to make profits by utilising their 
informational advantage, this profit does not come at the expense of other market 
agents, but rather as a natural consequence of their price-stabilising activities. In 
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addition, the greater the degree of competition between speculators, the lower will be 
their profits, and the closer the relationship between prices and fundamentals; so 
efforts should be made to encourage speculation rather than hinder it. If exploitation 
by speculators of the ignorance of other traders is theoretically possible, its potential 
threat can thus be minimised by minimising the market power of individual 
speculators, and by maximising the other traders' relevant knowledge. 
This view of speculation contrasts with the widely held opinion that speculators can 
destabilise markets and so increase uncertainty, and also profit at the expense of other 
traders who are not primarily engaged in speculation. 
5.2.4 Speculation and price stabilisation 
Irwin argued that some of the activity possible under our definition of speculation 
could be destabilising due to: 
"the technical conditions of the market and especially.... the ways in which the 
public enters and leaves the market" (Irwin, 1937, pp 269). 
Such 'technical conditions' could pave the way for profitable trade-based 
manipulation. Keynes and Kaldor have both given the argument that speculators may 
dominate and destabilise a market. As we have said elsewhere, Keynes argued that 
this was due primarily to the inherent uncertainty concerning the future, but he also 
assumed that many market participants behaved in a relatively unsophisticated way, 
and were ripe for exploitation. In a similar vein, Kaldor noted that: 
"If the proportion of speculative transactions in the total is large, it may 
become, in fact, more profitable for the individual speculator to concentrate on 
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forecasting the psychology of other speculators, rather than the trend of the 
non-speculative elements" (Kaldor, 1939, p. 2). 
This again assumed that more sophisticated speculators could concentrate on the 
exploitation of less sophisticated ones. Kaldor is thus arguing that the presence of 
unsophisticated speculators may prevent sophisticated speculation from being 
stabilising. 
To the extent that speculators keep prices in line with the future underlying asset 
value, it may well have a stabilising effect. Once the behaviour of other investors is 
taken into account, however, as it must be, since speculators trade on the basis of 
expected future price not value, the situation changes. It is not that there are two 
different types of speculation, but rather that there are two different scenarios under 
which the behaviour of the other investors either causes speculators to act as though 
they are concerned solely with chasing value, or induces an alternative effect. The 
Friedman proposition can only retain its validity in a general setting if we classify the 
other investors as speculators. 
Natural selection is not likely to reduce the effect of ill-informed investors to 
negligible proportions since there may be a constant influx of new funds, and the 
returns of these investors may not be much smaller than those of more informed 
investors. In fact, as De Long, Shleifer, Summers & Waldmann (1990b) demonstrate, 
ill-informed investors may actually earn greater profits than rational investors, as a 
result of taking more risky positions. 
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5.3 111-informed investor behaviour 
In remainder of this chapter we will look at some of the effects of different forms of 
ill-informed investor behaviour. We begin in this section by utilising the framework 
of Shiller (1984) to look at the effect of fads, under which ill-informed investor 
behaviour is determined independently of the price. In section 5.4 we go on to look at 
the effect of ill-informed investor behaviour that is affected by current and some past 
prices, focusing particularly on Hart (1977). 
5.3.1 Fads in ill-informed investor behaviour 
When infonned rational investors are risk averse, their required rate of return is 
determined by the aggregate amount of stock they hold, and so fluctuations in the 
stock demand of the ill-informed investors will affect prices, even if fully anticipated. 
111-informed investor demand can vary for a number of reasons, such as fluctuations in 
wealth. Shiller (1984,1988) argues that it can also vary as a result of fads and 
fashions, as the amount of interest in the stock market in general, or specific sectors, 
or specific stocks, fluctuates. Contagion can occur as more and more investors 
become interested in investment due to contact with, or the observation of, others that 
are interested. The stock market differs from other examples of contagion in that the 
price level is positively related to the amount of interest in stocks, and the amount of 
interest in stocks can also be positively related to the price level, which means that the 
mechanism of the contagion can shift onto the price. This, according to Shiller (1988) 
is the point at which a fad becomes a bubble. In the following section we analyse the 
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effect of changes in the level of ill-informed investor demand that is independent of 
the price, using the framework of Shiller (19 84), and so under the above definition we 
look at the possibility of fads and not bubbles. 
5.3.2 Modelling faddish behaviour 
The model in Shiller (1984) is a simple adaptation of the dividend discount model, in 
which rational 'smart money' investors must estimate the future stream of demand 
from ordinary investors, which is assumed to be deten-nined independently of the 
price, as well as future dividends. This polarisation of investors is clearly a gross 
oversimplification, but since the aim here is to illustrate the possible effect on market 
prices of ordinary investor demand that is known by informed investors in advance, it 
serves its purpose acceptably. 
It is assumed that the supply of stock is fixed, beliefs about the future dividend stream 
are homogeneous within the group of informed investors, and the risk-aversion of the 
group of informed investors as a whole is expected to remain constant over time. The 
proportion of the total stock outstanding demanded by informed investors (Q) is 




where E, is the expectations operator using all the information available in period t, 
and R, is the return expected for holding the stock from period t to period t+1. From 
this we can see that when the expected return is p the insiders hold no stock, and when 
the expected return is p+(p they hold the entire market. 
132 
Alternative models ofsecurity price equilibrium/ Chapter 5 RA. Courtenay 
The ordinary investors are assumed to desire to have stock holdings worth Y, in period 
t. This amount could depend upon the price of stock and past stock price movements. 




This gives a price in period t of-. 
co E 
p IDI+k+ (pE, yt+k f (5.3) k-O +p+ (py+l 
This collapses to the dividend discount model when T becomes small. 
As the demand from ordinary investors rises temporarily, the insiders allow the price 
to rise, but at the same time sell some of their holdings in the anticipation of being 
able to buy them back at a cheaper price. The ýehaviour of the insiders serves to 
smooth the effect on the stock price of the changes in ordinary investor demand. 
Although the expected return can never be negative when insiders are still in the 
market, the stock price can fall since the expected return can be lower than the 
dividend payment. If ordinary investor demand is large enough, insiders may sell 
short; when this happens, the expected return can be negative and of unlimited size. If 
insiders were unable (or unwilling) to sell stocks short, the total stock value would 
equal the nominal ordinary investor demand. 
Numerical examples can show the effect on price of various patterns for ordinary 
investor demand. This serves to illustrate the intuition, and give a feel for the model 
behaviour. It also allows us to assess the importance of the willingness of smart 
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money investors to sell short. We will assume in the examples below that the actual 
series turns out to be as expected by the insiders, and that dividends are constant, thus 
ensunng that under the dividend discount model with a constant discount factor the 
stock price would be constant. 
5.3.3 Example #1: The effect of ordinary investor demand 
Figure 5.1 shows the price path for the given two-humped ordinary investor demand 
function, with p=0.03, (p=O. 17 and a constant dividend of 1. 
Fig. 5.1: Ordinary investor demand andprice. 
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This reveals that ordinary investors can induce bubble-like behaviour in the price, 
although in this case the bubble does not burst, but gradually deflates. The smart- 
money investors will be short in the market when the expected return over the 
following period is less than 3 per cent. In this example, the expected return falls to a 
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low of 6.33 per cent in period 17, at which level the smart-money investors still hold 
almost twenty per cent of the market, down from a maximum of 53.5 per cent in 
period 13 corresponding to a return of 12.1 per cent, just before the ordinary investor 
demand begins to increase. Smart money holds 45.9 per cent of the market when 
ordinary investor demand is expected to remain permanently at its 'normal' level of 5. 
In the absence of smart-money investors, the price would correspond to the nominal 
value of ordinary investor demand; in this case the price would be lower in all periods, 
as would be expected when an important source of demand for stock is eliminated. 
The existence of smart-money investors clearly smoothes the price series relative to 
that which would prevail in their absence. However, if smart-money traders are risk- 
averse, as we have assumed them to be, they will not entirely eliminate the effects of 
changes in the nominal value of ordinary investor demand. 
The extent to which the price is smoothed will depend on the willingness of the smart 
money investors to sell stock short. Up to now we have assumed that these investors 
are as willing to sell short as they are to take long positions. In reality, however, short- 
selling may not be pursued as vigorously, especially over long periods, and so it is 
worth investigating the differences in the price series that will result when short 
selling does not take place, and instead the smart money simply leaves the market 
entirely when expected return falls below the threshold for participation given by the 
value of p. A price series for the 'no short-selling' case of the above model can be 
compiled by starting at the point at which ordinary investor demand levels off, 
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working recursively back to the start of the series, and for each period setting price as 
follows: 
D, +qY, + P,., 
I+p+g 
yI 
for Q, >0 
fo r Q, :50 
(5.4) 
where Qt here represents the proportion of total stock holdings accounted for by 
smart-money investors as given by formula 5.2: the actual proportion will be zero for 
QI: 5 0. 
5.3.4 Example #2: Price crashes induced by ordinary investors 
Figure 5.2 shows the price paths that will result from nominal demand from ordinary 
investors that rises monotonically before suddenly falling back to its base-line level. 
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Although we have stated above that we are working under the premise that the 
ordinary investor demand is independent of the price level, this example is consistent 
with ordinary investors that are alienated by a price crash. The advantage of using this 
specification of ordinary investor demand is that it gives us a plausible example of 
how smart investors can ride a price 'bubble' before selling out to less smart investors 
at or near the peak. 
This example reinforces the intuition that crashes are possible when short selling does 
not occur, but are not when it does. In fact, short selling leads to greater price 
smoothing in general, and prevents the price from being pushed as high as it would be 
otherwise. Even if short-selling does not take place, however, the presence of smart- 
money investors causes the ordinary investor demand to have a smaller effect on the 
deviation of prices from their long-term level, and so can be considered to be 
stabilising. 
If ordinary-investor demand always remains a small proportion of the level required to 
displace smart-money investors from the market, smart-money will ensure that prices 
follow a smooth path, and do not fluctuate greatly as a result of changes in this 
demand. It is possible, however, that at certain times, for example in great bull 
markets, the size of the group of smart-money investors can become relatively small, 
in which circumstances the effect of ordinary-investor demand will be relatively large, 
and may induce price crashes, as in our example. 
137 
Alternative models ofsecurity price equilibrium / Chapter 5 R. A. Courtenay 
Although in the Shiller model ill-informed investors can affect market prices, the 
effect of their varying demand on prices is at least partially smoothed by the actions of 
the smart-money investors, and causes prices to remain closer to fundamentals when 
short-selling takes place. This model therefore lends some support to Friedman's 
proposition. We stated above that, under Shiller's definition, this model deals with the 
possibility of fads, and not bubbles, since the contagion mechanism for the ill- 
informed investors is independent of the market price (although our latter example 
muddied the waters a little). It is clear, however, that the smart money traders 
purchase ahead of increases in ill-informed investor demand in anticipation of a price 
rise, and sell in anticipation of demand-induced price falls: this demonstrates that 
stabilising speculation and movement trading are not incompatible. 
It is also clear that sunspots in prices will occur in the above model when they affect 
the demand of ill-informed investors. Once again, however, the greater the market 
power of the informed investors, the smaller will be the effect on the market price; 
and when there are no ill-informed investors, sunspots in the price will not occur. 
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5.4 111-informed investor demand as a function of 
price 
5.4.1 Models with mechanistic ill-informed investor demand 
In Shiller's model, the stock demand of the ill-informed investors was assumed to be 
determined independently of the price. In reality, this demand is likely to be affected 
in some way by the price, with a number of different relationships being possible. In 
what remains of this chapter we will look at the implications of ill-informed investor 
behaviour that is a function of current and/or past prices, and the relevance of the 
particular form of the relationship. We begin by examining Hart (1977), which gave 
the conditions under which ill-informed manipulation that disturbs the steady state 
could be profitable in such a system, although did not isolate the best speculative 
strategies. Hart found that it can always be profitable to disturb the steady state when 
the system is asymptotically unstable, and can sometimes be profitable when past 
prices affect current prices. 
An awareness of Hart's work can enhance the understanding of a number of models 
that appeared in the literature prior to this aiming to assess the validity of the 
Friedman proposition that profitable speculation must be stabilising. These began with 
Baumol (1957), and continued with Telser (1959), Kemp (1963), Farrell (1966), 
Schimmler (1973) and Williamson (1972). We take a look at these models following 
our analysis of Hart (1977), and analyse them in the context of this model. Hart 
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(1977) can also be used to better understand the De Long, Shleifer, Summers & 
Waldmann (1990a) framework, as we will also demonstrate. 
Jaffow (1992) has developed Hart's idea into a stochastic framework, in which the 
equilibrium price process in the absence of speculators is exogenously specified. He 
attempts to find potentially-profitable arbitrage strategies for a manipulator, and 
derives results similar to those of Hart: in particular, it is shown that a sufficient 
condition for there to exist no arbitrage opportunities is that the stock price process 
depends only on the current stock holdings of the manipulator, and not on its history. 
5.4.2 Hart (1977) 
Hart (1977), starting with a system in an initial steady state, attempts to identify 
conditions for profitable speculation. In such a situation, any speculative activity must 
be destabilising, and hence the requirement here for a refutation of the Friedman 
position is to find any scope for profitable speculation. The profitability of a 
speculative strategy depends on the reaction of the non-speculators to the speculation; 
Hart points out that if non-speculative demand is positively related to price (as is the 
case in Williamson (1972), as we shall see below), and so embodies positive feedback 
trading in the aggregate, "it is not difficult to show that it is always possible for the 
speculator to make money, " (footnote 5, p 583); so the more interesting question 
concerns the weaker conditions for which similar results can be obtained. Speculation 
is profitable in a system which is explosively unstable; but avoiding disaster in such a 
(highly implausible) system would be impossible even in its absence. For the case 
where non-speculator demand is a linear function of current and past prices, the 
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requirements are completely characterised. ýHart justifies the inclusion of lagged 
components in the non-speculative demand function as follows: 
"First, in the absence of forward markets, non-speculative demand will in 
general depend on expected future prices, and expected future prices may in 
turn depend on past prices. Second, since we are concerned with the demand 
for a stock rather than for a flow, demand at date t will be influenced by stock 
decisions made at previous dates, and these decisions will have been made on 
the basis of prices ruling before date f' (p. 582). 
Non-speculative demand is independent of wealth, and the non-speculators 
themselves are assumed never to learn about speculative behaviour. Hart considers a 
non-speculator demand function, which for the linear case is of the following form: 
n 
F (P, 9, P, p l-i +b I-n) =jajP 
i=O 
(5.5) 





Hart finds it useful to define a variable as the deviation of price from the stationary 
price level: 
TC I= Of -P*) (5.7) 
A speculator is assumed to enter the market in period one, following a period in which 
the market was in a stationary state: 
7E 0= 7E -1 == 
7t = (5.8) 
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The speculator is assumed to formulate a strategy that involves leaving the market in 
or before period T, where T: 5t. The sales of the speculator must equal the non- 
speculative demand in each period: 
S, = F(P,, P, -, ....... 
P, Z a, P, -, +b 
n 
i-O (5.9) 
S, Z a, 7c, 
-, 
i=O 
The profits of a speculator following strategy S are as follows: 
TTT 
M PIS, (P* + 7C 1 
ýj 





It is assumed that the speculator realises his profits, which means that the cumulative 
sum of his sales over the period must be zero: 
TTn 
ES, = ZZa, 7C 
1.1 1-1 W 
(5.11) 
Hart shows that the condition for the speculator to make positive profits subsumes the 
latter condition, and so we arrive at Hart's Lemma 3.2: 
The speculator can make money if and only if there exist a positive integer T 





For the speculator to be unable to make money, this quadratic form must be negative 
semi-definite for all values of T. Hart shows that the quadratic form can be 
represented by a matrix in which each element is determined by the distance from the 
diagonal, and in particular takes the following form: 
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a,, a, /2 a2/2 .... a,, /2 0 .... 0 
a, /2 ao a, /2 a2/2 .... a,, /2 0 .... 
a2/2 a, /2 ao a, /2 a2/2 .... a,, /2 0 
.... a2/2 a, /2 ao a, /2 a2/2 .... a,, /2 
a,, /2 .... a2/2 a, /2 ao a, /2 a2/2 .... 
0 a,, /2 .... a2/2 a, /2 ao a, /2 a2/2 
0 a,, /2 .... a2/2 a, /2 ao a, /2 
0 .... 0 a,, /2 .... a2/2 a, /2 ao 
(5.13) 
Quadratic forms with this property are known as a Toeplitz forms. Making use of the 
mathematics literature on Toeplitz forms, Hart characterises the solutions. The main 
result is found in his Theorem 3.4, in which he states that (for ao < 0) the speculator 
can profit from disturbing the steady state if and only if the equation, 
Re f (z) = 0, has a solution z satisfying IzI < I, ' where: 
1 az. 1.0 1 (5.14) 
Hart's Lemma 3.5 shows, in addition, (for aO#O) that the system is explosive in the 
nil absence of speculators if and only if the equation f(z)=O has a solution z satisfying 
IzI < 1. As Hart points out (in Theorem 3.6). if the condition for explosiveness is 
satisfied, the condition for profitable speculation must also be satisfied, and so 
speculation will always be profitable when the system is explosive. 
Explosiveness is both a necessary and sufficient condition for profitable speculation in 
the following situations: when the coefficients of all the lagged terms in the non- 
speculator demand function are non-negative; when the coefficients of the terms with 
even lags are non-negative and the coefficients of the terms with odd terms are non- 
positive; and when the maximum lag in the non-speculator demand function is one. 
2 Where Reftz) is used to denote the real part off(z). 
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For the case where the maximum lag is of two periods, Hart's Theorem 3.9 shows that 
one or both of the following conditions must hold: 
1. The difference equation is explosive. 
2. The coefficients ao, a,, a2 satisfy: a2 < 0ý la, I :! ý 41a2 19 
and a, ' - 8aoa2+ 
8a22 >0 
Although not given by Hart, sufficient conditions for speculation to be unprofitable 
can be found relatively easily. For lags of up to n periods, a sufficient condition for 
speculation to be unprofitable is that: 
ao <0 
and laolý: Iall 
and jaojý: jajj+ja2j 
and lao I ý: la, I+ la21+la, l 
and 
and la, 1-2: la, l+la, l+la, l 
A necessary condition for speculation to be unprofitable, again not given by Hart, is 
that the following conditions hold: 
a, la, l > 
12 
and Ia. 1>2 
JL2 
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Since Hart looks at the profitability of (destabilising) 'strategies' followed by a body 
of speculators, it does not indicate the conditions required for competitive speculation 
to be stabilising. The presumption would be that competitive speculation would tend 
to stabilise prices. We once again reach a conclusion that monopolistic speculation 
can sometimes be destabilising, but that fully competitive speculation cannot be. 
5.4.3 Baumol (1957) 
Baumol (1957) represents an early attempt to produce a counter-argument to the 
Friedman position. Baumol was well aware, however, that its application to the stock 
market may have posed more problems than its application to other markets such as 
the foreign exchange market. The first set of key assumptions underpinning the work 
is that: - 
"there exists a group of non-speculators on some unspecified definition and 
that its activities somehow result in cyclical behaviour in the price of some 
commodity" (p. 264). 
To a modem finance theoretician, the latter assumption may perhaps be enough to 
immediately discredit the results. This should not be the case, however, unless one 
believes whole-heartedly that all agents are fully rational and that the performance in 
this market is the only issue of concern to them. Baumol makes an additional 
assumption, however, that is more controversial: it is that the demand of the non- 
speculators is a function of past as well as current prices. It is this that drives prices in 
cyclical manner. It is therefore probably the first model to explicitly use the concept 
of feedback trading. 
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The particular non-speculative excess demand function used by Baumol is as follows: 
E K-UP. +V (5.17) 1 
(pj-pl-l)+W(pl-l-pl-2) 
where W is a positive constant, and the constants K, U and V are given by the 
following: 
V= W(I - 2a) 
U=2W(I-a) 
K= Wk 
Setting the excess demand equal to zero produces a second-order difference equation 
for the price: 
P= 2aP. - +k 1 1-1 
PI-2 (5.18) 
Restricting the magnitude of a to be less than unity and solving produces the 
following: 
P=c cosqt +s sinqt +R=p cos(qt + r)+ R 1 
In the absence of speculators, prices would therefore follow a cyclical path. It should 
be noted that the non-speculator demand was set up in such a way, indeed the only 
way, that would ensure that a cycle of constant amplitude was produced: if the 
coefficient on the twice-lagged price term differs from unity, the amplitude of the 
cycle will either grow or shrink over time. That prices would follow a cyclical path in 
the absence of speculators should not provoke too many objections by more modem 
market theorists, since they would implicitly consider the situation when speculators 
are present: we must therefore wait until the with-speculator behaviour is revealed 
before judgement is passed. 
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Baumol shows that speculators can make profits by trading in a manner that increases 
both the frequency and the amplitude of the price cycle, and is thus destabilising. In 
particular, Baumol assumes that the speculators attempt to concentrate their purchases 
immediately after an upturn in the price, and their sales immediately after a downturn. 
The specific speculator excess demand function chosen is as follows: 
Es,, 
+, -,: 
C[(PI., - Pl)- (PI - PI-1)] 
= C[(P,., - 2P, + Pt-1)] 
(5.20) 
where C is a positive constant. This gives the appropriate pattern of demand since, 
should t represent a turning point of the cycle, the (P, +, - P, 
) and (P, - P, ) terms 
will be of the same sign, and thus reinforce each other; while at other points in the 
cycle they (at least partially) cancel each other out. 
Combining the excess demand functions of the speculators and the non-speculators 
produces the following: 
0 K- WP, +2WaP, -, - 
Wp, 
-2 + C(P, - 2P, -, 
+ PI-2 
(5.21) 




The expression for the price process therefore becomes: 
P, = T- 
K 
C+2- 
Wa -C pl-I - PI-2 v- W-C (5.22) 
This produces stable oscillations when Wa > C. This can only occur when a>0. 
Baumol shows (as Property 2) that this type of speculative behaviour will be 
profitable provided that the cycle followed by prices lasts longer than four periods. 
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What this model shows is that, in the presence of feedback trading, speculative 
behaviour may be both destabilising and profitable. One weakness of the model is that 
the speculative demand is not derived from optimising behaviour. Another concerns 
the assumption that speculators concentrate their purchases and sales just after turning 
points have been reached: if speculators could predict these turning points, speculator 
behaviour is likely to be stabilising. In addition, the presence of large numbers of 
competitive 'rational' speculators would severely dampen, if not eliminate, the 
cyclical behaviour. The continued existence of cyclical price behaviour when 
speculators are present may be enough to discredit this approach, but not necessarily 
the inclusion of feedback trading. 
Telser (1959) defended the Friedman position against Baumol, focusing his criticism 
on the feedback trading assumption, on the grounds that such behaviour, following 
Friedman's definition, would make all the agents speculators. As Baumol (1959) 
countered, this boils down to an uninteresting question of definitions; the real issue 
concerns the question of whether such feedback traders actually exist. 
Baumol's specification of non-speculator behaviour can be analysed in Hart's 
framework. 
Application ofHart (1977) to Baumol (1957). 
Comparing the non-speculator excess demand used in Baumol to the general form 
given in Hart, tells us the following: 
ao = -TV 
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Hart's Theorem 3.9 tells us that the speculator can make money from disturbing the 
steady state when the following conditions hold: 
-W<O 
191: 5 41WI 
4W2 a2 -8W2 +8W2 >0 
4a 2 >O 
(5.24) 
These always hold (for positive ffj and so speculation is always potentially profitable. 
5.4.4 Telser (1959) 
Telser (1959) looks at the effect on price variability of adding a monopolistic 
speculator to a system in which the non-speculator demand ftinction contains only two 
terms: the current price, with a negative coefficient; and a component that is a pure 
function of time: 3 
E(t) = -aP + h(t) a>0 (5.25) 
Given this non-speculator excess demand function, a monopolistic speculator would 
maximise profits by following an excess demand function of the form: 
a(P- F) (5.26) 
Telser showed that the addition of the speculator to the market would not alter the 
mean price, but would reduce the variance of prices to a quarter of its previous level. 
The notation used here differs from that in the original paper. 
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He then generalised the model slightly to a situation where the speculators were not 
perfectly informed about the mean price level and found that positive profits were a 
sufficient but not necessary condition for prices to have been stabilised. 
As we saw above, Hart's analysis did not encompass situations where the non- 
speculative demand function contains a component that is a pure function of time. In 
order to make use of Hart's results in this context we must content ourselves to look at 
the special case where the time-dependent component reduces to a constant: 
E(t) = -aP +K (5.27) 
When a is positive, as Telser assumes, this system satisfies the sufficient condition for 
speculation to be unprofitable. When a is negative, the system is explosive, and so 
speculation must be potentially profitable. 
5.4.5 Kemp (1963) 
Kemp (1963) begins by introducing a 'Giffenesque' (reversed-S-shaped) non- 
speculative excess demand curve, which has reappeared, in a more rigorous form, in 
both Gennotte & Leland (1990) and chapter three of this thesis. There are two stable 
equilibria, between which is a non-stable equilibrium, and Kemp shows how it would 
be profitable for a speculator to move the system from one stable equilibria to the 
other and back again. Williamson (1972) was unwilling to give this credibility, 
arguing that: 
"Since.... most economists would regard the possibility of multiple equilibria 
in the exchange market as a pathological case that is unlikely to be realised in 
practice, the force of this ingenious counter-example is limited" (p. 78). 
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In the light of the (information aggregation) model constructed in chapter three (as 
well as the work of Gennotte & Leland) which shows the possibility of multiple 
equilibria, and also our argument for the non-existence of 'fundamental' values, this 
opinion may need to be revised. 
In a second example, Kemp specifies a non-speculator excess demand function of the 
form used by Telser, and attempts to find a relationship between speculator profits and 





The only restriction placed on the speculative excess demand function is that their 
stock holding at the end of a given period (tj) is the same as at the beginning (to). This 
ensures that all profits are realised. Therefore: 
1, 
JS(t) dt =0 (5.29) 
to 
The price path in the presence of speculators is: 
PS (t) = 
h(t) + S(t) 
(5.30) 
=> P, (t) - SO - P(t) 
The mean price over the period will be the same as when speculators are not present: 
p= PS 
The profits of the speculators are: 
(5.31) 
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11 
FI Ps (t) S(t) dt 
(5.32) 
= -(tý - t', )cov. (PS, s) 
Squaring equation 5.30 and substituting produces: 
I 
var. S+ var. Ps + 
2ri(t, -to) 
= var. P (5.33) 
a'a 
As Kemp shows, this indicates that unprofitable speculation may still be stabilising, 
and that profitable speculation must be stabilising, which indicates a result akin to that 
of Telser: that positive profits are a sufficient but not a necessary condition for the 
presence of speculators to have stabilised prices. 
Kemp's analysis can be extended to derive some other results. Assume, for example, 
that the time-dependent variable in the non-speculator demand function is once again 
replaced by a constant: 
E(t) = -aP +K (5.34) 
In the absence of speculators, the price is constant, and therefore has zero variance. 
The term relating the variances and profit is now as follows: 
s+ 
I-I(tj - to) 0 var. S+ var. p2 
a' a 
(5.35) 
This shows that, for a positive value of a, the profit must be negative, and vice versa. 
Hence when non-speculative demand is a negative linear function of price, any 
speculative activity must result in a loss and destabilise prices, which, as we have 
already seen, is implied by Hart (1977). When non-speculative demand is a positive 
function of price, any speculative activity must be profitable (and will, of course, still 
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be destabilising): this is a stronger result than we could gain from Hart, since that 
work only indicates when speculation is potentially profitable. 
5.4.6 Farrell (1966) 
As we have seen, Telser and Kemp looked at the link between profitability of 
speculation and price stabilisation in a system in which the demand function of the 
non-speculators is a linear function of the current price. Farrell (1966) attempted to 
generalise the analysis to a situation in which the non-speculative demand function is 
not necessarily linear. 
Farrell started by making the what he calls the 'independence assumption, ' which is 
that the divergence of the price when speculation is present from the price when it is 
not is a function of the speculative demand in that period alone. As a consequence of 
this, non-speculative demand is not affected by prices in previous periods. The non- 
speculative demand function under this assumption can be written as follows: 
E(t) = d(lý - P,, ) (5.36) 
where P, represents the actual market price (in the presence of speculators), and P,, 
represents the price that would prevail in the absence of speculator activity. 
Farrell also invokes the Law ofDemand to impose the condition than this function is a 
monotonically decreasing function. To see that the Telser and Kemp models represent 
a special case of this for a linear function, we can re-arrange the functional forms used 
in those papers: 
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E(t) = -alý +K 
-a x- :ý 
( 
P' 
-a x (-ý - s 
(5.37) 
Farrell shows that a necessary and sufficient condition for positive speculative profits 
to guarantee price stabilisation is that the non-speculative excess demand function is a 
(negative) linear function of price, such as we have given above. The results given by 
Telser and Kemp therefore do not apply to any other forms of the non-speculative 
excess demand function. 
Farrell does show, however, that with transactions costs profitable speculation can 
still imply stabilisation for non-speculative excess demand functions that are not 
perfectly linear. Farrell also shows, however, that temporal interdependence, which in 
this framework involves a non-speculative demand function that depends on past as 
well as current prices, prevents a clear link between the profitability of speculation 
and stabilisation from being established, even with linear specifications. This should 
come as no surprise following Hart's results. 
Farrell concludes that his analysis using the independence assumption: 
"does not take us very far, for we have found reasons for expecting that many 
real-world markets will display some measure of temporal interdependence, so 
invalidating our sufficient conditions. Thus our search for reasonably simple 
and plausible sufficient conditions for the validity of our basic proposition 
seems to have been in vain. But the analysis of this paper will not have been 
wasted if it has persuaded economists that our basic proposition is too strong 
to hold with any great generality and that they should therefore seek to 
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establish weaker propositions concerning the properties of speculative 
markets" (p. 192). 
Schimmler (1973) demonstrated that the models of Telser, Kemp & Farrell can be 
unified and compared in an appropriate Hilbert space, and generalised Farrell's result 
by finding that Friedman's theory is not valid for any system that exhibits temporal 
interdependence in the nonspeculative excess demand function. 
5.4.7 Williamson (1972) 
Williamson (1972) showed that the lag structure of foreign exchange markets gives 
scope for profitable destabilising speculation. Following Williamson's argument, but 
expressing the model in terms compatible with Hart (1977), we can represent the non- 
speculator excess demand function as an expression for the balance of payments, and 
postulate that the Marshall-Lemer condition holds, which produces the following: 
E(t) = ao P, -a, P, -, 
(5.38) 
where ao, a, >0, the Marshall-Lerner condition implies a, > ao, and P represents the 
exchange-rate expressed as the number of units of foreign currency per unit of 
domestic currency. 
Since this system is explosive in the absence of speculators, Hart's results 
immediately tell us that speculation that disturbs an initial steady state can be 
profitable; but since the system is naturally unstable, the destabilising effect of 
speculation is difficult to assess. One thing that once again seems clear is that "a 
marginal addition to speculation would tend to be stabilising" (p. 82), since 
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competition between speculators is likely to push the price down to its steady-state 
level. Other less stabilising speculative strategies can be profitable, however: for 
example, cyclical behaviour can be induced. The overall effect of speculators on 
stability is determined by the strategy followed by the speculators: 
"If they know the equilibrium rate and buy (sell) when the price is below 
(above) equilibrium, then clearly their activity will be stabilising. It has often 
been asserted, however, that speculators are more likely to jump on a 
bandwagon than to lean into the wind. At some point, to be sure, they will 
jump off the bandwagon; but if this point is delayed, so that speculative 
activity produces large price gyrations, it does not follow that the speculators 
will lose money in the presence of a lag structure of the type postulated in this 
paper" (p. 83). 
The profits of the speculators in the Williamson model can be thought of as being 
made at the expense of other traders whose commitments in other markets induce a 
lagged reaction in this one. The specific form of the lagged response is perhaps only 
really applicable to the foreign-exchange market. 
Price & Wood (1974) note that in the Williamson model with cyclical exchange-rate 
movements the most profitable strategy for speculators would be to jump off the 
bandwagon before others; which would have a stabilising effect on prices. They also 
point out that a central bank could profit from stabilising the exchange-rate, if it was 
aware of the long-run equilibrium level. Competitive speculation, by well-informed 
investors, would therefore seem to be extremely desirable. 
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5.4.8 Competitive speculation 
One model that claims to illustrate the potential for destabilising competitive 
speculation is that of De Long, Shleifer, Summers & WaIdmann (1989,1990a). The 
crucial assumption made in this model is that of the existence of positive feedback 
trading: in other words, it is assumed that there exists a group of investors whose 
demand bears a positive relationship to the market price. The demand of these agents 
is counter-balanced by other (more powerful) traders, whose demand is related to the 
distance of the price from their estimate of the stock's value, which ensures that in the 
absence of rational investors the market price is dynamically stable. In this framework 
competitive speculation may not stabilise prices at times of new information arrival 
(De Long et. al. 1990a) or an exogenous demand shock (De Long et. al. 1989), since 
the anticipation by rational investors of the effect of this on the price can cause prices 
to fluctuate more than they would have otherwise. 
The De Long et. al. model is important since it represents perhaps the only example of 
competitive speculation in the stock market having a destabilising effect. In a storage 
model applicable to commodities markets Hart & Kreps (1986) showed that rational 
competitive speculators can destabilise prices, but the argument requires the presence 
of other agents who purchase for immediate consumption, and so is inapplicable to the 
stock market. It is also set in an overlapping generations framework, which is 
arguably not as suitable for analysing the stock market. Its uniqueness makes the De 
Long et. al. model worth investigating in depth, which we do in chapter eight. 
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5.5 Conclusions 
In section 5.3 we analysed a model in which faddish behaviour by ordinary investors 
affects the price when smart-money investors are risk-averse, although the presence of 
smart-money investors tends to smooth the price series and reduce the extent of the 
price fluctuations. This model also highlighted the importance of the assumption 
regarding short-selling, with an unwillingness of infonned investors to sell short 
leading to greater price fluctuations and the possibility of price crashes following 
price bubbles. 
For the case where non-speculator demand is not influenced by past prices Farrell 
(1966) showed that the Friedman proposition that speculation is stabilising is only 
sure to hold when the relationship between this demand and the current price is linear; 
and if non-speculator demand is influenced by past prices the Friedman proposition 
does not necessarily hold. Competitive speculation, however, would tend to stabilise 
prices. This ties in with the results we found using the Shiller (1984) model, and is 
also consistent with other models that illustrate that in the presence of noise traders 
speculative activity may be less than fully effective in stabilising prices, but it will 
make prices more stable than they would have been otherwise. 4 The only evidence in 
this type of framework that indicates that speculation may not tend to be stabilising is 
given by De Long et. al., which will be evaluated in chapter nine. 
4 See Figlewski (1979), Kyle (1985), De Long, Shleifer, Summers & WaIdmarm (1990b) and Campbell 
& Kyle (1988). 
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It should be noted that we have been assessing the effect of informed speculation. If 
we assume that speculators are actually ill-informed and boundedly rational, then it 
should be clear that their activities are likely to be destabilising in any framework. 
Stein (1987) demonstrated that even an influx of ill-informed speculators who are 
rational in the terms of the R. E. literature can destabilise a (commodities) market. 
We have seen, following Hart (1977), that speculation that disturbs the steady state 
can be profitable when non-speculator demand is influenced by past prices. Baumol's 
model shows that manipulation can be both profitable and destabilising in the 
presence of positive feedback traders, although the particular model formulation used 
was not that general. An alternative formulation for positive feedback trading is that 
given by De Long et. al. (1989,1990a) and Cutler et. al. (1990), and it is in this 
framework, utilising Hart (1977), that we analyse, in the following chapter, the 
possibilities for manipulation. 
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Chapter 6 
Positive feedback trading 
6.1 Introduction 
Positive feedback trading can result from investment strategies, techniques of 
estimating value, information paucity and psychological factors. In this chapter we 
investigate some of the theoretical, anecdotal and empirical evidence of its presence. 
We begin by looking at the consequences of some investors following trading rules 
that are dependent on the price, and in particular dynamic portfolio insurance 
strategies. We then look at the effect of information shortages and psychological 
factors, before examining anecdotal evidence of bubbles and incidences of 
manipulation. We finish by looking at empirical evidence that may indicate the 
presence of positive feedback trading. 
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6.2 Price-influenced trading rules 
6.2.1 Portfolio insurance 
We have seen that positive feedback trading involves selling after price falls, and 
buying after price rises. Such behaviour would also characterise a dynamic portfolio 
insurance strategy. Leland (1980) argued that a strategy of portfolio insurance is 
rational for investors whose level of (absolute) risk tolerance increases with wealth 
more rapidly than it does for the average investor, I as well as for optimists. This 
implies that positive feedback trading is not necessarily the result of irrationality or 
ill-informedness. However, this is not the same as arguing that simple mechanistic 
feedback strategies can legitimately be used in models to reflect this since, clearly, 
rational investors will still take into account expected returns, and will not allow 
themselves to be consistently exploited by other investors if the costs of this exceed 
the benefits from the insurance strategy itself 
There are several situations in which simple mechanistic rules may be relevant, at 
least on the down-side. It is sometimes important for investors that the value of their 
portfolio exceeds some minimum value. This reduces the discretion surrounding 
investment decisions as the portfolio value approaches this level as prices fall, and 
may force sales to be made 'at any price. ' Institutions, for example, may have 
commitments of a fixed size to meet. Leveraged positions are especially vulnerable, 
since lenders are likely to demand payment if the value of the collateral falls close to 
Black (1988) argued that rising levels of risk tolerance were a contributory factor in the market break 
of 1987. 
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the loan value. This was perhaps best illustrated in 1929, when the extent of margin 
trading - which involved purchasing stock with payment of a deposit for less than the 
full amount - increased enormously. 
2 Once prices began to fall, and margins became 
exhausted, the positions of investors that could not afford to provide more capital 
were liquidated: these investors were forced to accept whatever price could be got in 
the market, regardless of their own opinions as to the stock's true worth. Leveraged 
positions also tend to follow positive feedback behaviour in bull-markets, since the 
collateral provided by the stock value, and hence the scope for borrowing, increases in 
line with it. This (partly) explains the rise in margin trading as the market rose in the 
late 1920s. 
The modelling of portfolio insurance in the market has tended to assume mechanistic 
rather than explicitly modelled rational behaviour. This includes the information 
aggregation model of Gennotte & Leland (1990) - which we came across in chapter 
one, and will look at in greater depth in the concluding chapter - and Brennan & 
Schwartz (1989). 
6.2.2 Other trading rules 
Past price movements are used by some investors to assess the likely future direction 
of prices, and therefore to determine the appropriate investment strategy. Such 
chartism can lead to price rises inducing further buying, and hence positive feedback: 
this can happen when, for example, psychological barriers are broken. As we stated in 
See Galbraith (1975). 
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the introductory chapter, the root cause of such behaviour is the uncertainty 
surrounding the future stock value and price, which also has a number of other effects. 
6.3 Consequences of uncertainty, ill-informedness and 
psychological factors 
6.3.1 Uncertainty and the effectiveness of speculation 
As we argued in chapter one, the greater the degree of uncertainty about the future, the 
more influence the trading activity of ill-informed investors will have, since the 
relatively well-informed investors will be less inclined to trade strongly against them. 
The effectiveness of speculation in neutralising the effects of ill-informed trading is 
therefore naturally restricted. 
6.3.2 Trading on noise 
Information is incorporated into prices as investors act on it. For this to work 
effectively, however, the investors must be aware of how much of the information has 
already been incorporated into the price when they trade; and so they must either 
know the appropriate price which the new information implies, or, if the information 
is noisy, the trading activity and information of the other investors. If investors act on 
information that is new to them but that has already been incorporated into the price, 
they are trading on noise in the sense used by Black (1986), and will exhibit positive 
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feedback trading, since their demand will be in the same direction as the recent price 
changes induced by the new information. 
6.3.3 Price-influenced fads 
We have argued previously that investor interest in the stock market, and as a 
consequence stock demand, can be affected by social factors inducing contagion 
among investors. In the Shiller (1984) model of the previous chapter the contagion 
and the resultant fads were assumed to be independent of market prices, both past and 
present. It is more likely, however, that the contagion is reinforced by price 
movements. Even if the existing investors do not increase the level of their holdings 
as prices rise, the stock demand from newly-interested investors provides a source of 
positive feedback trading. 
The behaviour of individual ill-informed investors may be subject to fads that are 
influenced by the path of market prices, especially if these investors are sufficiently 
ill-informed as to be unable themselves to produce meaningful estimates of the value 
of stock. Such investors must rely on Keynes' 'animal spirits' to make investment 
decisions, with trading activity the result of a preference for action over inaction. The 
decisions taken as to whether or not to invest in this scenario must be based on factors 
such as their judgement of how good an investment the stock market has been in the 
past, or simply the degree of 'goodwill' they feel towards the market. 3 
3 This echoes an argument found in Black (1988). 
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Investors' goodwill is likely to be far less volatile in the short-term than prices, and 
changes in it are likely to lag (ex post) price trends. The length of the lag is not likely 
to be constant; it is certainly feasible to assume, for example, that a price crash, such 
as occurred in 1929, and to a lesser extent in 1987, can have a dramatic impact on the 
goodwill towards the stock market felt by society as a whole, depending on the 
general perception of the permanence of the price changes. 4 The idea that a prolonged 
bull period can, perhaps via the media, lead to greater participation, and thus positive 
feedback trading by this group of investors as a whole, bears comparison to the 
'visibility' idea of Miller (1977), whereby the demand for individual stocks is 
positively related to the degree to which the companies are known to the public at 
large. There must surely be some psychological effect of constant exposure to stories 
of high prices, perhaps 'record highs'. 
Even if these investors are aware of their lack of informedness, their behaviour is not 
necessarily irrational, since over long periods stock market investment has always 
proved profitable in markets that are currently well-established, and so avoiding the 
stock market entirely would not be rational. III-informed trading activity may actually 
be relatively profitable, as demonstrated by De Long et. al. (1990b). The current broad 
acceptance of the efficient markets hypothesis serves further to justify their behaviour, 
since it implies that the market prices are always 'fair, ' and so investors should be 
happy to accept whatever the price happens to be. Of course, if the efficient markets 
hypothesis is true, and the market prices do actually reflect fundamentals, then this 
See Allen (193 1) and Galbraith (1975) for a discussion of the breadth of stock-market participation in 
1929. 
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class of investor is not exploited. The danger is that it is not true, but that some 
investors believe that it is, since this may lead to investors ignoring their instincts, and 
blindly accepting any price. So once (potential) investors have built up their level of 
goodwill from previous price rises, the belief that prices are always 'fair' will lead 
them to be fairly insensitive to current prices. Thus if other agents can manage to 
induce goodwill, there will be scope for strategic behaviour to exploit the poorly- 
informed feedback traders; and the greater the belief that prices are 'fair, ' the more 
scope there is for price manipulation. Even without the presence of manipulators, 
there is an in-built tendency for the demand of poorly-informed investors, and hence 
perhaps prices, to follow trends. Perhaps we should label this effect - that the greater 
the belief that prices reflect fundamentals, the less likely this is to be true - as the 
'Paradox of Efficient Markets. ' 
Of course, if belief in the efficient markets hypothesis prevents ill-informed investors 
from investing on the basis of personal assessments as to whether the market is over- 
or under-valued, and believing that high returns in the recent past are likely to 
continue, it may have a stabilising influence, and so the net effect of such a belief is 
ambiguous, and will depend on its relative effectiveness in eliminating the fear of 
losses and the hope of large gains. 
6.3.4 Psychological evidence 
Our 'goodwill' theory does not necessarily imply that ill-informed investors' beliefs 
about future returns are influenced by recent returns. This type of belief formation 
may, however, be important. For example, Tversky & Kahneman (1982) have found 
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that excessive emphasis is placed on the recent past when expectations about the 
future are fonned. Evidence that past returns influence expectations of the future is 
given by the survey conducted by Case & Shiller (1988), 5 which found that 
expectations of future house price appreciation in different U. S. cities was positively 
related to past price changes. Andreassen & Kraus (1990) conducted experiments 
using authentic stock-price data, and found that the subjects tended to chase trends 
once they had identified them. The demand behaviour that this results in, with rising 
prices leading to an increase in demand, and vice versa, is known as positive feedback 
trading. Evidence concerning gambling behaviour may also be relevant, since 
investment activity can similarly be considered as a game involving risk-taking from 
which the investors derive enjoyment. 6 Established attributes of the psychology of 
gambling can help to explain speculative bubbles: 
"If the price of an asset has gone up and made some of one's friends 
considerably richer, one's attention is drawn to that asset. The gamble posed 
then by investing in the asset will certainly seem interesting. On reflection, 
one may well realize that one has no way of knowing whether the price of the 
asset will continue to go up or even reverse itself and drop. The 'chain letter' 
nature of the speculative bubble may even be readily apparent to market 
participants. But by the time one has realized this, the game may have so 
captured one's ego that one is sorely tempted to play" (Shiller, 1988, p. 63). 
Thus there are many reasons to believe that ill-informed investors may be subject to 
contagion generated by price changes. The following section looks at evidence that 
such contagion has existed. 
As reported in De Long et. al. (1990). 6 See Lease, Lewellen & Schlarbaurn (1974). 
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6.4 Evidence of price-based contagion amongst ill- 
informed investors 
6.4.1 Anecdotal evidence 
There have been many occasions in the past when prices in asset markets have risen 
rapidly before falling even more rapidly, and for which there is anecdotal evidence 
indicating that many investors lost sight of reality, and were prepared to buy stock at 
levels that informed assessment could not justify. Indeed: 
"The pages of history are strewn with language, admittedly imprecise and 
possibly hyperbolic, that allows no other interpretation than occasional 
irrational markets and destabilising speculation" (Kindleberger, 1978, p. 27). 
A commonly-used example is that of the 'tulipomania' that broke out in Holland in 
the 1630s. Apparently, during this: 
"People of all grades converted their property into cash, and invested it in 
flowers.... Everyone imagined that the passion for tulips would last for ever, 
and that the wealthy from every part of the world would send to Holland and 
pay whatever prices were asked for them. The riches of Europe would be 
concentrated on the shores of the Zuyder Zee, and poverty banished from the 
favoured clime of Holland" (Mackay, 1841). 
The Mississippi and South Sea bubbles occurred in France and England respectively 
in 1719/20. During the South Sea bubble incident: 
"Favorable rumours... intoxicated the country with the thought of instant 
wealth. Visions of glory danced in the investors' heads when they heard 
England might be granted the right of free trade with all of Spain's colonies. 
Mexicans supposedly were waiting for the opportunity to empty their gold 
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mines in return for England's abundant supply of cotton and woollen goods" 
(Malkiel, 1973, ch. 2, p. 34). 
Stock markets have exhibited bubble-like behaviour at intervals ever since. For 
example, the U. S. experienced bull markets associated with the development of canals 
and then railways, in the first half of the nineteenth century, and the Californian gold 
strikes of 1849. The 'hot' issues then became those associated with the telegraph (late 
1850s), steel, chemicals and munitions (1915), clothing, machinery and food 
processors (1919), aviation, radio, vehicles, mass production (1920s) .7 Post-war there 
have been stock booms associated with uranium, electronics, information technology, 
conglomerisation, and more recently bio-technology. The two best-remembered 
boom-and-crash scenarios of recent times terminated in 1929 and 1987. 
For each of these periods it is possible to find anecdotal evidence of speculative 
manias, fuelled by the rising prices. 8 The stocks of those companies engaged in these 
new areas have understandably been affected most, and have been endowed with a 
glamour that have made investment in them seem more attractive. This glamour has 
been combined with an increase in uncertainty concerning the future, since the new 
developments are always unprecedented, and so the degree of subjectivity in 
estimating 'fundamental' values is greater than usual. It is easy to argue that this is 
likely to lead to a greater level of volatility in beliefs and prices, since: 
"In abnormal times in particular, when the hypothesis of an indefinite 
continuance of the existing state of affairs is less plausible than usual even 
though there are no express grounds to anticipate a definite change, the market 
7 See, for example, Sobel (1965). 
" See, for example, Galbraith (1975) on 1929, and Soros (1987) on more recent bubbles. 
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will be subject to waves of optimistic and pessimistic sentiment, which are 
unreasoning and yet in a sense legitimate where no solid basis exists for a 
reasonable calculation" (Keynes, 1964, V, p. 154). 
To use the terminology of Malkiel (1973), the uncertainty and glamour may lead 
investors to 'build castles in the air. ' In addition, informed investors will be less 
willing to trade against ill-informed investors at these times of greater uncertainty, due, 
to the increased riskiness of such actions. The combination will lead to more influence 
for ill-informed behaviour in bull markets, and occurrences of bubbles. 
It is tempting to think that, with the steady shift of direct share-holding from 
individuals to institutions, the problems associated with ill-informedness will have 
diminished, and that stock-buying will have become more 'rational'. There is, 
however, little evidence that this is the case. Referring to the 1960s: 
"Bradley K. Thurlow, a well-known professional, summed it up by noting, 
'The funds behaved like the worst of small investors, showing speculative 
exuberance at the top, dire forebodings at the bottom, and steadfast timidity 
during the recovery"' (Malkiel, 1973, ch. 7, p. 154). 
An important feature of institutional fund management that makes contagion possible 
is the way in which participants form a fairly tightly-knit group. According to the 
protagonists themselves, exploitation of the fads of other fund managers is the key to 
the success of Warren Buffett and George Soros. 9 
See Soros (1987). 
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6.4.2 Disputing irrationality 
The claim of irrationality during bull markets has, however, been disputed by Garber 
(1990), who argued, with specific reference to the cases of the tulipomania and the 
Mississippi and South Sea bubble incidents, that such events can be explained with 
reference to beliefs about fundamentals by rational investors. In particular, Garber 
claimed that the tulip market may simply have displayed the standard behavioural 
patterns of bulb markets; and the South Sea stock price may have risen due to a 
rational expectation of a rise in economic activity. 
A crash is not itself evidence that prices have moved away from fundamental values. 
At times when it seems possible that'a shift in the growth rate of economic activity 
may be taking place, stock prices should move to reflect this. The two main 
possibilities affecting the price of the South Sea Company were that rapid commercial 
expansion would result, or would not. The possibility of rapid commercial expansion 
led to the initial rise in the price of stock, and would inevitably have been followed by 
either another rise or a crash as the outcome became clearer. A crash is therefore 
possible when the likely outcome is revealed rapidly; quite possible for such a polar 
situation. This could happen when the price affects the likely outcome, and so price 
movements become self-sustaining. 
6.4.3 Self-sustaining stock prices 
The stock market can influence the wider economy, since it determines one set of 
terms by which capital can be raised. In addition, stock prices, since they aggregate 
171 
Alternative models ofsecurityprice equilibrium I Chapter 6 R. A. Courtenay 
information about future dividends, can provide information about the beliefs of 
others concerning the future levels of economic activity, and so provide useful 
information for investors in the real economy. High stock prices, associated with a 
relative ease of capital-raising and optimism concerning the future, can stimulate the 
economy; while low prices can have the opposite effect. If the information about the 
effect of current prices on the future economic situation is reflected in the price, 
however, prices will not follow trends. 
This interaction between the stock market and the economy may lead to a possibility 
of multiple equilibria, especially since the potential for this is known to exist on an 
economic level. 10 It could be possible that high levels of stock prices are justifiable 
given expectations about the future state of the economy; but that once prices begin to 
fall, the expected effect of these falls on value may cause prices to fall discontinuously 
until an equilibrium is reached at a lower level. The economic stagnation following 
the crash of 1929 could perhaps be used as evidence of this, with the sharpness of the 
price falls arguably both causing and reflecting this. Theoretically, the effect could 
work in the opposite direction as well, with rising prices raising expectations of future 
levels of investment and output. 
Even if the direct 'economic' link between stock prices and economic activity were 
slight, in that the role of the stock market as a capital provider is relatively 
insignificant, and in addition market prices provide little useful additional information 
concerning the real economy, the stock market may still exert an influence. This can 
10 For example, see Shiller (197 8). 
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be for two reasons: firstly, some agents may believe that the influence is greater than 
it actually is; and secondly, some agents may believe that other agents, though not 
themselves, believe the influence to be greater than it actually is. This perhaps better 
illustrates the crash of 1987, when much talk of recession followed the crash, but 
prices subsequently recovered ground when this did not materialise. This latter 
argument is akin to that concerning sunspots, and illustrates that, in the presence of 
multiple potential equilibria resulting from the interaction - or the perceived 
interaction - of the market with the real economy, sunspot activity can lead to 
movements between equilibria, and can therefore affect both current and future prices. 
6.5 Lessons from market manipulation 
In this section we look at examples of manipulations that have taken place, taking care 
to draw out the possible implications for ill-informed investor behaviour in the light of 
explanatory models in a rational expectations framework. Incidences of past stock- 
market manipulations, like incidences of market bubbles, can help to reveal properties 
of investor behaviour; and even if the scope for such manipulation is removed by 
legislation, the insights it can give into non-speculator behaviour may still remain 
valid. 
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6.5.1 Action-based manipulation 
As we have seen previously in chapter five, Allen & Gale (1992) divide manipulation 
into three categories: action-based; information-based; and trade-based. To illustrate 
action-based manipulation, Allen & Gale give the 1901 example of the American 
Steel and Wire Company, the managers of which took short positions in the company, 
closed its steel mills, watched as the stock price plunged, then covered their positions 
before reopening the mills. A more recent example concerns Ramiro Helmeyer, a 
Venezuelan investor; who in July 1993 sold stock short on the Venezuelan exchange, 
then reputedly set off explosions around Caracas to increase the perceived level of 
political instability, and to profit from the resulting price falls. " 
Vila (1989) provides a simple model of this type of behaviour in a game-theoretic 
framework. Here the market participants consist of two agents that participate in an 
auction plus a manipulator and a potential noise trader. The manipulator formulates a 
strategy as to how often to enter the market, and how often to take 'action' - which 
could be the initiation of a takeover bid - that affects the value of the assets. The 
existence of noise trading is crucial for the ability of the manipulator to operate in this 
context. Unfortunately, interesting as cases of action-based manipulation may be, they 
tell us very little about the nature of other investors. 
6.5.2 Info rmation-based manipulation 
Information-based manipulation goes back at least as far as the South Sea bubble 
incident, in which favourable rumours were said to have been "purposely and widely 
11 Wall Street Joumal, 2nd Dec. 1993. 
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spread by the directors" (Malkiel, 1973, p. 34). This incident also provides an 
example of trade-based manipulation combining with information-based 
manipulation, since after the bubble appeared to burst in June 1720, when the stock 
price fell from 890 to 640 in a single day, the directors "gave their agents orders to 
buy, thus stabilising the price, and then - through a combination of manipulation and 
rumor - drove the price all the way up to 1,000" (Malkiel, 1973, p. 34). This type of 
activity came into its own with the growth in the importance of the media, and 
perhaps reached its peak in the 1920's with the partnerships between traders and stock 
tipsters: 
Such a partnership was formed between "John J. Levinson, a free-lance trader 
who... made profits of over one million dollars a year... [and] Raleigh T. 
Curtis, who wrote a column entitled 'The Trader' for the New York Daily 
News. Levinson would buy a stock, Curtis would speak highly of it in his 
column, the stock would rise, Levinson would sell, and the two friends would 
share the profit. Each time the procedure was repeated, it was easier, for as 
Curtis' readers bought on his recommendations, they made them come true, 
and the next time they trusted him 
, 
all the more. David Lion, a market 
manipulator, and William J. McMahon, president of the McMahon Institute of 
Economic Research and for a while, a widely-followed radio commentator on 
stock market affairs, worked a similar dodge" (Sobel, 1965, ch. 12, p. 248-9). 
The scope for information-based manipulation has received a boost with the 
development of the Internet: already there have been allegations that an on-line stock- 
tipping service, SGA Goldstar Research, was used to release false information about a 
company called Systems of Excellence, and to recommend its shares. 12 Since the 
scope for the dissemination of information is so much greater on the Internet than in 
12 Financial Times, 9th Nov. 1996. 
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other media, it is possible that information-based manipulation may receive a new 
lease of life. 
Vila (1989) and Benabou & Laroque (1992) provide models illustrating information- 
based manipulation. Benabou & Laroque (1992) used a model of strategic 
communication to look at the potential for agents with privileged but imperfect 
information to earn trading profits by manipulating prices over the long term through 
releasing strategically-distorted announcements. 13 Benabou & Laroque found that 
such manipulation is a real possibility, since the 'dishonesty' cannot immediately be 
distinguished from genuine error, and so the credibility of those revealing false 
information may diminish only slowly. This shows that the presence of information- 
based speculation does not necessarily imply the existence of irrational investors. The 
ease with which it can occur does, however, indicate the extent of the ill-informedness 
of many investors, the lack of common knowledge of beliefs, or the disparity in prior 
beliefs: such manipulation can only have a large effect if others do not realise the 
motivation behind the announcement and have little confidence in their initial 
estimate of the fair stock price. 
6.5.3 Trade-based manipulation exploiting external links 
All three types of manipulation can involve external links, with the market price 
having some significance outside of the market itself-, but for trade-based 
manipulation this possibility arguably becomes more important, and so we will look 
13 As we saw above (in chapter four), this issue was not addressed by Admati & Pfleiderer (1988), 
since the information seller in that model was assumed to be honest in his dealings. 
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at the possibilities with and without external links. In this section we look at the 
former. 
In the foreign exchange markets, central banks trade in currency in order to influence 
the exchange rate for economic (or political) reasons. Stein (1961) gave an example 
prophesying the collapse of the European Exchange-Rate Mechanism, that showed 
how such central bank behaviour can allow destabilising speculation to be profitable: 
when it attempts to retain the exchange rate within certain bounds through market 
transactions, there will always be a threshold of market pressure which, if exceeded, 
will force the bank to devalue the currency in order to prevent further outflow from its 
foreign exchange reserves. Although of a very specific nature, this example highlights 
the fact that potential opportunities for profitable speculation are likely to exist 
whenever an agent without unlimited resources attempts to maintain market prices 
through trading activity. 
In the stock market, there is scope for manipulation around rights issues, seasoned 
equity issues and takeovers. In a seasoned equity offering it may be possible to profit 
by driving down the market price, thereby inducing a reduction in the offer price. 
Gerard & Nanda (1992) illustrates how the losses the traders make by selling stock in 
the initial action can be more than made up for by purchasing stock at a reduced price 
in the offering. 
The situation is less clear-cut for rights issues, since the price at which the new shares 
are issued does not affect the value of the holdings of shareholders who take up their 
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allocation. Underwriters that wish to minimise the risk of having to take up any 
shares, however, can reduce their risk by reducing market prices prior to the setting of 
the rights price; and institutions that wish to purchase shares not taken up in the rights 
issue can increase both the number of these shares and the degree of under-pricing of 
each one by depressing the market price prior to the expiry of the rights offer. 
There has been a long-running investigation into activity surrounding the Eurotunnel 
rights issue of 1994. There is evidence of heavy short-selling both prior to the setting 
of the rights price, 14 and the closing of the offer. 15 Institutions have been accused of 
16 forcing the offer price down to reduce their underwriting risk , but proving this 
has 
been difficult. Institutions have also been accused of using insider information to 
profit from selling short before the plan to make the rights issue was announced; 17 but 
again, this has not been proven. Suspicions about price manipulation through short- 
selling prior to stock issues have also been raised in relation to the EuroDisney rights 
issue of 1994, and the sale of the second and third tranches of B. T. stock-18 Banks in 
India have also been accused in the past of keeping stock prices down prior to 
privatisations, to enable them to pick up shares in them at 'favourable' rates. All such 
activity requires collusion, or at least sufficient uncertainty that allows a powerful 
institution to act in this way undetected and without engendering a feeling of 
undervaluation. 
14 Financial Times, 13th June 1994. 
15 Financial Times, 21 st June 1994. 
16 Financial Times, 17th June 1994. 
17 Financial Times, 15th Aug. 1995. 
Is Financial Times, 3rd Oct. 1994. 
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An example of manipulation in the opposite direction to the above is that alleged to 
have been perpetrated by a trader at Drexel Burnham Lambert in 1986: Pamela 
Monzert was accused by the Securities and Exchange Commission of supporting the 
share price of Stone Containers so that a public offering underwritten by DBL could 
go ahead. ' 9 
It may also be possible for managers involved in real take-over bids to profitably 
manipulate the stock price. As with seasoned equity issues, bidders can 'lock in' 
profits by strengthening the share price of their company during a (paper) bid, as can 
targets by strengthening theirs; although in the latter case too much success may raise 
the price to a level that frightens off the bidder to the detriment of the target firm's 
shareholders. The court case following the Guinness bid for Distillers was based on 
the assumption that such behaviour could take place; although in the end it was not 
proven that the shares were supported '20 although compensation to Argyll, the rival 
bidder, was paid. 21 More recently the shares of Unichern were suspected of being 
supported to enhance the value of its bid for Lloyds Chemists. 22 Robert Maxwell was 
alleged to have illegally used money from pension funds to support the share prices of 
his companies, 23 but this was partly due to his use of stock as collateral. 
Bagnoli & Lipman (1996) show how the possibility of takeover bids can allow 
manipulation to take place. They showed how a manipulator can profit by purchasing 
19 Wall Street Journal, 5th April 1993. 
20 Economist, 15th Feb. 1992. 
21 Economist, 3 Oth Nov. 199 1. 
22 Financial Times, 23rd Feb. 1996. 
23 Economist, 13th June 1992. 
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stock, announcing a takeover bid, and then selling stock before abandoning the bid. 
Chatteý ea, Cherian & Jarrow (1993) have shown how the corporations can be viewed 
as manipulators of their own stock for the benefit of their shareholders. 
There is an incentive to manipulate prices that determine payoffs to other contracts. 
The most obvious example relates to derivatives, where manipulating the underlying 
asset price at the time when the payoffs on the derivatives are determined may be 
profitable. This type of activity appears to be fairly common, arguably taking place in 
stock markets such as Tokyo 24 and Hong Kong. 25 Nick Leeson appears to have 
attempted a version of this, by buying Nikkei futures in the hope of supporting the 
falling market and hence protecting the value of the large number of straddles he had 
sold: but in the end this just compounded the problem. 26 In Belgium, index-linked 
funds, that pay out when the Belgian index surpasses a reference level, have been 
accused of manipulating closing prices, which determine the reference prices, in order 
to minimise the payout. 27 Index manipulation can also be used by dealers to generate 
interest among general investors in the hope of securing more business. 28 
A prime example of the potential for speculation in a market where market prices 
determine contract prices elsewhere concerns recent events at the National Cheese 
Exchange in Green Bay, Wisconsin. The prices set on this exchange for cheddar 
cheese determine national U. S. prices for cheese, and also, indirectly, milk, although 
24 Wall Street Journal, 12th March 1993. 
25 Financial Times, 29th Nov. 1996. 
26 Economist, 4th March 1995. 
27 Financial Times, 30th March 1996. 
28 Wall Street Journal, 6th Oct. 1993. 
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little actual trading takes place there. Kraft Foods, despite being a large net purchaser 
of these products outside the exchange, accounted for 74 percent of sales on the 
exchange between 1988 and 1993, and has been accused of a price manipulation that 
has cost U. S. dairy producers about $1 bn. 29 
Kumar & Seppi (1993) used a model based on Kyle (1985) to show how it can be 
profitable for a manipulator, after taking a position in a futures market, to profit from 
manipulating the spot price used to determine the cash settlement price in this futures 
market. It is clear that manipulation that exploits agents external to the market itself 
does not necessarily imply any particular behavioural traits of these investors. A more 
relevant consideration is the potential for some investors to manipulate prices at the 
expense of other market participants. 
6.5.4 Pure trade-based manipulation 
It is possible that there is scope for manipulation even when there are no incentives 
for such behaviour resulting from external links to the market. Pure trade-based 
manipulation has been around from the early days of organised markets. Dutch traders 
at the beginning of the seventeenth century had already discovered the benefits of the 
'bear raid': 
"some brokers began to realize that concentrated selling over a relatively short 
period of time might cause the less wary to offer their shares at low prices, in 
this way spreading and intensifying the decline. If prices could be beaten down 
artificially at first, frightened investors could be counted upon to join in and 
push prices still lower. Those who realized what was happening could then 
29 Financial Times, 6th June 1996. 
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step in and buy shares at bargain prices. 'Bear raids' of this nature were soon 
common in Amsterdam" (Sobel, 1965, ch. 1, p. 6). 
Trade-based manipulation can also take the form of 'wash sales', which involves "the 
sale of a security by one broker to another who [acts] for him or his client, in order to 
give the impression of a transaction when one [has] not taken place... This device 
[has] been used to simulate a bull or bear market, when one actually [does] not exisf' 
(Sobel, 1965, ch. 3, p. 30-1). This practice became such a feature of early stock 
markets that by 1817 the New York Stock and Exchange Board had already legislated 
against it. This legislation, however, proved to be ineffective in preventing the spirit 
of wash sales to live on, in the activities of 'stock pools' which were common during 
the 1920s. 
"The point of a pool manipulation was simplicity itself. it was a way of 
inducing the Stock Exchange ticker tape to tell a story that was essentially 
false, and thus to deceive the public" (Brooks, 1970, ch. 4, p. 69). 
"Generally such operations began when a number of traders banded together to 
manipu ate a particular stock. They appointed a pool manager.... and promised 
not to doublecross each other through private operations. 
"The pool manager accumulated a large block of stock through 
inconspicuous buying over a period of weeks. If possible, he obtained an 
option to buy a substantial block of stock at the current market price within a 
stated period of, say, three or six months. Next he tried to enlist the stock's 
specialist on the exchange floor as an ally 
"Generally, at this point the pool manager had members of the pool 
trade between themselves.... These sales were recorded on ticker tapes across 
the country and the illusion of activity was conveyed to the thousands of tape 
watchers who crowded into the brokerage offices of the country. Such 
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activity... created the impression that something big was afoof' (Malkiel, 
1973, ch. 2, p. 39-40). 
Pools would often enlist the help of stock tipsters to spread favourable rumours, and 
sometimes even enlisted the help of the managers of the firm involved, to prevent the 
revelation of bad news while the operation was being conducted. 
"in a skilfully conducted manipulation, the thing would become self- 
sustaining; the public would in effect take the operation over, and in a frenzy 
of buying at higher and higher prices would push the stock on up and up with 
no help from the pool manager at all. That was the moment for the final phase 
of the maneuver, the pool's liquidation of its own stock, often spoken of as 
'pulling the plug"' (Brooks, 1970, ch. 4, p. 70). 
Wash sales and pool trading continue to be a problem in developing stock markets, for 
example the Stock Exchange of Thailand where in 1993 a group of investors was 
alleged to have moved shares between different accounts to simulate buying interest. 
30 
It also continues to occur in fully-developed markets such as Japan where, also in 
1993, a speculator, Makoto Araya "allegedly placed large buy and sell orders in Nihon 
Unisys simultaneously to create the false impression among average investors that the 
stock was popular" (Wall Street Joumal, 28th July 1993). 
The above examples show that trade-based manipulation can be split into two 
components: manipulation based on net trades; and manipulation based on gross 
trades. Bear raids are a pure example of the former, since it is the net sales by the 
speculators that depress the share price and induce the panic in the ranks of the other 
30 Wall Street Joumal, 30th April, 1993. 
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investors. Pool trading involves both types, but the defining characteristic of this form 
of manipulation, that of trading between pool members to arouse the interest of other 
investors, falls into the latter category. 
That trade-based manipulation can be profitable in a market exhibiting asymmetric 
information should come as no surprise, and fits with the models we have already 
seen of Vila (1989), Allen & Gorton (1992) and Allen & Gale (1992), in which the 
inability of ill-informed investors to distinguish the trades of uninformed manipulators 
from those of informed investors creates profitable openings. Another example is 
provided by Fishman & Hagerty (1995), who used a specialist-based model with noise 
traders, in which the specialist agrees to trade any quantity at the bid and ask prices, to 
show how a trader who it is thought might be informed can benefit from the 
mandatory disclosure of her trades. This occurs since the announcement of the trades 
affects the market perception of the stock value, and hence the price, allowing a 
strategy of buy-disclose-sell or sell-disclose-buy to be profitable. As with 
information-based manipulation, however, the scale of the price movements and 
profits that have been possible in the past illustrates the extremely low level of 
informedness of many investors about both the underlying stock values and the 
structure and operation of the market. 
6.5.5 Corners and squeezes 
Comers, and the subsequent squeezes, can be thought of as special cases of (net) 
trade-based manipulation. In the stock market these involve buying up all or most of a 
stock issue, in order to force those holding short positions to cover them at an 
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artificially inflated price. Theoretically, a successful comerer can charge any price to 
the short-sellers, and so guarantee a profit. Comers were extremely common in the 
nineteenth century; for example Jacob Little cornered the market for stock in the 
Morris Canal and Banking Company in the bull market of 1834: 
"By gaining control of almost the entire floating supply of stock, Little was 
able to force short sellers to pay his price for shares they had contracted to 
deliver and could not buy in the open market. Little sold Morris Canal stock 
that he had bought in December at $10 a share for an average price of $185 a 
month later" (Sobel, 1965, ch. 3, p. 42-3). 
The following account, concerning Allan A. Ryan and the Stutz Motor Car Company 
of America illustrates in more detail how a market can be cornered. It is taken from 
John Brooks, "Once in Golconda", pages 26 to 35. 
The price of stock in the Stutz Motor Car Company of America rose rapidly from 
around $100 per share at the start of 1920 to $134 on February 2. At this point, Allan 
A. Ryan, who had a controlling interest in the company - and was the son of the more 
famous Wall Streeter Thomas Fortune Ryan - heard that organised short selling had 
appeared in the market, and decided to fight it. It is possible that the short-sellers 
believed the stock to be over-valued at the new levels, but it may have been a 'bear 
raid' relying on driving the price below its true value in order to buy the stock back at 
lower prices. In any case, Ryan borrowed millions of dollars, and attempted to 
squeeze the short-sellers by buying all the stock appearing in the market and, in so 
doing, forced the price ever upwards. 
"At first, Ryan lost ground. So great was the short-selling pressure that, 
despite his efforts, by early March the price of Stutz had dropped back to near 
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100. But then the tide turned decisively. By the morning of March 24 Stutz 
was up to 245; that day it shot up to 282, and a week later had skyrocketed to 
391. In the course of the startling rise, practically all Stutz stockholders except 
Ryan, his firm, and members of his family decided to take their profits, and 
sold their stock - which was snapped up in every case by Ryan; meanwhile, 
the opportunity to get an inflated price for Stutz appealed more and more to 
the short sellers, whose number and activity increased, and Ryan bought their 
offerings, too. Toward the end of the month, the stock that they were selling to 
Ryan had first to be borrowedfrom him, since there was no longer anyone else 
who had any. Confident that he was winning, he gladly went on lending and 
then buying it, and the wild, uncontrolled rise to 391 on March 31 sealed his 
victory. The short sellers, it was clear, had disastrously underestimated his 
strength; they were overpowered, and their remaining choices were to buy 
back the stock they owed him, at his price, thereby incurring huge losses, or, 
alternatively, to face professional ruin and perhaps a prison term for breach of 
contract. Ryan.... had engineered in Stutz what Wall Street calls a corner" 
(Brooks, 1970, ch. 2, p. 26-7). 
The short-sellers eventually bought back their borrowed stock for $550 per share, 
ensuring that they suffered an average loss of several hundred per cent, much more 
than is theoretically possible for long positions of an equivalent size. The only gainers 
from this episode, however, were the original stock holders, who were able to sell to 
Ryan at the hugely inflated prices. Ryan himself became bankrupt, since the value of 
the loans he had taken out to purchase the Stutz stock far exceeded the payments from 
the short-sellers and the value of his Stutz stock. Had he not grossly overestimated the 
value of Stutz, he might have held out for a higher price from the short-sellers, and 
secured his actual fortune, rather than a paper one based on the unrealistic share price. 
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Comers were possibly the most risky form of speculation prevalent in the market, 
although they were potentially the most profitable. The above example shows that 
even a successful operation does not guarantee profits for the comerer, although, 
barring bankruptcy of all the shorts, this need not be the case. Since to successfully 
comer the market almost all the outstanding stock must be purchased, the price paid 
per stock to complete the operation is likely to be extremely high, and failure to secure 
victory ensures financial ruin: bankruptcy following unsuccessful cornering attempts 
was not at all uncommon. 
These days, comers are much more likely to be attempted in a commodities market 
than in a stock market. A good example is the activity in the silver market in 1979- 
80.31 It appears that Yasuo Hamanaka, the Sumitomo copper trader, attempted over a 
decade to manipulate the copper market, and established comers in 1993 32 and 1996, 
33 
on the latter occasion wrestling with the might of George Soros's Quantum fund . By 
exerting some degree of control over the price he should also have been able to profit 
from derivatives dealings. 34 The U. S. bond market has also been cornered in recent 
years: Salomon admitted trying (and to some extent managing) to comer the May 
Treasuries auction in 1991; 35 and Steinhardt Management and Caxton were accused of 
comering the market for two-year Treasury notes a month prior to thiS. 36 An example 
31 See, for example, Gastineau & Jarrow (199 1). 
32 Financial Times, 15th June 1996. 
33 Financial Times, 28th May 1996. 
34 Wall Street Journal, 15th July 1996. 
33 Economist, 17th Aug. 199 1. 
36 Financial Times, 17th Dec. 1994. 
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of a recent comer on a stock market is that in 1993 of Union Paper on the Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange. 37 
Since comers do not succeed at the expense of ordinary investors, but rather short- 
sellers who are likely to be speculators themselves following a different agenda, this 
type of speculation does not directly require ordinary investors to have any specific 
behavioural characteristics. Indirectly, however, this may not be the case, since the 
appropriate conditions for other types of speculation may be required, in order to 
induce the short-selling. 
6.5.6 Lessons from manipulation 
Legislation in the U. S. in the aftermath of the crash of 1929, for example the 
Securities Act 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act 1934, was designed to eliminate 
the worst of the speculative excesses from the market, and as a consequence "Pool 
operations, wash sales, the dissemination of tips or patently false information and 
other devices for rigging or manipulating the market were prohibited" (Galbraith, 
1975, ch. IX, p. 184). In contrast to the legislation of 1817, this seems to have been 
fairly successful in meeting its objectives. This does not mean, however, that the 
nature of the non-speculators has changed, and so the lessons we have learned about 
investor behaviour in the past may still be relevant. 
Manipulation seems to have been more prevalent during bull markets. This indicates 
that either speculation is solely responsible for such markets; or that the conditions 
37 Wall Street Joumal, 30th Aug. 1993. 
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creating them, or induced by them, are conducive to speculation. The former is 
unlikely to be true, although there may be some causality in this direction. As we have 
already mentioned, the increased uncertainty surrounding new economic or 
technological developments may provide the link. 
The potential for much speculation, notably trade- and information-based speculation, 
seems to be positively related to the extent of the participation in the market of 
relatively ill-informed investors. In the 1920s, for example: 
"people entered the stock market in greater numbers and with larger amounts 
of money than ever before. Their purchases and sales made the gigantic 
[Arthur W. ] Cutten and [Jesse] Livermore pools possible. " (Sobel, 1965, ch. 
12, p. 252). 
It seems as though the presence in the market of ill-informed investors is an important 
feature of markets, and that this provides the key to understanding the process of 
manipulation. 
6.6 Further evidence relating to investor behaviour 
6.6.1 Direct evidence 
Direct evidence of supposedly informed investors participating in a bubble has been 
unearthed by a survey conducted by Shiller (1988), which found that many investors 
believed the stock-market to be over-valued before the crash of October 1987, but 
stayed in the market in the belief that it would become even more over-valued in the 
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future. 38 In a similar vein, Frankel & Froot (1990) give survey results revealing that 
traders in the foreign exchange markets can believe that short-term and long-term 
movements can be in the opposite direction. These- results lend support to the claim 
that bubbles can exist; although, as we have seen, this would not necessarily imply the 
presence of irrationality on the part of the agents, and could instead simply indicate a 
lack of informedness. The existence of bubbles is, however, compatible with 
contagion amongst ill-informed investors, which could lead informed investors to ride 
the bubbles in the hope of being able to sell out before they burst. 
6.6.2 Evidence from stock prices of the influence of positive feedback 
trading 
The presence of positive feedback trading that is not fully countered by informed 
trading will lead to: stock prices that vary more than is warranted by changes in 
fundamentals; overreaction to changes in fundamentals, perhaps causing deviations 
from fundamentals that are persistent; and, linked to these, price trends that are 
subsequently reversed. 
LeRoy & Porter (1981) and Shiller (1981) were the first to find that the variance of 
stock prices has exceeded the variance of dividends, thus violating an implication of 
the standard model of efficient markets with a constant expected return. It has since 
been shown that the assumption of stationarity in these studies subjects the results to a 
significant degree of small-sample bias; however, it is possible to conclude, as in the 
survey by West (1988), that although: 
38 A good description of some potential bubble fonns can be found in Blanchard & Watson (1982). 
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"Subsequent studies39 that explicitly allow for unit roots find excess volatility 
that is typically an order of magnitude smaller than for studies that assume 
stationarity.... they do still tend to find substantial excess volatility" (p. 639). 
A consequence of excess volatility is that prices will move away from their 
fundamental levels; and the return to these levels will cause stock returns to exhibit 
negative correlations over longer horizons. Several studies have claimed to have 
found evidence of serial autocorrelation in stock prices. Lo, & MacKinlay (1988) 
found evidence in short-horizon returns. Fama & French (1988), Poterba & Summers 
(1988) and Cutler, Poterba & Summers (1990) found evidence of positive 
autocorrelation at short horizons (up to a year) and negative autocorrelations beyond 
this. 
The estimation of long-term autocorrelation is subject to the difficulties associated 
with small samples. One consequence of this is that the overall results will be 
sensitive to the inclusion of particular sub-sections of the sample. Kim, Nelson & 
Startz (1988) show that the findings of long-term negative autocorrelation in Fama & 
French (1988) and Poterba & Summers (1988) depends heavily of the first ten years 
of the 1926-1985 sample. Richardson & Stock (1989) and Richardson (1993) show 
that when the appropriate adjustments are made for small sample sizes and long- 
horizon returns, much of the power of these studies are lost. As Cutler, Poterba & 
Summers (1990) show, weak evidence of negative autocorrelation may still remain, 
although the statistical tests do not have the power to confirm this conclusively 
(Campbell, Lo & MacKinlay, 1997). 
39 Such as Mankiw, Romer & Shapiro (1985), French & Roll (1986) and Roll (1988). 
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Although the studies of mean reversion are subject to such econometric difficulties, 
the conclusions from the volatility tests are more established, and indicate that the 
standard constant return model is not appropriate. This, however, merely indicates that 
the returns are not constant, and does not provide an explanation: 
"What is left - which is non-trivial - is the source of the non-constant expected 
retums" (Kleidon, 1988, p. 659). 
One area of the literature which may shed light on the source of the non-constant 
returns is that which looks for evidence of overreaction to new information. Evidence 
of overreaction to adverse world events and news of presidential illnesses was found 
by Niederhoffer (1971), and subsequent evidence indicating (longer-lasting) 
overreaction has been provided by DeBondt & Thaler (1985,1987), Howe (1984), 
Renshaw (1984,1990), Good (199 1), Lehmann (1990) and Campbell & Kyle (1993). 
This type of price behaviour is consistent with excess volatility and mean reversion. 
The empirical evidence of excess volatility and mean reversion has been interpreted 
by Shiller (1984) and Poterba & Summers (1988) as indicating the presence of fads. 
Such a conclusion, although consistent with the evidence, lacks strong specific 
endorsement, since: 
"There is little direct evidence that trading by naive investors plays a 
substantial role in stock determination. Such evidence as there is in favor of 
fads is largely indirect, and consists of negative verdicts on traditional present- 
value models" (West, 1988, p. 640). 
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The weakness of statistical tests makes it impossible to distinguish between a wide 
variety of competing models of stock price behaviour, and to identify instances of 
deviations of prices from fundamentals if and when these occur (Summers, 1986). It 
is, however, possible to interpret the empirical evidence, as well as other evidence, 
such as the high volume of trade that takes place, as indicating a failure of the efficient 
markets model on a fundamental level, and that: 
"Regrettably, it appears as if it is the assumptions of rationality and rational 
expectations that require reformation" (LeRoy, 1989, p. 1616). 
Cutler, Poterba & Summers (1990) showed that the mean reversion they seem to have 
discovered is consistent with long-term deviations of prices from their mean path 
caused by the dynamics of speculation in a market containing naive (or non-rational) 
investors. They postulated a model of investor behaviour that contains three types of 
investors that are similar to those that reappear in De Long, Shleifer, Summers & 
Waldmann. (1989,1990a), which we examine in detail below; and demonstrated that 
this framework can produce positive serial correlation in stock price series in any of 
three ways: firstly, when there is a lag before fundamental traders learn about value; 
secondly, when there is negative feedback trading; and thirdly, when there is positive 
feedback trading influenced by returns in several previous periods. The first two 
alternatives simply delay the incorporation of new information into prices, and so lead 
to positive serial correlation until the information is fully incorporated. The third 
alternative, however, that of positive feedback trading, as well as initially leading to 
positive serial correlation, can also lead to negative serial correlation at longer 
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horizons, and so is arguably more consistent with the empirical evidence, although, as 
we have seen, the empirical evidence is as yet inconclusive. 
6.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have outlined some of the theoretical, anecdotal and empirical 
evidence that points towards the existence of positive feedback trading. Theoretical 
, causes ranged from trading strategies such as portfolio insurance and chartism, to 
uncertainty, bounded rationality and investor psychology. Anecdotal evidence related 
to past instances of bubbles and market manipulation. The empirical evidence, 
although not providing strong support for the existence of positive feedback trading, is 
at least consistent with it, and indicates a failing in the standard efficient markets 
model. Overall, the evidence allows us to follow Shiller in concluding that: 
"Despite the weaknesses of the anecdotal evidence, it does suggest that there is 
an important influence of faddish behaviour in financial markets" (1988, p. 
58). 
Since the possibility of positive feedback trading exists, its effects should be studied. 
The following chapter looks at the implications for prices of the form of positive 
feedback trading and passive investor behaviour described in De Long et. al. (1989, 
1990a) and Cutler et. al. (1990). 
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Chapter 7 
Manipulation with positive feedback 
traders 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we develop and analyse a simple model featuring positive feedback 
trading. There are a number of problems associated with incorporating positive 
feedback trading into models, since it is likely to vary in importance through time and 
with phases in market behaviour. It is also likely to follow a relatively complicated 
form that would be difficult to model. Since, however, there is evidence that it fonns 
an important feature of investor behaviour, it should not be ignored, and we should 
attempt to learn as much about its implications as we can. This simple model should 
therefore be seen as a preliminary attempt to shed light onto relatively uncharted 
territory. The use of such a simple model ensures that the results obtained must be 
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interpreted with care, and the more extreme implications discounted: but some benefits 
from the exercise will remain. 
In this chapter we look at the scope for trade-based manipulation in the presence of 
positive feedback traders. In particular, we make the assumption that the feedback 
traders exist in a market along with value-investors, whose demand is determined by 
the discrepancy between the market price and the estimated stock value. As the 
modelling of the behaviour of these agents is done in a similar way as in De Long, 
Shleifer, Summers & Waldmann (1989,1990a), the analysis of this chapter helps to 
facilitate the assessment of that model which is carried out in chapter eight. The 
specification of the value- and demand-shocks introduced in section 7.4 also have their 
counterparts in De Long et. al.; but here these are placed in a much more general 
setting, with no assumption of stock liquidation which, as we shall see later, is an 
integral part of that work. In section 7.5 results from Hart (1977), which we have 
highlighted in the previous chapter, are applied to our specification in order to 
determine the conditions necessary for manipulation in such a situation; and we finish, 
in section 7.6, by using a numerical example of manipulators following the strategy 
proposed by Baumol (1957) to show how manipulation could occur in an appropriate 
setting. 
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7.2 Modelling feedback trading 
As in De Long et. al. (1989), we assume that the positive feedback trader demand 
(Df ) is positively affected by the price changes in the preceding two periods. It can 
also provide the market with a demand shock. In particular, we assume that it takes the 
following form: 1 
Df "ýP(Pt-i-Pt-2)+8(P, -P, -, 
)+f, (t) 





ppt-2 + ft (t) 
(7.1) 
Beta and delta are assumed to be non-negative. The demand shock is a function of 
time, and is unrelated to market prices. We could think of this as deriving from a 
separate group of noise traders, but is attributed to the positive feedback traders for 
convenience. De Long et. al. (1990a) used only 'delayed' feedback, coffesponding to a 
delta of zero, and did not incorporate a demand shock. 
It is not difficult to see that if this defined the behaviour of the only group of agents 
present in the market, the market price could be extremely unstable. Setting this 
demand equal to a fixed stock supply, and assuming a strictly positive value for delta, 
reveals the following second-order difference equation for the price series: 
A PI-I + PI-2 + (7.2) 
If we assume that the stock supply is zero and that there is no time-varying demand 
component this can be simplified to the following: 
1 Note that the use of beta and delta here differs from that in De Long et. al. (1989). Our beta is 
equivalent to beta plus delta in that model. 
197 
A Itemative models of security price equilibrium / Chapter 7 R. A. Courtenay 
pt-I + Pt-2 (7.3) 
We show in Appendix E (sections EI and E2) that this system does not oscillate, but is 
dynamically unstable. 
7.3 Feedback traders and passive investors 
7.3.1 Introducing passive investors 
Analysing this situation is unsatisfactory in a number of ways: speculative activity 
would in a sense be 'too easy'; and it is difficult to justify the assumption that ALL 
gnon-speculators', rather than just some, are positive feedback traders in the sense that 
their demand is a positive function of the current price; it also makes an assessment of 
the destabilisation issue problematic, since we have not mentioned fundamentals. De 
Long et. al. therefore assume that there exists another type of agent, denoted 'passive' 
investors. By assumption the passive investors are not capable of formulating strategies 
based on the behaviour of the other agents, but simply act on their estimates of 
underlying stock value, which is unaffected by the market price. In particular, their 
stock demand in period T (DP) is given by the following: T 
DP =a (7.4) T 
(VT 
- PT) 
where V represents the passive investors' estimate of the fundamental stock value. 
The passive investor demand therefore increases at a constant rate as the price moves 
away from the value estimate. 
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7.3.2 Equilibrium with passive investors and feedback traders 
Combining the demand functions of the feedback traders and passive investors gives us 
a non-speculative excess demand function which is as follows: 
E (t) = Dtf + DP 
= (V, - p, ) +0 (p, -, - p, -j 
+8 (p, - p, _ý) + 
f, (t) (7.5) 
= -(oc - 8)p, + (p - 8)p, -. - pp, -,. + ccv, + f, (t) 
Setting this equal to zero and rearranging: 
pt = pl-I - Pt-2 + 
avt + f, (t) (7.6) 
(CC - 8) (CC - 8) (CC - 8) 
If we assume that the value estimate of the passive investors is constant, and that there 
are no demand shocks, this can be simplified to: 




«y. - 8) «X - 8) p 
This bears more than a passing resemblance to the model used in Baumol (1957). The 
time path represented by this second-order difference equation will have different 
properties depending on the strengths of the two coefficients of feedback trading. 
7.3.3 Oscillations 
We show in the appendix (E I and E3.1) that the price path will oscillate when the 
following condition holds: 2 
4ap : ý. (p +8 )2 (7.8) 
and that this condition is equivalent to: 
8<-02., r(-xp (7.9) 
2 See, for example, Levy (1992). 
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A sufficient condition for this to hold is: 
8<ý (7.10) 
This clearly cannot hold for a beta of zero, and so the price will not oscillate when 
there is no delayed feedback. 
7.3.4 Stability in an oscillatory system 
When the above condition holds, and thus the path oscillates (as it does in Baurnol, 
1957), the oscillations will either be damped, regular, or explosive, depending on 
whether the magnitude of the coefficient of the twice-lagged term is less than, equal to, 
or greater than one. The system will therefore be asymptotically stable when the 
following condition holds: 
1A81 
<1 
2: ß +8 for (x >5 
The system will exhibit regular cyclical behaviour as in Baumol when this is an 
equality. This condition is derived in an alternative way in the appendix (E3.2). 
7.3.5 Stability in a non-oscillatory system 
We show in the appendix (E3.3) that a non-oscillatory system will be stable when the 
following conditions hold: 
EITHER P ýý 8 
OR P<8 
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7.3.6 Regions of oscillations and stability 
Figure 7.1 shows the combinations of the coefficients that produce systems that 
oscillate-, and also those that are asymptotically stable, oscillatory or otherwise, as 
derived from the above conditions. The equations for the boundary lines can be found 
by normal 1 sing the relevant conditions (by dividing through by alpha) and expressing Z71 
thern as equalities. Stability occurs when one of the following conditions hold: 
1) p6 <-po +2V-pjj AND p6 
OR 




where: pp --= p /a and P6= 8/(X - 
The first condition corresponds to the plain white region in figure 7.1, while the second 
corresponds to the white hatched region. 








0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 
rho-delta 
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Cases where the system in the absence of speculation would be asymptotically unstable 
are not particularly interesting, since the destabilising effect of speculation would be 
difficult to assess in such a situation. For the case of delayed feedback only (8 = 0) as 
in De Long et. al. (1990), figure 7.1 shows that the system will exhibit asymptotically 
stable oscillations. 
When there is no delayed feedback trader response to price changes (P = 0) the 





This exhibits asymptotic stability when the magnitude of the coefficient is less than (or 
equal to) one: 
I 
(7.15) 
This shows that when there is no delayed feedback the system exhibits asymptotic 
instability when delta exceeds half the value of alpha, which is confirmed by the figure 
7.1. 
7.4 System dynamics 
In this section we will look at how the system behaves once it has been disturbed from 
its steady state. In particular'we will look at two different types of shock: a demand 
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shock; and a shock to the underlying stock value. These mirror those found in De 
Long et. al. 
7.4.1 Demand shock 
A demand shock occurs as the result of liquidity trades. This is the type of shock 
present in De Long et. al. (1989). Assume that the system is in its steady state, with 
past prices equal to V, when a one-off demand shock N hits the market in period T. 
The price in this period is determined as follows: 
8)pT + (ß - 8)pT-1 - ßPT-2 + ÜCV 
= -«X - 
ö:. + (ß - 
s)v 
-ß v' 0 +av (7.16) 
«Y- -5) 
For simplicity, we will now assume that delta is zero. The system reduces to the 
following: 
pt =E Pt-i -E Pi-2 + Va 
(X (X 
(7.17) 
The path of prices in this system will take the following form, for discrete values of t: 3 
Ar' cos(tO + B) + V,, 
where: r= 
F-41ý 
and 0 is such that the following holds: 
coso 
(7.18) 
This shows that the periodicity of the cycle is proportional to the square root of beta. 
3 See, for example, Goldberg (1958). 
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7.4.2 Value shock 
When a value shock occurs, the system must move to a new steady-state equilibrium, 
motivated by the realisation by the passive investors that, with a new fundamental 
value of V,,, the stocks are now mispriced. The general form of the price process, again 
for discrete values of t, is similar to that for the case with the demand shock, but 
centred around the new fundamental value: 
Cr' cos(tO + D) + V,, (7.19) 
where r and 0 is the same as in the previous example. 
7.4.3 Numerical example of a demand shock 
Assume now that beta is a three-quarters, alpha is one, and the value estimate is 




Cos' (-Irl-) ý4) 
(7.20) 
Assume also that a demand shock of one hits the market in period one. The subsequent 
path of prices is given by the following: 
8 
pt --rtcos(tO+n +10 
,. 
r3, l-Q9 2) 
This generates the price path shown in figure 7.2. 
7.4.4 Numerical example of a value shock 
Given the same system as in the previous example resting in a steady-state position, 
assume that the value estimate of the passive investors changes from ten to eleven. If 
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we assume that this occurs in period one, the price will now begin a cycle that can be 
characterised by equation 7.22. 
4 
p, =- -ý= r cos (tO + 0.447 8) + 11 113 
(7.22) 
3 
The associated price path is given in figure 7.3. 
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7.5 Profitability of disturbing the steady state 
7.5.1 Lessons from Hart (1977) 
As we mentioned above, Hart (1977) looks at the conditions under which 
(monopolistic) speculation can be profitable in a system that is not subject to other 
types of shocks, and is currently resting in its steady state. Since Hart deals with 
incremental demand in each period, while for the De Long et. al. example we have 
been considering the demand for total stock holdings, we need to express the non- 
speculator excess demand function in a new form. The incremental demand of the non- 
speculators is as follows: 
E 
= -(CC - 8)(Pt - PI-1) + (P -8 XPt-l - PI-2) 
v (7.23) ß (Pi-2 - Pf-3 + (Y'( t- 
vt-1 ) 
= -(a - 5)p, + (Cc +p- 28)p, -, - 
(2p - OPI-2 
ßp, -, 
When V, the value estimate of the passive investors, is constant, this reduces to: 
-(CC - 8)p, + (CC +0- 28)p, -, 
- (2 P- OPI-2 + PA-3 
(7.24) 
Equating these with the Hart notation gives: 
ao = -(a - 8) 
a, = oc +0- 28 
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We can define a new function, as in Hart: 
«x +ß -25)z-(2ß _ 
8>2 + ßZ3 (7.26) 
As we have seen previously, Hart shows that speculation that disturbs the steady state 
can be profitable if and only if the equation, Re f (z) = 0, has a solution z satisfying 
Izi < 1. The real part of the above can be found by first splitting z into its real and 
imaginary components: 
=-b+ci (7.27) 




- 2(2p - S)b 2 +4pb3 
where 0: 5 x<I and b' < x. 
For speculation that disturbs the steady state to be profitable, there must exist a root b 
that lies within the unit circle for some feasible value of x. A sufficient condition for 
this is that the original function f(z) has a real root that satisfies the condition. In the 
appendix (E3.5) we show that this is the same condition as for the system to be non- 'r 
oscillatory and asymptotically unstable. 
Hart does not provide the conditions for profitability for the thrice-lagged case, since 
the general form of this proves too intractable, and so we do not have a ready solution 
to the problem handy. We can, however, make use of Hart's Theorem 3.6, which 
states that asymptotic instability is a sufficient condition for profitable speculation. 
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7.5.2 Sufficient conditions for non-proritability 
Expres, slon 5.15 of chapter five reveals that, for our example, a sufficient condition for 
manipulation that disturbs the steady state to be unprofitable is as follows: 
(x -6ý! I(x +P- 281 
and (x -8 loc +P- 281 +12 61 (7.29) 
and (x -8 lot +0- 281 + 12P - 61 +P 
These are clearly increasing in severity, implying that we need only consider the final 
condition, which can be expressed as: 




where p 1, =0 /a. and p6= 8/(x - 
This condition is illustrated in figure 7.4. The intersection of the two lines, which 
marks the apex of the shaded triangle, occurs at the point (2/3,1/3). 
Fig. 7.4: Sufficient WI Condition. 
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7.5.3 Necessary conditions for non-profitability 
Expression 5.16 of chapter five reveals that a necessary condition for manipulation to 
be unprofitable is that the following hold: 
> cc +p -28 
2 
and a -8 >1 
2p 
and a -8 >p 2 
These can be expressed alternatively as: 
4p8 :5 pp +3 
EITHER p0 -a- 
p8 





OR po : 5-E-8 and 
3 
ps -pp 22 
AND p8 + 
P5 
2 
The combined condition is shown in figure 7.5. Speculation can be profitable for values 
in the unshaded area. 
7.5.4 Combining the necessary and sufficient conditions 
Figure 7.6 shows the combined coverage of the sufficient and necessary conditions. It 
shows the region where speculation can be profitable; the region where speculation 
cannot be profitable; and the region where the conditions are not strong enough to 
pronounce one way or the other. It also gives the regions of stability and instability, as 
revealed previously. 
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Fig. 7.5: NecessarY condition. 
Fig. 7.6: Combining the conditions. 
As can be seen from figure 7.6, the area not covered by the necessary and sufficient 
conditions represents approximately half of the total area. In addition, the necessary 
condition is entirely superseded by the combination of tile conditions for asymptotic 
instability and Hart's Theorem 3.6, which, as we have seen, states that asymptotic 
instability implies profitability. 
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7.5.5 Isolating the boundary of profitability 
In the appendix (E3.6) we show that the region in which speculation that disturbs the 
steady state can be profitable is defined by the following conditions: 
EITHER pp >1 2 
OR Po <1 2 
AND p8 '? -21pý(1-2pý) 
AND either p8 <4pp 
or ps >p 
(7.33) 
The region bounded by the conditions is indicated by the bold line in figure 7.7. Note 
that the above indicates that speculation that disturbs the steady state can be profitable 
on the curved border, but not on the straight line. 
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FillUre 7.7 shows that an increase in feedback trading can, in some circurnstances, 
move the systern from a situation in which speculation is profitable to one in which it is 
not. For example, with an alpha of one, and a delta of 0.6, speculation can be profitable 
when beta is zero-, but if beta rises to, say, 0.2, speculation can no longer be profitable. 
Combining figure 7.7 with the necessary and sufficient conditions allows us to assess 
more clearly the performance of these. This is done in figure 7.8, and reveals that: the 
sufficient condition identifies only about a third of the unprofitable region, but gives 
two of the boundary points, ( 1/2,0) and (2/3,1/3); and the boundary of stability gives 
a reasonable approximation of the boundary of profitability for values of pli < 1/2. 









I- Border Iýinýe] 
The bOUndanes of the regions displaying unique combinations of oscillatonness, 
stability and profitability are shown in figure 7.9. The situation can be seen more 
clearly if we focus on the central section, which is shown in figure 7.10. 
Fig. 7.9: Combinations of'oscillatoriness, stabilityand prolitabilitv. 
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The characteristics of each of the regions are given in table 7.1. 
Table 73: Characteristics of the regions. 
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Oscillations. Stability. Profitability. 
A x 
B x x 
c 
D x 
E x x 
7.5.6 Comparison with Baumol (1957) 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, Baumol (1957) contains a model that 
encompasses positive feedback. That model can be compared with the one we have 
analysed above. In Baumol the coefficients of the non-speculator excess demand 





where W is a positive constant. All further coefficients (a3, a4, etc. ) are zero. To re- 
cap: in the model we have been using, the coefficients are as given in equation 7.25, 
which are: 
ao = -(cc -8) 
a, =CC+P-28 
a. = -(2p - 8) 
a3 =p 
A comparison of the coefficients reveals that these models are only compatible for the 
following parameter values: 
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This indicates that the De Long et. al. formulation is not as general as might be 
supposed. 
7.6 Profitable speculator strategies 
Previously we found the values for beta and delta under which speculators can make 
money from disturbing the steady state. In this section we look at an example of a 
profitable speculative strategy that can be employed in such a situation. The particular 
strategy we use is taken from Baumol (1957), and represents a rule-of-thumb approach 
rather than one based on optimisation. Since in De Long et. al. the optimal behaviour 
of the speculators is determined by working back from a fixed end-point, the approach 
in that paper is not transferable to this situation. 
7.6.1 Speculator strategy from Baumol (1957) 
We saw in the previous chapter that in the Baumol (1957) model speculators can make 
money by utilising the following excess demand function, which, although not 
explicitly derived from optimising behaviour, is designed to min* speculator 
behaviour that concentrates purchases just after a price trough, and sales just after a 
peak: 
Es,, +, = C[(Pt+l - Pt) - 
(p, - Pt_, )] 
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The speculator demand will therefore follow a cyclical pattern of the same frequency 
as the price. Although Baumol assumes that the prices before any speculator 
involvement are fluctuating cyclically, we know from the previous chapter that 
speculators can profit from disturbing the steady state to induce this cyclical behaviour. 
Suppose that the speculators in our system behave in the same way that they do in 
Baumol, with the exception that they have to initially disturb the steady state. We can 
therefore express the speculators' excess demand function in the following way: 
Es, ( 
=c[(pt -pf-1)-(pf-1 -pf-2)]+ X, -Xt-1 
(7.37) 
= C[(pf -2p, -I 
+ PI-2)] + X, - Xt-1 
where X is the demand shock required to jerk the system out of its steady state, and is 
assumed to be non-zero only in period one, the first period of speculative activity. The 
total demand from the speculator in period t is therefore given by the following: 
F =C 3, t 
(P, - Pt-i)+ X, (7.38) 
Adding this to the non-speculator total demand function and setting it equal to the 
stock supply, which we set equal to zero for convenience, allows us to determine the 
new price process: 
-((x -8- C)PI + (P -8- C)Pt-l - PPI-2 + (1vt + Xt = 
=* pl = 
(ß -ö - c) 
Pt-1 -ß PI-2 + 
ctvt + xt (7.39) 
«Y -5- C) (üt -5 - C) «X -8 - c) 
The price will oscillate when the following condition holds: 
(p_B_C)2 
<4p(a-8 -C) (7.40) 
A sufficient for this to hold is that: 
0>8+c 
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When the price oscillates, the cycles are of the following fonn: 
p, =A 
2 
co4tO + B) 
ýa-3 C) 
where 0 is given by cosO 
2. ýFfl(a -3- C) 
(7.42) 
and A and B are given by the initial 
conditions. 
7.6.2 Setting up the numerical examples 
Let us now look at the effect of speculative involvement of this sort, within the system 
used to provide the previous examples. For simplicity we will set the fundamental 
value to zero, which does not alter the nature of the cycles illustrated. The parameters 
am therefore as follows: P= 3/4,8 = 0, a=1, V=0. Assume that the speculator 
purchases one unit of the stock, in period one, to disturb the system from its steady 
state. The speculator demand in subsequent periods is determined, via prices, by the 
value of C. The lines in the subsequent plots follow the colour-scherne given in table 
7.2. 
Table 72: Colour-codefor plots. 
red deviation of price from mean 
green contribution of current period to total profit 
black incremental demand of speculators 
The deviation of the price (from its mean of the fundamental value ý) is plotted, rather 
that the price itself, in order to aid comparison of this cycle with the others given. The 
contribution of each period to the total profit is calculated in the following way: 
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Single period profit =-E,, tpt 
(7.43) 
'Me cumulative profit of the speculators is therefore given by: 
T 
Cumulative profit to period TI -E, p, (7.44) 
t=1 
7.6.3 Numerical example #1, with C of zero 
When C is zero, the price will follow a path totally determined, beyond the first period, 
by the non-speculator demand function; and so will resemble that given previously for 
the demand shock. This is shown in figure 7.11. Such a strategy would clearly not be 
followed by a speculator, since he would have no way of recouping the initial loss from 
disturbing the steady state. 
Fig. 7.11: Price path with C of zero. 
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7.6.4 Numerical example #2, with C of 0.2 
Figure 7.12 shows the situation with C set at 0.2, and shows that the speculative 
activity has reduced the rate at which the price cycle is damped. Since the green line - 
representing the incremental change in profits - has a mean greater than zero, the 
speculator earns positive profits once the system has been dcstabilised. 




In order to assess the profitability of the speculative strategy as a whole, the 
cumulative profit must be analysed. This is shown in figure 7.13, and reveals that the 
speculator recoups the early loss and moves into profit by the twelfth period. 
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7.6.5 Numerical example #3, with C of 0.3 
Figure 7.14 represents the situation when C is 0.3. The speculative activity is now at 
such a level that makes the price dynamically unstable. 
Fig. 7.14: Price, demand and incremental Profit with C of 0.3. 
................................. I 
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The mean profits over each cycle are still positive, but are now increasing, ensuring 
that cumulative profits are rising at an increasing rate, as borne out by figure 7.15. 
Fiv. Z 15: Cumulative profit with C of 0.3. 
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This example highlights a limitation of the model, since it is clear that the most 
profitable form of speculative behaviour is dynamically unstable. We would not expect 
to see this type of behaviour in reality, since it would become clear to the market 
participants that manipulation was taking place. 
7.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has revealed the richness of potential price behaviour in the presence of 
positive feedback trading. It has also shown that the presence of positive feedback 
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trading does not necessarily provide an opening for manipulators, since the potential 
for this to be profitable will depend on the delay with which prices feed back into 
demand and the strength of value-trading by passive investors. 
Unfortunately, the example given in section 7.6 reveals that when manipulation is 
possible its most profitable form leads to price fluctuations that increase over time. 
However, if other factors were to be taken into consideration, such as the riskiness of 
the strategy or the likelihood of the strategy being discovered, this conclusion might 
change. A non-linear passive investor demand function might even be sufficient. In any 
case, this feature highlights the need for more sophisticated modelling of the effects of 
positive feedback trading. 
Now that we understand better how a market with passive investors and positive 
feedback traders behaves, it is time to examine the De Long et. al. claim that 
competitive speculation can be destabilising. 
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Appendix E: For Chapter 7 
0 El Second-order difference equations 
Take a general second-order difference equation such as the following: 
a, p, -, + 
a2A-2 (El) 
The characteristic roots are the roots of the following expression, which is derived 
from the above: 
m2- alm-a, =0 (E2) 
The characteristic roots are therefore: ' 
1(2- 
1,2 ý2a, ± , 
Fa, + 4a2 
The system will oscillate around the stationary level of zero when the characteristic 
roots are complex, which occurs when the discriminant is negative, which is when the 
following condition holds: 
a, 
2 
+4a2 <0 (E4) 
When the system does not oscillate, it is asymptotically stable whenever both the 
characteristic roots lie within the unit circle. 
1 See, for example, Levy (1992). 
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E2 Feedback traders only 
Substituting in the values from our example with feedback traders only, reveals that 
the characteristic roots are given by: 
1.2 2 (E5) 
=> ýtl 2 
Since the roots are always real, we know that the price path does not oscillate. For 
asymptotic stability we require that both of these roots lie within the unit circle. This 
is not the case here, and so a perturbation from the steady state will lead to the 
magnitude of the price increasing indefinitely. 
E3 Feedback traders and passive investors 
EM Generalities 
When both feedback traders and passive investors are present, the characteristic roots 






(p-8± C(-P 4-c c 
(E6) 
This tells us that the price path will oscillate when the following condition is met: 
4ap > (p +8y (E7) 
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The boundary, beyond which the system oscillates can be found by solving the above 
as an equality. This gives: 
8= -P ± 2ja-P (E8) 
Re-inserting the inequality, and noting that we are only interested in positive values 
of delta, allows the condition for oscillations to be written as: 
8< -P 2ýa-p- (E9) 
E3.2 Condition for stability in an oscillatory system 
When the characteristic roots have an imaginary component, the condition for 
stability becomes: 
(p -8y 4p(a -8)-(p +8y <I 
4(cc -8y 




=>cc ý: P +8 
EM Condition for stability in a non-oscillatory system 
For stability we require the largest root to lie within the unit circle. When P ý: 8, the 
condition becomes: 
2 +8y -4ccýp <I 
=: >C(P+8y -4aP : 52a-P-8 
=> (P + 8y - 4ap: 5 4()C 
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This always holds. When P<8, the condition becomes: 
(cc 8) 




+8y - 4(xp :5 2a +p- 38 
When 2a +P- 38 < 0, this never holds. When 2a +p- 38 ý: 0, the condition 
becomes: 
-4ap : ý(2a +p -36Y 
(E13) 
2 
Combining these conditions gives the result found in the main text. 
E3.4 Profitability 
As we noted in the main text, following Hart (1977), we can define a new termj(z): 
f(Z)= -(a -8)+ (a+ p -28ý--(2p _8ý2 + 
pZ3 (E14) 
For speculation that disturbs the steady state to be profitable, we require the existence 
of a solution to: 
Re f(z)= Re[-(a -8)+ (a+ p -28ý--(2p _ 8ý2 + pZ3 
1=0 (EI5) 
that satisfies IzI < 1. 
We can split z into its real and imaginary components as follows: 
b+ci 
Substituting this into the function gives: 
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Ref(z) =Re[-(cc-8)+(cc+p-28)(b+ic) 
-(2p - 8Xb + icý + P(b +icy] 
=Re {-(a -8)+ (a+ P -28)b 
2p _8 
b2 


















=> lb+id <I 
b' + c' <I 
c2 <I-b 
2 
=> c2 =I-b 
2 
=: ý c2 =x-b 
2 
where x=-I-y, 0: 5x <1 and b' <x. 
(E17) 
Substituting this into the above gives the expression found in the main text (7.28). 
E3.5 Sufficient condition for profitability 
A sufficient condition for profitability is that one of the roots of the full function 
(E14) is real and lies within the unit circle. The roots are: 
1, and 
F(p 
+8y - 4otp (E18) 
2p 
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The non-unitary roots are therefore real when: 
4otp :5 (p +8y (E19) 
This is the same condition as for the system not to exhibit oscillations. 
Remember that speculation will be profitable when the smallest root (in magnitude) 
lies within the unit circle. We can consider two cases: P ý: 8 and P<8. First, it is 
worth noting that the magnitude of the term inside the square root is less that the 
magnitude of the square of the term outside. This can be shown as follows: 
0: 5 (P + 8y - 4(xp 
(E20) 
When P ýt 8, the condition for the smallest root to be within the unit circle is: 
+8y - 4ap 1 2p (E21) 
+>0 
This always holds. When P<8, the condition for the smallest root to be within the 
unit circle is: 
2p 
+8Y - 4(xp >8- 3p 
This always holds for 8< 3p. When 82! 3p, the condition becomes: 
(P+8y -4ap >(6 -3py 
=: > 2p -28 +cc <0 
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Combining the above gives sufficient conditions for speculation that disturbs the 
steady state to be profitable: 
4ap:! ý (p +8y 
AND EITHER P '2ý 8 
OR P< 
(E24) 
AND either 8< 3p 
or 8 ý!: 3p 
and 8>p+-cc 2 
Plotting these conditions reveals that they are equivalent to the conditions for the. 
system to be non-oscillatory and asymptotically unstable. 
E3.6 General conditions for profitability 
We showed in the main text that the real part of the function can be written as: 
Re f (z) 
(E25) 
-8)b2 3 = (2 ß-8 )x - «x -5)+ «x +ß-3 ßx - 28)b -2 (2 ß +4ßb 
where z=-b+ci, 0: 5x<l and b< 
This will have a root (for b) that lies within the unit circle when the following 
expression has a real root that lies within the unit circle: 
2p- a +(oc -2P-28ý-2(2p-8)b' +4pb' (E26) 
This expression is the above expression under a value for x of one. The roots of this 
are as follows: 
1, and 
-+8-ýp 2 Zap- 
4D 
(E27) 
A requirement is that the term inside the square-root is non-negative, since b is real: 
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82 +8p2-4(xp -Rt 0 (E28) 
This always holds when P ý: a/2. When P< cc/2, this will hold when: 
82 >-4«ß-8ß2 
=>8 2-- 2 jß- «x --2 ß) 
(E29) 
Assume that the roots are real. When P ý: (x/2, the condition for the smallest root to lie 
within the unit circle becomes: 
-8+ý8 +8BV- <1 4p 
ý8 2+8P2-4ap < 4p +8 (E30) 
82 +8 p2 -4ap < (4p +8y 
2p + 26 + cc >0 
This always holds. When P< cc/2, the condition for the smallest root to lie within the 
unit circle becomes: 
--. 8+ >-I 4p 
=> >8 -4p 
This always holds when 4p > 8. When 4p:! ý 8, the condition becomes: 
82 +8 p2 -4ccp > (8 -4py 
=: > 20 -28 +cc <0 
> p+-a 2 
(E3 1) 
(E32) 
The over-all conditions for speculation that disturbs the steady state to be profitable 
are therefore: 
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EITHER > (X 
2 
OR <a 2 
, 
Fp (a -2 (E33) AND 8 ý! 2. ý 
AND either 8< 4p 
or 8 >p+-' 2 
Dividing through by alpha produces the conditions given in the main text. 
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In the previous chapter we saw, with the help of Hart (1977), the conditions under 
which speculation that disturbs the steady state can be profitable in an economy with 
feedback traders and passive investors. We also found a speculative strategy that 
could be profitable, although we did not isolate the optimal speculator strategy. This 
previous work does not, however, tell us anything about the speculative possibilities 
associated with the incidence of shocks to the system. If a system suffers a change in 
the fundamental stock value, or receives a demand shock, it may be vulnerable to 
speculative activity when such activity could not profitably disturb the steady state: 
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and if this is the case, it would be important to see what form such speculation would 
take. It is the broad aim of this chapter to investigate these issues. 
The analysis of the previous chapter dealt with the possibilities for monopolistic 
speculation. It is apparent that in such a framework competitive speculation would 
lead to prices remaining firmly at fundamental levels. We shall see below that the 
incidence of shocks may prevent competition from having such a stabilising role. In 
fact, competitive speculation may be more destabilising than collusive speculation. 
The structure we use shares many characteristics with the models found in De Long 
et. al. (1989,1990a), which deal exclusively with competitive speculators. 
Throughout we will compare our model with these, and produce new results. In the 
main body of the text we will assume that the shock concerns the fundamental stock 
value, as in De Long et. al. (1990a), rather than a demand shock as in De Long et. al. 
(1989). In the appendix, however, we produce results for the more general case with 
both types of shock. 
We begin by detailing the basic model framework, and examine the implications of 
this in the context of the previous chapter; in particular, we try to assess the 
importance of the assumption, explicitly made in De Long et. al., that the stock is 
liquidated. We then introduce a utility-maximising speculator to the system, derive 
the market prices, and look at some special cases. Competitive speculation is analysed 
next, with a slightly richer information structure. This then allows us to compare 
prices under the alternative assumptions that speculators act competitively or collude 
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(and hence act jointly in the same way as would a monopolist). We finish by 
attempting to draw some conclusions from the analysis. 
8.2 Model structure 
8.2.1 Basic framework 
As in De Long et. al., we will assume that the stock is liquidated in period three, and 
that a steady state has existed prior to period one, with prices and value equal to zero. 
When liquidated the stock pays out an amount equal to a pre-determined 'mean' value 
disturbed by noise ((D + 0). The mean of the liquidation value ((D) can take three 
possible values ((D= -ý, 0 or ý). The noise term (0) has a mean of zero and a variance 
2 
of a. We will initially assume that the speculator receives information in period one 
that reveals the mean of the liquidation value: this corresponds to the De Long et. al. 
case of 'noiseless' information. The speculator may receive this information in either 
period one or period two. To re-cap, the assumptions made are as follows: 
Assumption 1: A steady state, with prices equal to zero, exists prior to period 1. 
Assumption 2: The stock will be liquidated in period 3, paying an amount (D + 0. 
Assumption 3: The mean of the liquidation value ((D) is revealed to the speculators in 
period 1, and can take one of three values ((D= -ý, 0 or ý). 
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Before analysing the model, we will first assess the implications of adding the 
assumption of liquidation. 
8.2.2 The implications of the liquidation assumption 
The assumption of third-period stock liquidation is clearly an unrealistic one. It is, 
however, necessary for the isolation of the equilibria once rational speculators are 
added to the system. It is important to assess how much the results are compromised 
by such an assumption; either by the restrictions it effectively imposes, or by the 
freedom given to speculators not to have to liquidate their holdings at market- 
determined prices. 
We can replace the assumption of liquidation with the assumption that competitive 
speculators peg the price at the revealed 'fundamental value' in period three and 
beyond. This means that the speculators must offset the trades of the feedback traders, 
since the passive investors will purchase nothing, and so the speculator demand 
follow the following sequence: 
Dp- 
3r :- ß(PI -P2)+5(P2 -(D-0) 




From period five onwards the holdings of each agent type will be zero, and so the 
speculators will have reversed all their speculative trades. Since the price has been 
kept constant at the fundamental value, this has been achieved costlessly. 
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The liquidation assumption is therefore equivalent to an assumption that the stock is 
not liquidated, but that the market price equals the new stock value once this has been 
revealed. For simplicity, it would also be necessary to assume that it is known (or at 
least believed) that the new stock value will prevail indefinitely. It seems reasonable 
to assume that arbitrage, possibly from other speculators or the passive investors, 
ensures that this occurs: indeed, this is a necessary assumption when speculators are 
competitive. This assumption therefore marks a clear divergence with the previous 
chapter, since there we were working under the assumption that, although the 
fundamental value was unchanging, the price was determined by the monopolistic 
speculator, and need not necessarily reflect it. 
Stock liquidation can therefore be thought of as a simplifying assumption that 
enhances model transparency, and that is relatively benign in a world of competitive 
speculators, since in this environment prices at all times other than when a change in 
this fundamental value is imminent would be kept at fundamental values by arbitrage 
even in the absence of liquidation. When there is a monopolistic speculator the 
assumption of stock liquidation is justifiable, due to improved modelling tractability, 
but also less benign, since an equivalent alternative assumption is more difficult to 
construct than for the competitive case. 
The immediate consequence of the liquidation assumption is that the scope for 
speculation is limited to the periods immediately preceding a change in the 
fundamental value. For non-competitive speculators, this limits the potential length of 
speculative strategies. Another way of looking at the liquidation, value assumption 
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with a monopolistic speculator is therefore as a restriction on the range of speculative 
strategies that can be followed. It must therefore reduce the scope for profitable 
speculation relative to a situation where such a liquidation assumption is not made. 
8.2.3 Feedback traders and passive investors 
The stock demand of the feedback traders and passive investors at dates one and two 
are determined in the same way as in the previous chapter, and are therefore as 
follows: 
DIf =8 (Pi - PO) = 8p, 
Dj 2f = P(PI -PO)+8(P2 -PI) (8.2) 
- 8)(PI - PO)+ 8 (P2 - PO) 
-8)PI +8P2 





where V, represents the value estimate of the passive investors in period one, and (D 
represents the liquidation value, or alternatively the new 'fundamental' stock value. 
Note that the passive investors are not necessarily 'rational' in the sense used in the 
rational expectations literature - although their pattern of behaviour may turn out to be 
rational in certain circumstances if modelled more explicitly - and so they are not 
insulated from 'exploitation' by the speculators. 
De Long et. al. assume that information about the liquidation value becomes available 
in period one, but that the passive investors discover this only in period two - hence 
V, is zero - and so they are 'uninformed' in period one. We will leave open the 
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possibility that V, may take other values: in particular, that the passive investors may 
be 'informed' in this period, in which case they will not suffer at the hands of the 
speculators, since they will always purchase stock when the price is below its true 
value, and sell when it is above. Making the assumption that the passive investors do 
not receive an information signal in period one enshrines in this model an 
informational advantage for the rational speculators. De Long et. al. do not see this as 
a problem, since their paper was motivated by the question of whether the addition of 
better-informed and rational agents could make market prices more unstable. But this 
does not mean that studying a situation in which the passive investors are not 
informationally disadvantaged in this way would not be of interest, since this would 
allow us to see which aspects of the price behaviour are due to the information 
advantage, and which are due to the lack of rationality on the part of the passive 
investors. 
8.2.4 Introducing speculators 
Since it is known that an increase in the risk-bearing capacity will exert a stabilising 
influence on price, we follow De Long et. al. in introducing speculators into the 
market in a way that keeps this constant. Hence the effects of an increase in the 
measure of informed rational speculation are only analysed for cases where the 
measure of passive investors is correspondingly reduced: introducing speculators of 
measure ýt into the market entails a reduction of the measure of passive investors to (I 
- 0. 
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The speculators are assumed to have a mean-variance utility function, the sole 
argument being final-period wealth. In period two the variance of the distribution of 
the liquidation value detennines the aggressiveness with which they push the price 
towards fundamentals. In period one the quality of the information signal is also 
important. We will deal in turn with the alternative assumptions that the information 
signal in period one is 'noiseless' or 'noisy. ' 
8.2.5 Informational assumptions 
De Long et. al. make two alternative assumptions concerning information. The first of 
these, whereby in period one the speculators receive information revealing the mean 
of the liquidation value, is termed 'noiseless' information. The second assumption is 
that of 'noisy' information. 
For the case of noisy information, De Long et. al. (1990) assume that in period one 
the speculators receive a signal concerning the mean liquidation value (cý) which can 
take two possible values, symmetric about zero and both equally likely (ý or -ý); and 
that the outcome will be either the value of the signal or zero, with equal probability. 
The informational set-up, for both informational assumptions, is represented in the 
following table: 
Table 8.1: Information assumptions. 
Value signal (F, ý). Liquidation value mean (0). 
Noiseless info. Noisy info. 
0 or ý; 1/2 
0 0 n/a 
4 40 or -ý; 
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8.2.6 Prices in a world without speculators 
The prices in the absence of speculators, following receipt by the passive investors of 
information relating to the new fundamental stock value, are the same as those given 
in the previous chapter. The difference now is that in period three the price becomes 
equal to the new fundamental value, rather than continuing its cyclical behaviour. The 
prices at dates one and two are therefore given by the following: 
Cc 
a (p -8)V, a(D 
((X -8y 
(8.4) 
In Appendix F (section Fl) we give the prices for the two cases corresponding to 
when the passive investors are uninformed (VI = 0) or informed (VI = (D) in period 
one. 
The impact of speculators on market prices can be assessed by comparing the prices 
when they are present to those given above. 
8.2.7 Defining what we mean by a 'destabilising' effect on prices 
Since we are interested in looking at the destabilising effect of comPetitive 
speculation, we must make clear what we mean by this. We follow De Long et. al. in 
using the following definition: 
Definition: the presence of speculators is 'strongly destabilising' when it 
leads to the price in both periods one and two being further from 
fundamentals than it would have been in the absence ofspeculators. 
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An alternative to this would be to look at the total fluctuation in price: this approach 
may produce results that are more reliant on the outcome of the liquidation value; but 
this could be overcome by taking the expected values. The total price fluctuation 
could be defined as the sum of the magnitudes of the price changes for the three 
periods. We do not consider these alternatives. 
8.2.8 Fundamental stock values 
We are now in a position to be able to determine the fundamental stock values. The 
following table shows the fundamental stock value in periods one and two (1,2) for 
the alternative assumptions of information signals that are noiseless or noisy. It also 
gives the estimates of this fundamental value made by the passive investors (VI, V2) 
under the alternative assumptions that in period one they are informed (1) or 
uninformed (U) in period one. 
Table 8.2: Fundamental stock values. 
Noiseless info. Noisy info. 
Fund. Val. (D, (D c/2, (D 
V(19 0, (D 0, (D 
VM (D, (D I c/2, (D 
We have defined the 'fundamental value' to be the value that would reflect all the 
information that could theoretically be known about the liquidation value in that 
period. Until liquidation the size of the noise term (0) is undetermined. 
241 
Alternative models ofsecurity price equilibrium /Chapter 8 R. A. Courtenay 
8.3 Monopolistic speculation 
8.3.1 Introducing monopolistic speculators 
We will now introduce a (monopolistic) speculator into the system. Such a situation 
was not covered by De Long et. al. (1989,1990). For the purposes of analytical 
tractability, the model structure, barring the monopolistic speculator assumption, will 
broadly follow that of De Long et. al. (1990), with information signals being received 
in period one, no supply shock in period two, and no fast-acting feedback trading (i. e. 
delta is zero); although we allow for the possibility that the passive investors may be 
as informed as the speculator in period one, unlike De Long et. al., who assume that 
the speculators are more informed than the passive investors in this period. 
8.3.2 Equilibrium prices 
We show in the appendix (F2.1) that the price in period two for this formulation will 
equal the following: 
I 
P2 =-ý, (a,,, ++ k))- Výa (D (8.5) 
cc . 
(2 + %) 
2 where: a ýt)cx and X =- 2(x ,y n1a 
At this point we will assume that the monopolistic speculator receives a noiseless 
information signal in period one, revealing the mean of the liquidation value ((D). The 
equilibrium prices for a system with a monopolistic speculator and noisy information 
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is given in the appendix (F2.1, F2.3), but they are sufficiently complex to make a 
close study of their properties unrewarding. 
Under noiseless information, since the monopolist knows in period one the 
information he will have in period two, he knows the price that will prevail in period 
two as a function of his own period one demand. This makes his task of choosing this 
period one demand relatively straightforward. We show in the appendix (F2.2) that 
the equilibrium price in period one is: 
(Da .2 
(2+; ý)+VI(I+kb. (ct. -ß) 
ß)ý (3 + D. ) ß}- 
for a. >ß (8.6) 
This shows that the price bears a positive relationship to both the liquidation value 
signal and the value estimate of the passive investors. 
When the liquidation value (and consequently the period one infonnation signal of 
the passive investors) is zero, the price in each period will be zero. This gives the 
following result: 
Result 8.1: Monopolistic speculation is not profitable in the absence of a shock 
This lack of speculative potential must be due to the assumption of stock liquidation, 
with its associated truncation of the time-horizon. 
Since speculators always enter the market when a shock occurs, we have another 
result: 
243 
Alternative models ofsecurity price equilibrium /Chapter 8 R. A. Courtenay 
Result 8.2: Unlike speculation that disturbs the steady state, speculation surrounding 
a shock is always profitable. 
As we mentioned above, we know that the unfailing profitability of speculation in the 
presence of shocks is not due to the assumption of liquidation, because the liquidation 
assumption is equivalent to a five-period speculative strategy that involves choosing 
demand to maximise profits in periods one and two, given that prices will be set equal 
to the fundamental value from the third period onwards, and so can be thought of as a 
restriction on the range of strategies available to speculators. This indicates that the 
driving force behind the profitability is the existence of the value shock itself. the 
presence of shocks that disturb the steady state is sufficient for speculation to be 
profitable. 
8.3.3 No feedback trading 







These show that, as we would expect, in the absence of feedback traders it will be 
profitable for the speculator to move prices away from fundamental values only when 
he has an information advantage over the passive investors. The expected profit of the 
speculator (and the corresponding loss to the passive investors as a group) when the 
passive investors are uninforined in period one is as follows: 
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(3 + 2%Y 
This loss is not foreseen by the passive investors, and is proportional to the measure 
in the market of passive investors and the square of the liquidation value signal, 
which represents the degree of uninformedness of the passive investors. 
8.4 Competitive'speculation 
8.4.1 Introducing competitive speculators 
The previous section has shown that a shock to the system will allow monopolistic 
speculation to become profitable, when it is not necessarily profitable for speculators 
to disturb the steady state themselves. So far, however, we have said nothing about 
equilibrium in the presence of competitive speculators. As we have seen previously, 
the addition of competitive speculators to a system usually tends to push prices 
towards fundamental levels, as would be the case in the system without shocks that 
we looked at previously. In a system with shocks, however, things may be different, 
as revealed by the De Long et. al. (1989,1990a) models. The De Long et. al. models 
are designed to show that, even when speculators behave competitively they can 
destabilise prices. 
In this section we will develop the model with competitive speculators, following De 
Long et. al. (1989,1990a). This involves little more than adding the assumption of 
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competitive speculation to the above model. In the subsequent section we compare 
these competitive results with those we obtained under monopolistic speculation. We 
show that increasing the degree of competition between speculators may actually 
destabilise prices. This is a new result. 
The De Long et. al. 1989 and 1990a models are extremely similar to each other in 
fonn, but differ in their focus: in the initial working paper, the speculators are given a 
signal about a future demand shock emanating from the feedback traders (or an 
additional group of noise traders), but have no special information concerning the 
liquidation value; while in the later Journal of Finance paper, the signal relates to the 
liquidation value, and there is no demand shock. So if we are interested in studying 
the effects of a group of investors anticipating the future demand from other agents, 
the appropriate model to study would be the first one; while if we are interested in 
studying the effects of the appearance in the market of new information, we should 
study the second one. The 1990a model also makes the simplifying assumption that 
the feedback trading depends solely on the price change in the previous period; or in 
other words that delta is zero. 
In order to simplify the exposition, the main body of the text will analyse the effect of 
a shift (or a potential shift) in the underlying stock value, as in De Long et. al. 
(1990a), rather than a demand shock, as in De Long et. al. (1989). For completeness, 
the results for the general model form, in which there is a change in value and a 
demand shock, along with the special case of a demand shock alone, are given in 
Ap endix G. The feedback trading will be of the form used in the previous chapter, I-P 
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determined by both current and lagged price changes, as in De Long et. al. (1989), 
rather than just the lagged price change, as in De Long et. al. (I 990a) and the previous 
section of this thesis (8.3). 
8.4.2 Noiseless information 
When the information signal is noiseless, the rational speculators are informed, in 
period one, of the expected value of the liquidation value (0), and so the information 
available to them is the same in both periods one and two. These investors therefore 
know in period one the price that will prevail in period two conditional on the price in 
period one; and since they know the period one price when making their decisions in 
period one, they therefore know for certain the price that will prevail in period two. 
From the point of view of the rational speculators, then, holding stock between 
periods one and two is riskless; and so, when they are present in the market, arbitrage 
will ensure that the following result holds: 
Result 8.3: As recognised by De Long et. al., competitive speculators under noiseless 
information ensure that the prices in periods one and two will be identical. 
We show in the appendix (F3.1.1) that the stock demand of the rational investors in 
period two is given by the following: 
M= (D -A D2 
2ya 2 (8.9) 
The rational agent demand (per agent) in period two is therefore simply a constant 
multiplied by the excess of the expectation of the liquidation value over the period 
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two price. We will follow the De Long et. al. convention of setting this constant - 
(1/(2ycr 2 )) - equal to the demand coefficient for the passive investors 
(cc), which 
ensures that the period two demand for agents from these two groups will always be 
the swne: 
D2'=D P= cc 2 
((D-P2) (8.10) 
Hence the period two behaviour of the passive investors is (assumed to be) the same 
as that of the rational investors, so it is only the period one behaviour that sets them 
apart. In the appendix (F3.1.1) we show that the market prices are given by the 
following: 
WD 
A=A=P for [t 
Since these prices will be zero when the liquidation value remains at zero, we have 
the following result: 
Result 8.4: Competitive speculation under noiseless information is not profitable in 
the absence ofa shock 
Other results are also apparent: 
Result 8.5: As recognised by De Long et. al., under noiseless information the market 
prices are not affected by the measure of competitive speculators in the market ([t), 
once this rises above zero. 
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Result 8.6: As delayedJeedback develops under noiseless information, the price rises 
ftom itsfundamental level, becoming unbounded as beta approaches alpha. 
We show in the appendix (F3.1.2) that when the passive investors are informed in 
period one, a sufficient condition for the presence of speculators to be strongly 
destabilising under our definition is that beta exceeds delta. We also show in the 
appendix (F3.1.3) that when the passive investors are uninformed in period one, the 
presence of speculators is strongly destabilising when beta exceeds both delta and half 
the value of alpha. Combining these gives the following result: 
Result 8.7: Under noiseless information, competitive speculation will be strongly 
destabilising when thefollowing conditions hold: 
P>8 for 
(8.12) 
P>& P>ct for V, =0 2 
Since when the passive investors are uninformed the magnitude of the price in period 
two will be at least as great as in period one, and will exceed the magnitude of the 
liquidation value, we can legitimately say for this case that if beta exceeds delta the 
price fluctuates more when rational speculators are present. Hence we have another 
result: 
Result 8.8: Under noiseless information, the presence of competitive speculators will 
cause prices to fluctuate more when the amount of delayedfeedback (beta) exceeds 
249 
Alternative models ofsecurityprice equilibrium I Chapter 8 R. A. Courtenay 
the amount of immediate feedback (delta), regardless of the level of informedness of 
the passive investors in period one. 
When the feedback trading is all immediate (P = 0) the presence of speculators is 
stabilising; and, in fact, moves prices to their fundamental levels. When the feedback 
trading is all delayed (8 = 0) the presence of speculators is always strongly 
destabilising when the passive investors are informed; and is strongly destabilising 
under uninformed passive investors when the value of beta exceeds half the value of 
alpha. This shows that the form of feedback trading is crucially important when 
considering questions of destabilisation: a higher degree of immediate feedback 
trading (8) makes speculation more stabilising; while a higher degree of delayed 
feedback trading (0) makes speculation more destabilising. 
The main drawback with this assumption of noiseless information is that, although it 
provides an extremely tractable model, the arbitrage it induces may mask interesting 
results we may be able to glean from a weaker assumption. To this effect we will now 
look at the situation in which the information in period one is less complete than in 
period two. 
8.4.3 Noisy information 
Assume that the signal received by the rational speculators in period one contains 
some noise. In period one the price that will prevail in period two is not known, since 
the rational speculators have less information than they will use to choose their 
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demand in period two. This ensures that there is risk associated with holding stock 
between periods one and two, which is not the case when the information is noiseless. 
In period one the rational speculators, given their information signal (cý), know that 
the expectation of the liquidation value in period two will be one of two values (cý or 
0), 'with each outcome equally likely, although they will not know which of these 
outcomes will occur until period two; and given their optimal investment rule, they 
thus know in period one the two possible prices that will prevail in period two, 
conditional on the period one price. For each of these prices, the certain-equivalent 
value of their holdings conditional on the price in period one and their demand in the 
same period can be calculated by the rational speculators; their period one problem 
becomes one of choosing their demand to maximise the certainty-equivalent of their 
period two wealth given these two possible levels. 











ac, 2Vcýa (a -8y -8'c4' 
ot (XE+2( a -(P -8)ý4CF2(ot _8y _CC86+2 
(8.13) 
From this it is straightforward to derive the period one price for the cases where the 
fundamental value estimate of the passive investors in period one (VI) is either zero or 
the expected liquidation value given the information signal (eý/2). 
251 
Alternative models ofsecurityprice equilibrium I Chapter 8 RA. Courtenay 
The price equations clearly show that when the information received by the informed 
speculators in period one is not noiseless, the prices in periods one and two are 
influenced by the measure of these investors in the market ([t). This two-feedback- 
type case does not readily provide clear-cut results. We can, however, say the 
following: 
Result 8.9: Under noisy information, and with competitive speculators and informed 
passive investors, prices will be at theirfundamental levels in the absence offeedback 
trading. 
Delayedfeedback 
When there is a lag between price changes and feedback trading (8 = 0) the market 
prices are as follows: 
cce (Vic 4 
(1 - ýL) + 
2CT 2 ýL) 
Cr 




The following result is immediately apparent: 
Result 8.10: Under noisy information, and with competitive speculators and delayed 
feedback, the magnitudes of the prices in both periods are positively related to the 
value estimate of the passive investors in period one. 
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This gives another result: 
Result 8.11: Under noisy information, and with competitive speculators and delayed 
feedback increases in the informedness of the passive investors are strongly 
destabilising. 
In the appendix (173.3.3) we prove the following: 
Result 8.12: Under noisy information, and with delayed feedback and informed 
passive investors, the presence of competitive speculators is always strongly 
destabilising. 
In the appendix (F3.3.2) we also show that when the passive investors are not 
informed, the condition for strong destabilisation is as given in De Long et. al. 
(1990a, expression 21). In this scenario, increasing the measure of speculators in the 
market (ýt) initiallY moves the period one price towards the fundamental value from 
below; and always moves the period two price away from fundamentals. Increasing 
the measure of speculators in the market is therefore not always strongly destabilising 
under our definition of the term when the passive investors are uninformed, although 
we can say the following: 
Result 8.13: Under noisy information, and with delayed feedback and uninformed 
passive investors, the presence of competitive speculators leads to a greater degree of 
price fluctuation over the period as a whole, causing prices to fluctuate more. 
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As De Long et. al. acknowledge, for the case of uninformed passive investors, 
provided that beta exceeds half the value of alpha there exists a value for the measure 
of speculators in the market above which additional speculators will move the price 
further away from fundamentals than it would have been in the absence of 
speculators. 
Combining results 8.12 and 8.13 gives a further result: 
Result 8.14: Under noisy information, and with competitive speculators and delayed 
feedback the presence of competitive speculators leads to a greater degree ofprice 
fluctuation over the period as a whole (regardless of the level of informedness of the 
passive investors). 
The price in each period will have the same sign as the liquidation-value signal. We 
show in the appendix (F3.3.5) that this implies the following result: 
Result 8.15: Under noisy information, and with delayed feedback, an increase in the 
measure of competitive speculators in the market (ýQ increases the magnitudes of the 
prices in both periods one and two. 
In the appendix (173.3.6) we also prove the following: 
Result & 16: Under noisy information, and with competitive speculators and delayed 
feedback, the prices in both periods one and two are positively related to the degree 
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offeedback trading (P). Prices will become unbounded at a finite level of positive 
ftedback activity. 
Immediatefeedback 
When the feedback trading reacts immediately to price changes (P = 0) there is an 
inverse relationship between the prices in periods one and two, the size of which 
depends on the strength of the positive feedback trading. Further analysis of this case 
is rather less straightforward than for the case of delayed feedback trading, and does 
not yield results sufficiently tractable for our purposes. We will therefore resort to 
numerical examples. The examples below are sufficient to validate the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 8.1: Under noisy information, and with immediate feedback trading, the 
introduction of competitive speculators can destabilise prices whether or not the 
passive investors are informed in period one. 
In the first example the passive investors are assumed to be informed in period one, 
and the model parameters used are as given in table 8.3. The market prices with and 
without competitive speculators are shown in figure 8.1. 
Table 8.3: Parameter valuesfor example #1. 
a 6 9 cI (D 
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Fig. 83: Price with informed P. Ls, noisy info. & no delayedfeedback 
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The second example demonstrates that the impact of competitive speculators when 
the passive investors are uninformed in period one - as is assumed in De Long et. al. 
(1990) - can be destabilising. The parameters used are given in table 8.4, and the 
resulting prices are shown in figure 8.2. 
Table 8.4: Parameter valuesfor example #2. 
11 
0.5 0.9 +I 1 0.5 
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Fig. 8.2: Price with uninformed P. Ls, noisy info. & no delayedfeedback 
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These show that even if positive feedback traders respond only to current price 
changes, rational informed speculation can destabilise prices. This result contrasts 
with the conclusion drawn in footnote six of De Long et. al. (1990a) which reads: 
"Our working paper version.... shows that it is the responsiveness of positive 
feedback traders to past price changes - the coefficient P- and not the 
responsiveness of demand to current price changes that leads to the possibility 
of destabilizing rational speculation. " (p. 385) 
We have shown that, although the above conclusion is valid for the model contained 
in De Long et. al. (1989), it is not transferable to the later work, and so the 
simplification of allowing delta to be zero is not as benign as it is portrayed. 
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8.5 Price comparison: competition versus monopoly 
We have already seen that in this model the introduction of competitive speculators 
may move prices away from fundamentals; but this does not tell us whether or not 
prices will be closer to fundamentals when the speculators are competitive than they 
would be if they had market power. In this section we will compare the situations 
with monopolistic and competitive speculators. 
In order to be able to compare the results, we must make the effective 'size' in the 
market of the three groups the same for each case. This only poses a problem for the 
rational speculators. We can think of the monopolist as the figurehead of a cartel 
consisting of colluding speculators. If the cartel was unable to affect market prices, 
the individual speculators would wish to demand the same amounts each as they 
would acting individually. To achieve the desired specification, we need only to set 
the period two demand of a monopolistic speculator that ignores the effect his 
demand has on prices equal to the aggregate demand from speculators acting 
competitively, and solve for the coefficient of risk-aversion for the monopolist. This 
produces the following: 
(1) -A (D -A 
2y 
. (T 
2 2y a2 
(8.15) 
rn 
The remainder of this section consists of a numerical example that is sufficient to 
validate the following proposition: 
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Proposition 8.2: Competitive speculation can be more destabilising than monopolistic 
speculation, for the same degree of market power, regardless of whether or not the 
passive investors are informed in period one. 
The parameter values used in the example are given in table 8.5. 
Table 8.5: Parameter valuesfor example 3. 
yc I (y, 1 (1) 
0.5 -0.1 11 
---0.5 
1 11 
Figure 8.3 shows the resulting market prices under the different assumptions of 
speculative behaviour when information is noiseless and the passive investors are 
uninformed in period one. The relative instability of prices in the presence of 
competitive speculators is clearly illustrated. 
Fig. &3: Price comparison, competition vs. monopoly. CV 
2.5 
2 --------------- -------------- 
1.5 ----------- ------------ ------- -- ------- 
-------- ---- -------------- 




-o- No speculators. Competitive speculators, -N- Monopolistic specUla r. 
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Table 8.6 gives the profits for each of the agent groups as a whole, for the above 
example. It also gives the 'standardised' profit, which is simply the group profit 
divided by the measure of that group in the market, and could be thought of as 
indicating the relative profit per investor. 
Table 8.6: Profits under example #3. 
Competitive Monopolistic / collusive 
, 
Group Standardised Group Standardised 
Feedback traders. -1 -1 -0.39 -0.39 
Passive investors. 0.9 1 -0.13 -0.15 
Speculators. 0.1 1 0.53 5.25 
This clearly shows that, although the monopolistic behaviour causes prices to 
fluctuate less, it dramatically increases the profits of the speculators: in this example, 
collusion allows the speculators to increase their profits five-fold. This increase in 
profits comes solely at the expense of the passive investors, with the feedback traders 
actually benefiting significantly. The losses of the passive investors highlight the 
failing of their rationality. 
8.6 Conclusions 
8.6.1 General conclusions 
We have seen (results 8.1 & 8.2) that in a system in which shocks hit the system, 
speculation can be profitable when speculation that disturbs the steady state of an 
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otherwise identical system would not be. This shows that, with new information and 
demand shocks impacting the market all the time, the scope for speculation may 
actually be greater than that implied by the Hart (1977) analysis. We have seen 
(proposition 8.1 and example) that the addition of competitive speculators to a system 
in which positive feedback trader demand reacts immediately to price changes can be 
destabilising. This contradicts an assertion made in De Long et. al. (1990). 
Perhaps the most interesting conclusion (proposition 8.2 and example) is that 
competitive speculation may be more destabilising than monopolistic speculation, 
keeping the market power of the speculators constant: this tells us that collusion 
between speculators may actually exert a stabilising influence on market prices. 
8.6.2 Conclusions from the competitive equilibria 
There are a number of conclusions we can draw about the market behaviour in the 
presence of competitive speculators. 
Increasing the measure ofspeculators in the market. 
Under the assumption of noiseless information, result 8.5 revealed that the prices are 
not affected by changes in the measure of the rational speculators in the market 
relative to passive investors (ýt), providing this measure remains positive: the price 
function jumps discontinuously as the measure of rational speculators becomes 
positive, then remains unchanged as the measure increases further. 
261 
Alternative models ofsecurity price equilihrium / Chapter 8 R. A. Courtenay 
Under the assumption of noisy information we saw (result 8.15) that when there is no 
fast-acting feedback (8 = 0) an increase in the measure of speculators in the market 
increases the magnitude of the prices in periods one and two, and therefore causes 
prices to fluctuate more. The situation is less clear-cut when the feedback trading 
kicks in immediately, and the effect can work in both directions. 
It must be remembered that these results were obtained by keeping the measure of 
positive feedback traders in the market constant: we were in effect assuming that 
more and more passive investors begin to behave as speculators. The effects of 
increasing the joint measure of passive investors and competitive speculators can be 
found by reducing the size of the coefficients of positive feedback trading. Increasing 
the coefficient of feedback trading is equivalent to reducing the extent of speculation. 
Increasing the extent ofpositive feedback trading. 
Under the assumption of noiseless information, the price in each period equals the 
'fundamental' value ((D) when there is no delayed positive feedback trading (beta is 
zero), regardless of the degree of immediate feedback trading. As result 8.6 showed, 
once feedback trading develops, and the value of beta becomes positive, the period 
one and two prices rise, until, as beta approaches alpha, the magnitude of the 
equilibrium price becomes unbounded. 
Result 8.16 showed that under the assumption of noisy information, when the 
feedback trading is delayed (8 = 0), the prices in both periods are positively related to 
the degree of feedback trading (for a positive information signal), which means that a 
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marginal decrease in the feedback coefficient (P) leads to prices becoming more 
stable. Once again the situation when some feedback trading responds immediately to 
price changes (P = 0) is not straightforward to analyse. One thing we can say, 
following result 8.9, is that as the amount of positive feedback activity becomes 
fismall' in the context of the market as a whole, prices approach fundamental values 
when the passive investors are informed. 
The relative effects of the differentforms offeedback 
Under noiseless information, the prices are not affected by the degree of immediate 
positive feedback trading. This is because the equilibrium price is determined by the 
situation in period two, and, since the price change from period one to period two is 
zero, there is no channel through which immediate feedback can exert an influence. 
In the noiseless information case we could also see that, since the price fluctuation in 
the absence of speculators is positively related to the degree of immediate feedback 
trading, the destabilising effect of speculators is negatively related to immediate 
feedback, but positively related to delayed feedback: in fact, we can see from result 
8.7 that when more feedback is immediate than delayed (8 > P), the presence of 
competitive speculators is actually stabilising. 
Increasing the degree of informedness of the passive investors. 
Under noiseless information, the prices are not affected by the fundamental value 
estimate of the passive investors in period one. Result 8.10 showed that under noisy 
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information with delayed feedback, the price in both periods is positively related to 
the period one value estimate of the passive investors. 
Speculation in the absence of feedback traders is not profitable under noiseless 
information, since arbitrage keeps prices in line with fundamentals. Speculation in the 
absence of feedback traders is only profitable under noisy information when the 
passive investors are informationally disadvantaged in period one. When feedback 
traders are present, speculation is always profitable. This shows that the presence of 
uninformed passive investors is not a necessary requirement for profitable 
speculation, but is sufficient when information is noisy. The presence of feedback 
traders is a necessary and sufficient condition for profitable speculation when 
information is noiseless; and is a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for profitable 
speculation when information is noisy. 
8.6.3 Summary of the conclusions 
The main conclusions can be stated briefly as follows: 
* Demand and value shocks give additional scope for profitable speculation. 
* Competitive speculation may be more destabilising than monopolistic 
speculation. 
* Competitive speculation can be destabilising without delayed feedback. 
o Reducing delayed feedback increases price stability. 
* Delayed feedback is more destabilising than immediate feedback. 
* As feedback trading becomes small, prices become more stable. 
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* As the market power of speculators becomes large, prices become more 
stable. 
8.6.4 The destabilising effect of competitive speculation 
It is now time to see how the De Long et. al. claims of a destabilising effect of 
competitive speculation have stood up to our examination. 
De Long et. al. look at a world in which shocks hit the system. This makes it distinct 
from the shock-free situation in Hart (1977). In a world with shocks, the assumption 
of liquidation makes sense. We have seen that the informedness of the passive 
investors does not affect the conclusions concerning the destabilising effect of 
speculation: indeed, with infonned passive investors and delayed feedback, 
competitive speculation is guaranteed to be destabilising. 
De Long et. al. seems to provide a strong argument that competitive speculation in the 
lead-up to a shock can be destabilising, but this is with one proviso: which is that the 
competitive speculators are constrained to be present in the market in a fixed 
measure; or in other words, that they have a limited market power. Increases in the 
market power of competitive speculators will eventually lead to prices becoming 
more stable. 
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Appendix F: For Chapter 8 
F1 No speculators 
When the passive investors are uninformed in period one (VI = 0), the prices will be 
as follows: 
p1 =0 
ct(D p2 = 
-5 
(F 1) 
When the passive investors are noiselessly informed in period one (VI = (D), the prices 
are: 
(x(D Pi = 
-8 
P2 
+0 -28) U2+ ap - 2cc8 (D 
(F2) 
2 +82 ()t _8 
)2 2cc8 
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F2 Monopolistic speculator 
F2.1 Derivation of the period two price 
In period two, the monopolist maximises utility, given his demand in period one and 
his information set in period two. We have kept the De Long et. al. assumption of a 
mean-variance utility function, which in this case gives an expected utility in period 
two of the following: 




- P2)- 7 ns 
(2 
(F4) I'l 
(p2 - PI) + 
D2 D2 Iya 
The monopolist knows the level of demand from the other investor types. As before, 
the demand from the group of passive investors is given by a constant ((x) multiplied 
by the difference between the fundamental value estimate of this group and the price 
in this period (p2), and weighted by the measure of these agents in the market. 
Dp (1 -P2) 2' - 
4C ((D (F5) 
At this point it would be convenient to define a new term for the sake of expositional 
simplicity: 
(X. = (1 - ýt: (F6) 
The demand of the positive feedback traders under our assumption of zero delta is: 
Df = 2 
OPI (F7) 
Since in equilibrium the demand from the monopolist must be exactly 
counterbalanced by the demand from the other two agent types, the above demand 
267 
Alternative models ofsecurity price equilibrium lAppendix F R. A. Courtenay 
equations give us the relationship between the monopolist demand and the period two 
price. 





((t) - P2) - PPI 
Therefore: 
D2 + OPI 
+ (D (F9) 
cc . 
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The monopolist maximises this with respect to his period two demand to discover the 
utility-maximising level. 





Setting this equal to zero gives the following: 
D rni Dr"' - pp, 2 -"ý 
2(l + CC my Ina 
2 (F12) 
This expression can be simplified to: 
rill 
rni 
2 (F13) 2+% 
where: 
Xa 2a 7,,, a 
The second derivative of the utility function with respect to the period two demand is: 
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d'E(U) 2 2y 2<0 
(I 
m (dD2 Y 
(F14) 
Since this is always negative, we have found the level of demand that always 
maximises the expected utility of the monopolist. 
In period one there will be no demand from the positive feedback traders, so the 
market clearing condition is: 
D rnt I' = -Dip 
(FI5) 
We will again denote the fundamental value estimate of the passive investors in 
period i as Vi. The period one market clearing condition can now be written as: 
+ cc,,, (V, - pl) =0 (F16) 
or equivalently: 
+v (F17) a fit 
By combining equations F8, F12 and F15 the price in period two can now be 
expressed as a function of the price in period one, as in the main text. 
F2.2 Derivation of the period one price under noiseless information 
Under noiseless information, the rational speculators' certainty-equivalent wealth in 
period two (W2) is: 
D, 7,2 W. = DI )+D'((I)-P2)-Y ", 
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Since this certainty-equivalent wealth is known for certain in period one, the 
expectation of this in period one represents expected utility for the monopolist: 
_p, )+Dr»i«D_ )_y 
(Drit 2 E(UJI, )= EI 
ýDI7(P2 
2 p2 lpt 21 (F19) 
The price and monopolist demand in period two can be expressed in terms of the 







+ +Vlp(l+, % +(D 
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)I 
Substituting these into the expression for the expected utility gives the following: 
(Dj"" I- 
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( -cc., 3+2k)+ 
+I 
Di"'VI 
pIa,, (I+, %)+ p J+ Dr"'((D - VI) (F21) 22+ ani ( 
ß2v2 
2ct (2 + X) 









P {a (I + (D - V, 2 2+, %) am ( 
Setting this equal to zero gives us the following expression for the period one 
demand: 
)rm = 
Vict. ßlct (l+2, )+ ß}+cc, (2+2, »- VI) L, 
ß2 (F23) am 3+21)-2ctß(l+2, )- 
This gives an expression for the price in period one of the following: 
270 
Alternative models ofsecurityprice equilibrium lAppendix F R. A. Courtenay 
PI = 
V, 10{cc. 
(I+%)+P}+a. 2(2+, %X(D-VI) 
+ V, (F24) 
a'(3+2%)-2a .. 
P(l +, %)- P' 
This can be re-arranged to give the expression found in the main text. 
The second derivative of the utility function is: 
d'E(UII, ) 
= 
2a P(I + %)- a. 2 (3 + 2, %)+ p2 
rm 3 2+, %) 
(F25) 
(dDý' a, ( 
The sign of this follows the sign of the numerator, which can be re-written as: 
(P 2 
+2a. p -3cc. 
2 )+ 28a 
. 
(p - cc .) 
(F26) 
It is clear that both of the terms will be negative when the weighted alpha term (a,, ) 
exceeds beta, and positive when the opposite is true. Hence a necessary and sufficient 
condition for the expression for the period one demand given in the text to maximise 
expected utility is that weighted alpha exceeds beta. 
F2.3 Derivation of the period one price under noisy information 
Assume that the information signal is noisy in period one. The certainty-equivalent 
wealths for the two possible outcomes in period two of the mean of the liquidation 
value are as follows: 
(Dj""L 







Dl""(c -VI) 22 Ot no 
( 
ß2V2 
2ct, (2 + X) 
(F27) 
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2 (DI" )_ 
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The monoPolist maximises as follows: 
max Var ( Dr 
ý(W21,1)-Y 
tit 
W2 II (F3 1) 
The first derivative is: 
DI' 










XI + 7. )+ ß' l+ ý- - v. UM 22 
Setting this equal to zero and re-arranging gives the following expression for demand: 
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2 (2 +XV, 2V 
76 2CC 
32 12a,,, p (I + X) _ CC ", 
2 p2V, 
" 
(2 + X) (3+2, %)+ 
(F33) 
(F34) 
This can be re-arranged to give the following: 
p1= 
cc., ýjc'y a'(2+%)+ca. (2+?, )-2V, (a. + P (I+, %)) (F35) 
232+2, )- 2ý2ct. ß(1 + 2, )-ct, 2(3 + 2X)+ ß 
The second derivative of expected utility with respect to the period one demand is as 
follows: 
d2 2a. D(I+%)-a .2 (3+2%)+ p2 Hie 
2 
(F36) 3 2+%) 2 d (DI"" ant ( 
A comparison of this with the corresponding expression for the case of a noiseless 
information signal shows that a sufficient condition for it to be negative is that 
weighted alpha exceeds beta. The condition for a maximum can be written as: 
(I+ X)_ CC 1112(3 
2a 
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F3 Competitive speculators 
F3.1 Noiseless information 
F3.1.1 Derivation of equilibrium marketprices. 
Since the rational investors are atornistic, they are correct in thinking that they have 
no power to influence the equilibrium market prices, and so take them as given. They 
maximise their expected utility, which is as follows: 
fDrc(P 
_PI)+Drc«D+o _P, 




=DIJ P2-PI)+D2 -P2)-y 
rc ( r 
Hence the derivative with respect to the period two rational agent demand is: 
(1) -A- 2yD2' (T 
2 
OD2' (F39) 
Setting this equal to zero gives the expression for demand found in the main text. The 







Since this is always negative, we know that a maximum has been found. 
In equilibrium, the stock demand must equal the stock supply - which is assumed to 
be net zero for convenience - so the sum of the demand from the three investor types 
must be zero. 
gD2' +(I-[t)D2' f 22 rc P =-D2 
C (D-P2)= -((P -8)PI +8P2)=-PP2 
(F41) 
From this we can derive the price expressions given in the main text. 
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F3.1.2 Informedpassive investors. 
Comparison with equation 8.4 reveals that when passive investors are informed in 
period one, the price in period one when speculators are present will be further from 
the fundamental value when beta exceeds delta. 
In the absence of rational speculators, the price in period two will exceed the 
liquidation value when the following condition holds: 
a(D (a +p -28)> (D 
=*(oc-5y <(X{(a-8)+(P-8)1 
=> CC 
2- 2(x8 +82 <()C2 -2a8 +ap 
<a 
(F42) 
A sufficient condition for this to hold is that beta exceeds delta. When the price in 
period two in the absence of rational speculators exceeds the liquidation value, the 
condition for the presence of rational speculators to move prices further away from 
fundamentals is the following: 
(x(D > (x(D (a +p -28) a-P (CC -8), 
=: > (oc - 8y > (a - PAOC - 8)+ (p - 01 
=- a' -M +8' > (Cc 
2_ 
a8 -CEP + P8) (F43) 
+(p+ a 
p2- 2P8 +82 >0 
> 
This shows that a sufficient condition for the price in period two to be further away 
from fundamentals in period two when rational speculators are present is that beta 
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exceeds delta. We can therefore say that a sufficient condition for the presence of 
speculators to be strongly destabilising when passive investors are informed in period 
one is that beta exceeds delta, or in other words that the strength of the delayed 
feedback exceeds that of the immediate feedback. 
F3.1.3 Uninformedpassive investors. 
Comparison of the prices given above with equation 8.4 reveals that when passive 
investors are uninfonned in period one, the price in period two when speculators are 
present will be further from the fundamental value when beta exceeds delta. 
The price in period one would be zero in the absence of rational speculators. The 
condition for the price to be further from fundamentals when rational speculators are 
present is therefore that it exceeds twice the fundamental value: 





Combining the conditions for the two periods reveals that when passive investors are 
informed in period one the presence of speculators will be strongly destabilising when 
beta exceeds both delta and half the value of alpha. 
F3.2 Noisy information, general case 
The alternative market-clearing conditions for period two are: 
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c P2a 8)PI + 8P2a 
- ()CP2b = -(P -8 
)PI + 8P2b 
(F45) 
These give the relationship between the price in period two and that in period one for 
each of the possible outcomes, which can be expressed more clearly as: 





The period one market-clearing condition becomes: 
ý01' + (I - ýt)xDjp + DIf = 
[tD, ' + (1 - ýtýc Vý - 
!, l) + 8p. =0 
(F47) 
As for the case of noiseless information, the rational investor demand in period two 
will be as follows: 
D ro (D A 2 2ya 2 =(x((D-P2) 
(F48) 
The certainty-equivalent wealths for the two possible states are: 
P2a rc 6, -P2a)- 7D2 a2 
W2a 




P2a)_ 7 (P2a -A+ P2a 2a 
2 (F49) 









The expected value of the period two certain equivalent wealth and its variance in 
period one are given by the following relationships: 
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The expected utility of the rational speculators is given by: 
E(Ulr., )= E(WIPýyVar(W2 JE 4) 
Differentiating this with respect to the period one demand gives: 
-, - 
CLY 2_ (P2bY 





7 D11rc (P2 
a- P2 h)2+ 
P2a + P2h 
22 
Setting this equal to zero gives us the following expression for the rational speculator 
demand: 
The period one market clearing condition is: 
P2a + P2b 




ha - P2b Y (P2a - P2b) 2 
P2a + P2b 




Ct (P2a + P2b 
7 (P2a 
- P2h) 
22 (P2a -P2h) 2 
2 
ý01' + (I - ýt)x (VI - pl) + 8p, =0 (F54) 





Solving this simultaneously with the expression for demand, and substituting in for 
the period two demands gives an expression for the period one price of- 
ac, 
2 
'o 2V, F, oa(a_8Xl_[, 
)+R(4a2(CC_8y_82F 2) 
CCEý2( CC -8y(I-R)+R(ot-(P+8)X4CF2(ot_8y_a8C42 
(F55) 
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The second derivative of the expected utility function with respect to the rational 
speculator period one demand is: 
a2 E(Uls 4 
=-y 
(P2a-P2h) 2 
a (DI - 
(F56) 
Since this is always negative, the above price always corresponds to rational 
speculator maximising behaviour. 
F3.3 Special case: delayed positive feedback 
F3.3.1 The condition for the period one price to exceed the fundamental value 
estimate o the passive investors. )f 
This condition is one we have seen before: 
VI < 
Cý cc 
2 (a -P) 
(F57) 
and is satisfied for our both our 'informed' and 'uninformed' assumptions, hence the 
result given in the main text. 
F3.3.2 Uninformedpassive investors. 
In the absence of speculators, and with no immediate feedback, the price in period 
two will equal the liquidation value when passive investors are uninformed in period 
one. Since the price in period one in the absence of speculators will be zero, and the 
price in period one in their presence will be greater than the fundamental value, the 
issue of whether or not speculation is destabilising therefore depends on whether or 
not the price in the presence of speculators is greater than twice the fundamental 
value: 
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aý (Vjý (I - ýL) + 
2Cr 2ýt) 
()Cý 21_ [L)+4Cr 
2 ý, a 
(F58) 
This can be re-arranged to fonn the condition, given in De Long et. al. (1990a, 
expression 2 1): 1 
2cy 0 2 
tl 
- 2( (F59) 
F3.3.3 Informedpassive investors. 
In the absence of speculators, and with no inunediate feedback, the price in period 
one will equal the fundamental value when passive investors are informed in period 
one, and will exceed the liquidation value in period two, and so the presence of 
speculators will be strongly destabilising when the price in period two in the presence 








We have already seen that this always holds (F3.3.1), and so we can say that when the 
passive investors are informed in period one the presence of speculators is strongly 
destabilising. 
F3.3.4 Market prices in the absence offeedback traders. 
The price in period one will equal the following: 
1 Since ý2 = ý2. 
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c, 2VF., (I-ýt)+4cr'g F- 0 for V, :: ý 
c0 
A2 
602(1_ g)+4cr'[t 22 (F61) 
V, Co implies p, = 22 
The price in period two will be equal the liquidation value, and so when there is no 
feedback trading the price will equal its fundamental value at all times provided that 
the passive investors are not informationally disadvantaged. 
F3.3.5 Varying the measure of informed speculators. 
The derivative of the period one price with respect to the measure of informed 
speculators in the market is given by: 
ap, = 
2co 2(y 2()t 
(C 
0()C - 2V, (oc - P)) 
ag 14 ýt(y 2 (CC + ar 2 (1 _ ýt) 
2 (F62) 
This is positive for 0: 5 V, <6ý, which encompasses our cases of informed and 2 
I 
CO 
uninformed passive investors. It is negative for -: -: 5 V, :50. These results, combined 2 
with the fact that the price in each period has the same sign as the liquidation value 
signal, indicate that an increase in the measure of speculators will increase the 
magnitude of price in period one, and consequently the price in period two as well. 
F3.3.6 Varying the degree offeedback trading. 
The rate of change of the price in period one with respect to an increase in the degree 
of feedback trading is as follows: 
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ýt) + 4(y 
2p (CC 
This is always positive (for a non-negative passive investor value estimate), and so 
proves the result given in the main text. The price in period one will equal the true 
fundamental value of the stock when beta is of the following magnitude: 
=co(co -2V, 
)-TaF(I-[L) gives p, = 
co 
cr ýt 2 
(F64) 
Further increases in beta continue to increase the price in period one, until this price 
becomes unbounded at the following level of beta: 
=CC I+ 
F-I (1 0 
gives p, = oo (F65) 4cr ' ýt 
I 
This clearly shows that, unlike the case with noiseless information, the price does not 
become unbounded when beta equals alpha, but at a value of beta greater than this. 
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Appendix G: For Chapter 8 
G1 Monopolistic speculator and noisy information 
When the information concerning the liquidation value is noisy, the certainty- 
equivalent wealths for the two possible outcomes in period two of the mean of the 
liquidation value are as follows: 
WI= 
(DI" Lf2o, 
p (I + ot 
H12 
(3 
+2%)+ p2 2a 2am 3(2+ %) n' 
I 
+. 
Di"VI (cc (I ++ DI"" V, 
(X 
m2 







12ot P(I+, %)-ot 23 +2%)+ p2 W2 b 2oc 3 2+%) 
Mi 
+ 
DI' V, {, Cc (I ++ DI"" V, (G2) 2 2+%) aM ( 
p2v2 
2cc,,, (2 + 





(I + %) _ CC n#2 
p2 
2a 32+ %) 





Ia., p(l + %)+ P2 J+ Djr Vý) 
CC no 
(2 
2 V, 2 
2a, (2 + X) 
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2 
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The monoPolist maximises as follows: 
max.. ý(W21I, )-y . Var(W2 
I I, )} 
The first derivative is: 
djj 
= 
DI" {2a"ip 2 (3+2, %)+ p2 
dDp7n CC M3 2+, %) I 
Setting this equal to zero gives the following expression for demand: 
2a. 
fV. la. p(1+%)+ p2}+ CC . 
2(2+ E- V. 
) I 
D' = 
ye2a. 3 2+ %)_a. 2 
42 
p2 %)-212ccp(l+ (3+2, %)+ 1 
The equilibrium price is therefore: 
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This can be re-arranged to give the following: 
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a. r le 
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Comparing with the corresponding expression for the case of a noiseless information 
signal shows that a sufficient condition for this to be negative is that alpha exceeds 











p (1 (3+2, %)+ -2 
G2 Adding a demand shock to 
competitive speculators 
G2.1 Model structure 
(Gil) 
a model with 
Assume that in period two the feedback traders provide a demand shock of N. ' The 
feedback demand therefore takes the following form: 
Dif =8 (PI - PO) = 8p, 
D2'f =P(P, -Po)+8(P2-pl)+N 
- 8)(PI - PO)+ 8 (P2 - po)+ N 
-8)PI +8P2 +N 
The prices in the absence of speculators will therefore be as follows: 
- Pi =5 
I a(D +N P2 = 
CC(p -8)V'+ 
(a -8y a 
(G12) 
(G13) 
We again assume that information concerning the demand shock can be either 
noiseless or noisy, in the way given in the table below. For the case of noisy 
1 In De Long et. al. (1989) this is represented as ; ýý - 
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information, we assume that the structure resembles that for the mean of the 
liquidation value, with the outcome taking one of three possible values (-v, 0, v), and 
the signal one of two (-v or v). This is illustrated in table GI. 
Table Gl: Demand shock 
Demand shock signal Demand shock (N). 
Noiseless info. Noisy info. 
v v0 or v; 1/2 
0 0 n. a. 
-V -V 0 or -v; 1/2 
G2.2 Noiseless information 
The price in periods one and two when information is noiseless is as follows: 
A =P2 = 
a(D +N for ýt >0 (G14) 
a-P 
G2.3 Noisy information 
We will assume that the information about fundamentals is also noisy. The alternative 
market-clearing conditions for period two are: 
(1 E -P2a)ý-«ß-8)Pl +ÖP2a +EI) 
P2b -«ß - 5)Pl + 8P2b 
(G15) 
- ÜLP2C «ý -«ß -8 
)PI + 5P2C +F, 
v) 
-UP2d «*: " -«ß -ö)p, +ÖP2d) 
These give the relationship between the price in period two and that in period one for 
each of the possible outcomes, which can be expressed more clearly as: 
P2a 
-8)p, +(Xe+ +EV 
a -5 
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The period one market-clearing condition becomes: 
ý01' + (I - [t)cxD, ' + DIf = 
(G17) 
ý0, ` + (I - ýt)x 
(V, 
-+ 8p, =0 
As for the case of noiseless information, the rational investor demand in period two 
will be as follows: 
D rill = 
(1) -A= (X 2 27cr 2 
((D-P2) (G18) 
The certainty-equivalent wealths for the four possible states are: 
22 
W. = DI' Drc 
) cy 0 2a P2a - Pl)+ D2rca P2a 
)- 7( 2a 
22 
a -P2a) DI (P2a -A+ P2a 2a 
2 
P2a) 
PC A (P2a -A+2 
(G19) 
W2 












The expected value of the period two certain equivalent wealth and its variance in 
period one are given by the following relationships: 
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W2a + w2h + W2c + W2d 
4 
Va+21e4lev W2/- E(W216ý lev)) i=a 
)41( 
The expected utility of the rational speculators is given by: 
E(Ujs e, c, 





Taking the derivative of this with respect to the period one demand and setting this 
equal to zero provides one equation in terms of period one price and rational 
speculator demand. The period one market clearing condition provides a second 
equation: 
[tD, ' +0- Ou (vi - pi )+ 5p, =0 (G22) 
Substituting in the relationships between the period two and period one prices and 
solving gives a value for the period one price of. 
_5XI a2(CCE4 +E"X a 2VI 
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G2.4 Special case: supply shock only 
The fundamental value of the stock is zero at all times, and so the deviation of the 











2(oc -8) for ýL >0 
a +( ,f 
2(a -5) cc a_0 
9v -I cc -81 
pI= 
0 for [t = 
(G25) 
The price in period one will always be zero when rational speculators are absent, so 
the price will be further from fundamentals when they are present. However, the total 
price fluctuation when rational speculators are present will be the same as when they 
are absent in the event that beta equals delta, and will only be greater when beta 
exceeds delta. 
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion 
9.1 General remarks 
The failure of existing models in the finance literature to take account of the high 
degree of uncertainty surrounding the determinants of underlying value and the lack 
of information that prevents many investors from fulfilling the requirements of the 
rational expectations literature, has led to an inability to adequately explain certain 
aspects of market behaviour, such as crashes. In this thesis we have focused on 
investigating the consequences of relaxing some of the relatively strict informational 
assumptions made in the literature. 
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We began with a relatively broad investigation of the art of model-building, focusing 
particularly on the importance of the assumptions regarding liquidity- and noise- 
traders. In chapter two we constructed, from the framework of Hellwig (1980), an 
information aggregation model in which each investor receives information about 
only one of the factors that detennine the payoff, and showed that with no 
improvement in information quality the informativeness of the price is necessarily 
reduced as the number of factors is increased, and that there is a finite limit to the 
number of factors beyond which improvements in information quality generated by 
the specialisation cannot offset this effect. This shows that the way in which 
information is distributed in an economy is important in determining the ability of 
prices to aggregate information, and that this is therefore not determined solely by the 
quality of the individual pieces of information available and investor characteristics. 
We found that the model structure has similarities with the A. P. T. -based model of 
Handa & Linn (1991); but its motivation, and the use to which it has been put, differs 
significantly. 
In chapter three, we constructed a model, again based on Hellwig (1980), in which the 
investors have private information about the extent of liquidity trading. This is the 
first model in the information aggregation literature that has investigated the 
consequences of the price aggregating more than one distinct type of information. We 
showed that such a structure can lead to multiple equilibria and price crashes. These 
results did not rely on adverse selection, as in Wilson (1980), or the presence of 
portfolio insurers, as in Gennotte & Leland (1990), and so provide the first illustration 
of such a possibility for seasoned-equity markets. 
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In chapter four we developed the model presented in chapter three, in a similar 
manner to the way Verrecchia (1982) developed the model of Hellwig (1980), and 
showed that multiple equilibria can still exist, and crashes still occur, when 
information acquisition is made endogenous. We also found that for certain 
specifications of the cost function the overall quality of the infonnation acquired is 
independent of the cost of information about liquidity trading. The former result 
supports the results of chapter three by showing that the key results remain when the 
model is made more realistic. The latter result, although dependent on the particular 
specification of the cost function, indicates that the availability of infonnation about 
underlying value plays the dominant role in determining the character of prices. 
In chapter five we began to look at the implications of the presence in the market of 
what could be classed as 'naive' investors, who perhaps do not fulfil the requirements 
for rationality of the rational expectations literature. We started by looking at (and 
developing) the simple 'smart-money' model of Shiller (1984) in which the stock 
demand from naive investors affects prices via the required return of the smart 
investors. It was shown that when short-selling is restricted, bubbles and subsequent 
crashes can occur as a result of smart money taking advantage of temporary increases 
in demand from naive investors to buy on an upswing and sell out at or near the top. 
We then went on to look at models from the literature that incorporate naive investors 
whose demand is a function of present and/or past prices, focusing particularly on 
Hart (1977), and found that the scope for profitable destabilising speculation is 
heavily dependent on the nature of the naive investor behaviour. 
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In chapter six we brought together various pieces of evidence - anecdotal, theoretical 
and empirical - that suggest that positive feedback trading may be a feature of naive 
investor behaviour. The evidence ranged from the existence of trading rules resulting 
from portfolio insurance and chartism, through trading on noise and psychological 
factors, to historical episodes of bubbles and market manipulations. This evidence was 
extremely important in determining the credibility of the work in chapter seven. 
In chapter seven we looked at the link between the extent of positive feedback trading 
and destabilising manipulation in the presence of unsophisticated value-seeking 
investors. Using the results of Hart (1977) and the specification of naive investors 
given by De Long et. al. (1990a), we found a rich variation in the types of market 
behaviour and the potential for manipulation that can occur with different levels and 
types of positive feedback trading. It thus appears that the effect of positive feedback 
trading is heavily dependent on the precise nature of the market structure, again 
indicating that such behaviour will be difficult to discern empirically. 
Chapter seven concludes with an example, based on the speculator behaviour in the 
counter-example to Friedman (1953) given by Baumol (1957), that shows how 
manipulation can be both destabilising and profitable under the appropriate 
conditions. This model was not meant to describe accurately the general nature of 
stock price movements, but it does indicate a type of behaviour that may become 
profitable as conditions in the market change, and so may prevail for a short time 
before observed by others. It may be more generally relevant for individual stocks at 
times of high levels of positive feedback activity, such as in strong bull markets. 
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Provided that their market power is not unlimited, competition between manipulators 
may not completely eliminate this type of behaviour, although there will be a strong 
disincentive to create the initial price disturbance, and so there may be more reliance 
on reacting to exogenous shocks. 
In chapter eight we used the De Long, Shleifer, Summers & Waldmann. (1989,1990a) 
framework to investigate further the implications of positive feedback trading, this 
time in the presence of exogenous shocks. We also attempted to assess, in the light of 
previous chapters, the De Long et. al. conclusion that competitive speculation can be 
destabilising, and found that in the presence of shocks there is greater scope for 
manipulation than there would be otherwise. We also found that the presence of a 
positive feedback from prices to demand that occurs after a delay is more destabilising 
than one that kicks in immediately. Increases in the extent of speculation were shown 
to be stabilising as the market power of speculators increases beyond a certain point, 
and so there is support for both opponents and proponents of the Friedman position. 
Perhaps the most surprising result is that competitive speculation can be more 
destabilising than monopolistic speculation. 
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9.2 Suggestions for future research 
9.2.1 General comments 
This thesis demonstrates that there is much work still to be done in assessing the 
impact of the nature of information on stock prices, and in modelling the behaviour of 
uninformed investors. The modelling of positive feedback trading in the latter part of 
the thesis is necessarily crude, given the state of our knowledge and the available 
modelling technology, and this illustrates that there is ample scope for future research 
in these areas. More work needs to be done in dealing appropriately with the 
uncertainty present in the real world, and with the bounded rationality of investors 
who do not have the level of information assumed in rational expectations 
frameworks. There must be scope for integrating psychological factors, including 
contagion, into more rigorous frameworks. Until these factors are addressed, models 
will continue only to partially reflect reality. 
On a more specific level, we have discovered the need for a multi-period information 
aggregation framework that does not rule out multiple equilibria in its construction, 
and more sophisticated ways of modelling the presence of positive feedback trading. 
9.2.2 Specific models 
During the course of this research a number of modelling ideas came to light that were 
not pursued. We outline some of these below. 
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Restricting common knowledge. 
One way in which a lack of common knowledge can be important is through 
uncertainty about the infonnation that has already been incorporated into the price. 
Indeed, investors acting on information that has already been incorporated into the 
price are the 'noise traders' of Black (1986). It may be possible in an information 
aggregation framework to introduce uncertainty about the proportion of investors who 
have received an information signal; or perhaps even uncertainty about the timeliness 
of information individual investors have received. 
Introducing differences in priors. 
Differences in priors could be introduced in an information aggregation framework, 
and could provide results to compare with those of Pfleiderer (1984) who looks at 
changes in the quality of information, and Holthausen. & Verrecchia (1990) who look 
at the effects of changes in informedness and consensus, both under the common prior 
assumption. As with Harrison & Kreps, it must be clear that the differences in prior 
beliefs are robust to the sharing of information in such a sophisticated model of 
learning from prices. It is anticipated that the information aggregation framework 
would be robust to such a generalisation: a simple possibility could be that there are 
two groups of agents each with their own estimate of the mean value of the liquidating 
payoff. 
Endogenous stock supply. 
Following the spirit of Chatterjea, Cherian & Jarrow (1993), we could allow the 
corporations to which the stock relates to time their decisions concerning the issuing 
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of new stock and repurchasing of stock already outstanding in a framework similar to 
Shiller (1984). The variations in the return resulting from fluctuations in the holdings 
of uninformed investors ensure that such timing will enhance corporate value. 
9.3 Final comments 
In extending the information aggregation literature by adding information about the 
trading of noise traders, we have revealed some of the problems stock market prices 
will have in aggregating more than one type of information, and provided results that 
are consistent with empirical evidence such as 'excess' volatility and the occurrence 
of crashes. The evidence we found in chapter two, of the difficulty prices will have in 
aggregating information when this is dispersed more widely amongst agents, is 
consistent with the observation that prices do not accurately reflect the aggregate 
stock of information present in the economy. These results indicate the benefits that 
can be gained from relaxing assumptions in realistic ways. 
The modelling of positive feedback trading we carried out in the latter half of the 
thesis is perhaps a first step in assessing the susceptibility of markets to manipulation, 
and the underlying structure that allows this to be profitable. The result that 
monopolistic manipulation may be less destabilising that competitive speculation is an 
interesting one, and deserves further investigation. 
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